
Class \ ]A\Z 



Book 



L 



Hds 




KINO GEORGE V. OE GREAT BRITAIN AND IRELAND 
TSAR NICHOLAS II. OF RUSSIA 



SOVEREIGNS 
and STATESMEN 

OF EUROPE 



BY 



10 7£ 



Princess Catherine Radziwill 



Author of 

"Memories of Forty Years" 

"The Royal Marriage Market," etc., etc. 



With Eight Photogravure Illustrations 




FUNK & WAGNALLS COMPANY 

New York 

1916 



.7 






1 



CONTENTS 





Introduction . 


ix 


1. 


Russia ...... 


1 


2. 


France ...... 


42 


3. 


Austria ..... 


72 


4. 


Bulgaria and Servia 


. Ill 


5. 


Belgium and Greece 


. 144 


6. 


Italy ..... 


. 164 


7. 


Turkey ..... 


. 194 


8. 


Germany ..... 


. 208 


9. 


England ..... 


. 233 


10. 


Good-bye ...... 


. 249 




Index ...... 


. 255 



LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS 



King George V. of Great Britain and Ireland and 

Tsar Nicholas II. of Russia . . Frontispiece 

Signor A. Salandra . 

M. J. L. Goremykin . 



M. Raymond Poincare, President 
Republic .... 



of the French 



Ferdinand I., Tsar of Bulgaria 
Albert I., King of the Belgians 
Victor Emmanuel, King of Italy 
William II., German Emperor . 
The Right Hon. H. H. Asquith 
M. Rene Viviani 



FACING PAGE 

32 



32 

62 
140 
148 
170 
212 
244 
244 



INTRODUCTION 

SOMEONE has remarked, with little truth and 
possibly as little wit, that in the twentieth century 
sovereigns are but a relic of a bygone age, and states- 
men of problematic use now that we have the telegraph 
and telephone. 

One has only to remember that the greatest war the 
world has ever seen was brought about by the will of 
ruling monarchs, and to observe how sovereigns personally 
have been leading their peoples in the crises that have 
arisen since Germany threw the gauntlet in the face of 
the civilised world, to become convinced of the falsity of 
such a straining after epigram. 

Monarchs have become once more the arbiters of 
the destinies of their peoples by exercising their power 
and personal initiative to a far greater extent than any 
sovereign has been called upon to do since the Franco- 
Prussian War of 1870. During this last couple of years, 
too, diplomatists and statesmen — far more than Parlia- 
ments and people — have had to make momentous decisions 
on their own responsibility with a finality that allowed no 
time for redeeming mistakes. 

I do not think that I am claiming too much in saying 
that when the terms of that peace for which the whole 



x Introduction 

world is longing will have to be discussed, this personal 
initiative is sure to become even more important. It 
seems to me, therefore, that those who will have to stand 
before history as responsible for that peace deserve to be 
described and their characters to be studied. 

Modern statesmen are very painstaking individuals ; 
good workers for the most part, and honest men without 
doubt, but, if I am to speak quite frankly, I cannot find 
anywhere, except in England, diplomats of transcending 
genius. 

I feel convinced that Britain will take the lead in the 
settlement ; and as one of Russian birth I have the 
greater liberty to say that I believe British statesmen 
most fully possess the wisdom, political knowledge, and 
fine sense of proportion necessary to give the balanced 
consideration which comes of a long-sighted vision to the 
arduous and complicated questions which will arise at 
every step and turn. 

Britain is the only country that had no need to fight. 
She took up the sword for the sake of a principle and out 
of respect for her own signature. Her chivalry in main- 
taining the rights of Belgium has assigned to her the 
foremost place in Europe, and most certainly has given 
her the moral as well as the material right to have a 
leading voice in future negotiations. 

CATHERINE KOLB-DANVIN 

(Princess Catherine Radziwill). 



Sovereigns and Statesmen of 
Europe 



RUSSIA 

FOR the reason that my own native land of Russia 
lies nearest my heart it is my wish to start these 
pages, which tell of the political leaders of Europe, with 
those of the Great White Land over which the Romanoffs 
hold sway. The outstanding political personality in Holy 
Russia is the Tsar. 

Nicholas II. has been a cruelly maligned man. Few 
sovereigns have had such terrible responsibilities to face, 
few have found themselves obliged to fight against such 
enormous odds as has Nicholas II. from the very first 
days of his accession to the throne. 

When his father died Nicholas was still quite a young 
man, and more inexperienced than he ought to have been, 
because his education had been conducted on lines which 
compelled an implicit obedience to the will of his parents 
and an utter repression of any initiative he might possess. 
Alexander III., who perhaps remembered the difficult 
position into which he himself had been thrust during the 



Sovereigns and Statesmen of Europe 

last years of his father's reign — when, unwillingly, he had 
found himself looked upon as the head of a party of 
opposition to the throne — had determined never to allow 
his own son to suffer from the same hindrance. 

Alexander III., therefore, had his heir brought up in 
such a manner that, when called upon to take up the 
sceptre, he would find himself unfettered, and free from 
any obligations contracted in regard to former friends. 
The young Grand Duke Nicholas had been kept far from 
the knowledge of State affairs, being trained in the same 
way as any officer obliged to work his way in the army, 
and dependent only upon his personal merits for advance- 
ment. He received, however, no initiation into the details 
of the administration of a great Empire, nor was he shown 
the difficulties which attached to Tsardom. The only 
cardinal principle, indeed, which had been impressed upon 
him was the very elementary axiom that, when he should 
come to the throne, his first care and thought must 
always be for the welfare of his country. It is said that 
Alexander III. had the idea that it was best for his son 
to receive his initiation into statecraft when he reached 
his thirtieth year. Then, Alexander thought, he would 
be able to give better attention to such matters, but 
during the earlier years his son should do nothing but 
amuse himself and enjoy a few years of peaceful uncon- 
cern before he was brought face to face with the realities 
of existence. 

It must not be forgotten that in those days the late 
Tsar was a relatively young man, with a splendid physique 



A Stroke of Destiny 

and an excellent health. To all appearances he had long 
years of life before him, and he had the full expectation 
of being able to guide his heir's footsteps in political life, 
and also to instruct him according to his own ideas. 
Providence interfered, and Alexander III. succumbed to 
an insidious disease before even he had reached his fiftieth 
year, and also before his eldest son had had time to realise 
all the difficulties and grasp all the responsibilities of 
the task which so unexpectedly descended upon his 
inexperienced shoulders. 

Until almost the last days of his father's life Nicholas 
had been treated as a child, not only by all his numerous 
uncles and aunts, but also by the few intimate friends 
of Alexander III., such as Count Woronzoff Dachkoff. 
Conceivably, therefore, it was difficult for them to 
readjust their ideas in a moment and at once to accord 
to him the honours due to a sovereign. Nicholas II. 
noticed that they did not immediately assume the respect- 
ful tone and demeanour due to the Tsar of all the Russias, 
and the circumstance did not please him. He resented 
it more than would have been the case had he possessed 
enough experience of life and of mankind to understand 
that this was almost inevitable for the time being, and 
things would very soon right themselves of their own 
accord. Timid by nature, he did not, perhaps, assume 
from the very first the dignified attitude of a monarch, 
and the consciousness that this was the case communicated 
to all his actions an indecision which was at once seized hold 
of by eager busybodies anxious to criticise the new Tsar. 

3 



Sovereigns and Statesmen of Europe 

In reality few monarchs ascended their throne with 
such good intentions as Nicholas II. I will not go so far 
as to say that he wished, as some people have affirmed, 
to inaugurate a system of government akin almost to 
Constitutionalism. His famous reply to the address of 
the Zemstvo of Tver, indeed, points decidedly to the 
contrary ; but it is certain that he seriously intended to 
rule his vast dominions with justice and in a liberal sense. 

The new Tsar of all the Russias was kind of nature ; 
he would never willingly have hurt anyone. His 
generosity was unbounded; indeed, in those early days 
he was reproached more than once for not grasping the 
real value of money. His consideration for others 
appeared in everything that he did, and the affection 
and respect with which he treated his widowed mother 
left nothing to be desired. He was an indulgent and 
tender husband, an excellent and devoted father, and a 
trustworthy friend. His heart had always been in the 
right place, and no one had ever appealed to his mercy 
in vain. He liked to give, to please those about him, and 
he loved his country perhaps not wisely but well, with 
a keen sense of his duty in regard to it. 

That circumstances went against Nicholas II. is 
certainly not his fault, and can be attributed only to that 
detestable spirit of bureaucracy which has been the curse 
of Russia ever since the days of Peter the Great, whose 
genius did not go so far as to foresee all the evil it 
would do when no longer controlled by his iron hand. 
To bureaucracy and the police Russia owes many of its 

4 



Emperor Nicholas II. 

past and present misfortunes, and every sincere Russian 
patriot ought to pray for the complete triumph of 
England. It is by the adoption of the English spirit of 
government alone that anything like a serious, useful 
political life can develop itself in Russia. Happily for 
Russia, the Emperor is keenly conscious of the fact, and 
is, perhaps, the most sincere admirer in Russia of English 
institutions. 

More than once Nicholas II. has seen his best inten- 
tions either frustrated or misunderstood and misconstrued. 
When he succeeded to the throne his popularity for a 
brief space of time was very great and very real; then, 
unfortunately for him as well as for Russia, outside as 
well as family influences intervened, and, retiring and 
inexperienced as he knew himself to be, he did not feel 
courageous enough to allow himself to be guided by his 
instinct alone. There is certainly nothing of the nature 
of Peter the Great in the present Tsar, but there is 
undoubtedly more honesty in his character than in that 
of the famous reformer, and he would never consent to 
anything that he considered his conscience could not 
accept. That injustices have been committed in his reign 
cannot be contested, that cruelties, even, have been 
needlessly performed is also true ; but no man can justly 
make the Tsar responsible for them. He is compelled 
to rely on others, whom he must trust to administer the 
details of his immense Empire. 

The present Tsar has been given a bad name and the 
reputation of having a weak character, whilst in reality 

5 



Sovereigns and Statesmen of Europe 

he has only had an extreme distrust in himself. Through 
his fear of not always doing the right thing, he allowed 
others to dictate to him and to explain to him things as 
they saw them, not as they really were. 

From the first days of his reign Nicholas II. applied 
himself to the task of pleasing his subjects, even in 
insignificant things. When he appeared in public those 
with whom he conversed heard pleasant words which 
impressed them with the feeling that Nicholas was not 
entirely banal in his thoughts, but spoke with the 
sincere intention of interesting those to whom he was 
talking. That this was the case I had occasion to 
experience personally. At one of the first balls which 
were given in the Winter Palace by the present Empress, 
I found myself by chance in the vicinity of the Tsar as 
he was crossing a gallery which ran along the state apart- 
ments of the Imperial residence, when, seeing me, he 
approached and told me that he had been that very morn- 
ing reading an old military report written a good many 
years ago by my father, and he added that he could 
remember seeing him one day in the late Emperor's 
study. 

This little incident — which, I hope, the reader will 
forgive me for quoting — is but one of the many instances 
of the real kindness of heart of Nicholas II., who at the 
time I am alluding to was trying his best to become 
popular among all classes of society. Why his efforts 
were so misunderstood is a mystery to me ; but mis- 
understood they were, and he very quickly noticed it, 



The Tsar's Home Life 

and, of course, was wounded to the quick by what he 
considered was the ingratitude of people whom he had 
done his best to propitiate. 

In spite of all the troubles that were to fall upon him 
in such rapid succession the Tsar was supremely happy 
in his home, and found in the tenderness and devotion 
of his lovely consort, and in the love of his children, 
enough to satisfy him and to make him forget the depres- 
sions of sovereignty. Society and its pleasures did not 
appeal to him ; and, besides, his life was so continually 
occupied, and his attention so much engrossed by serious 
subjects, that it is but natural he preferred spending his 
evenings by his own fireside to attending balls and 
festivities, for which neither he nor the young Empress 
had ever cared. He had realised that whatever he did he 
would be misunderstood, and that no one gave him credit 
for all the good which he had planned and, in certain 
instances, performed. A sense of irritation against those 
who were maligning him was the natural and inevitable 
result of his numerous disappointments, and this irrita- 
tion manifested itself in an attitude of extreme reserve, 
which by and by took the place of the former amiability 
he had displayed so willingly whenever the opportunity 
to do so had occurred. Petrograd began to complain 
that the Sovereign avoided gracing with his presence 
public and private festivities which he had been expected 
to attend, and little by little a wall arose dividing the 
Monarch from his people, slowly but surely destroying 
his popularity. 

7 



Sovereigns and Statesmen of Europe 

This was none of the fault of Nicholas TT. ; indeed, he 
was the first to deplore it. He did not, however, realise 
that an active remedy for so regrettable a situation lay 

in a closer union between the Tsar and his subjects based 
on personal intercourse. Instead, his love for solitude, 
which was shared by his consort, induced the young 
Sovereign to withdraw more and more from the world, 
and to confine himself to the society of a few trusted 
friends, wlun if 1 may venture an opinion, were not the 
best he might have had. 

In the lonely grandeur of Tsarskoye Selo, and of 
Livadia, in the Crimea, where the Imperial Family used 
to spend the autumn months, the Russian Monarch could 
not remain in that close touch and contact, with his people 
which alone can ensure a nation's confidence in the 
Sovereign. All sorts of stories — unkind and untrue — 
began to circulate concerning Nicholas II. as well as the 
Empress, and soon they were enveloped in an atmosphere 
of gossip, until at last, it became a popular .belief that 
they did not care for Russia and that Russia did not care 
for them. 

The enemies of the throne and of the dynasty believed 
in this Legend, and tried to induce others, both at home 
and abroad, to believe in it too. It. spread about witli 
the rapidity lies always spread, and many of the misfor- 
tunes that have befallen Russia during the last fifteen 
years or so are due to the credence which it obtained, 
even among people who ought to have known better. 
In that respect Nicholas II. was decidedly unfortunate, 

8 



The Bureaucratic Machine 

and in the choice which he made of* r-crtain advisers he 
was even more unlucky. 

It is a curious fact, but one which DO person at all 
well informed as to the existing order of things in Russia 

will deny, that there is a deplorable laek of real states- 
men in this wonderful country of mine. Whether it is 
flue to the influence of Liberalism, Socialism, Nationalism 

or any other " ism " I eannot say, but it is a fact that 
nearly all our leading men, until quite lately, have been 
essentially middle-class people, and as such could never 
understand or enter into the higher order of polities, 
such as they have been practised in England, for instance. 

Russia's salvation would Ik: to get rid of this particular 
and peculiar world of civil functionaries, among whom, 
much to the sorrow of all real patriots, most Ministers 
have been chosen. I do not wis}) to imply that t) 
bureaucrats did not perform their duties conscientiously ; 
but they did so like well-trained machines, without dis- 
playing any initiative, as would one of high and gentle 
birth. They simply followed the old routine they took 
up, just in the same manner as they sat down in a 
ministerial chair at a ministerial desk. None of them 
had statesmanlike instincts or applied himself to study 
the remote causes of a present evil, and none attempted 
any practical reform. 

An exception was Count Witte, a really distinctive 
figure among the gallery of useful mediocrities who ruled 
over the destinies of Russia, yet who, to all the good 
sehemes which Nicholas II. nursed in the silence of his 

9 



Sovereigns and Statesmen of Europe 

heart and in the secret o\' his soul, opposed thai stubborn 

resistance horn out oi' respect for dead traditions. 

Upon these men must be tixed the responsibility tor 
most of the mistakes which brought about the reverses 
o( the .Japanese War, the revolution which desolated the 
country for something like three years, the perpetual 
antagonism which from the first day o[' the assembling 
of a Duma this magnificent concession to public opinion 

was entirely the work o\' the present Tsar existed be- 
tween it and the responsible Government, ami. finally, 
the errors and the want o\' foresight that, after the glorious 

opening of the present war, have deprived my nation oi' 

its early successes and brought Russia face to face with a 

foreign invasion o( some o\' its most fertile provinces. 

To tix this responsibility on Nicholas 11. would be a cruel 

and wicked injustice, for none in all his immense Empire 

has suffered more from it than he has. 

It is a threat, a very great, pity indeed that until quite 
recently the Emperor could not bring himself to have 
more confidence in his own judgment and in his own 
instincts as to what is good for Russia. If this realisation 
had dawned upon him a few years earlier it would have 
been an all-round advantage. The war, which is changing 
many things, is bringing to the Tsar a fuller knowledge 
of the strength of his own personality. He is discovering 
himself, and the Russia o( to-morrow will benefit vastly 
thereby. 

Nicholas II, has more than an average share of good 
sound common sense : his decisions, too. are generally 



The Salvation of Russia 

right- at least, in so far as thing* are presented to 
his judgment* Left alone, it is quite certain that he 
would never have invented the multitude of laws which 

annoy and sometimes unfairly act upon the peaceful 

people ivho aspire to nothing else but to be allowed to 
exist quietly, without interference from the police or 
other authorities. Unfortunately, the Emperor is sur- 
rounded by persons who are limited in their intelligence 
and restricted in their views. They see the salvation of 

Russia in a system of government founded on suspicion, 
and perpetually keep looking for an imaginary plot 
against the person of the Sovereign and the safety of 
his counsellors. 

All through the Japanese War, and during the y 
that followed upon it, the Tsar allowed the people to 
whom I have just been referring to have it all their own 
way, until tyranny beeame the rule in Russia. In that 
respect Count Witte was an exception, but, then, he 
was one of the rare real statesmen of modern Russia, 
and he looked at things from all the height of a mag- 
nifieent intelligence. 

Gifted with extraordinary self-control and considerable 
dignity, Count Witte held the opinion that a minister 
or a statesman in an executive position ought before 
everything else to shield his sovereign, and, if need be, 
to assume on his own head the weight and the responsi- 
bility of any mistake which this sovereign might have 
been led into by the force of circumstances. When the 
Count signed the Treaty of Portsmouth he did so without 

i / 



Sovereigns and Statesmen of Europe 

referring its clauses to the Tsar. He acted in general 
accord with the instructions which Nicholas II. had 
personally given to him before he departed for America, 
and when asked why he had not thought it necessary 
to send one last telegram to Tsarskoye Selo before 
acquiescing to the Japanese demands, Count Witte 
merely replied : "I would not be a patriot if I did not 
reserve to my master the right and the possibility to 
disavow me, or even to punish me, should he deem that 
I have not sufficiently taken care of Russia's interests 
or Russia's dignity." The reply is quite worthy of a 
real statesman, and even if Richelieu had worded it 
otherwise he could not have taken exception to it. 

In spite of this singularly great feature of his, in so 
many respects, remarkable character, Count Witte was 
not the man capable of bringing about that regeneration 
of Russia which was so ardently desired by all true 
patriots. Though no one seemed to be aware of that 
fact at the time when the Count was at the head of the 
first Constitutional Ministry which Russia saw come into 
existence, the Emperor realised it, and grasped it at once. 
In this Nicholas evinced his keen insight into the needs 
of his country. He loves Russia ; he would like above all 
things to see her prosperous and great. He realises very 
well, too, not only the difficulties that stand in his way 
to bring this desire of his heart into execution, but also 
the sad fate which has never given him the collaborators 
fitted for the high task. 

People have remarked that the Emperor did not show 

12 



Ideals of Nicholas II. 

the same confidenee in himself whieh distinguished his 
late father and whieh made him rely entirely on his own 
personality to impose his will on his surroundings. It 
must not be forgotten, however, that when Alexander 
III. assumed supreme power he was something like ten 
years older than his son was when the latter aseended 
the throne ; that, moreover, he had oeeupied responsible 
positions, had taken part in a serious and glorious war 
(that of 1877, against Turkey), and that he had gathered 
an experience not vouchsafed to Nicholas II. 

Considering all these facts, therefore, one can but 
wonder at the few mistakes made by the present Tsar 
during the first years of his reign. The world did not 
know that the Sovereign whom it believed to be entirely 
selfish was perpetually revolving in his mind how he could 
be of use to his people, what reforms he could undertake, 
and how he could best come into personal contact with 
the nation. His prodigious power did not make him 
happy, and more than once he was heard to express the 
regret that, notwithstanding the extent of his power, it 
availed him but little in ameliorating the condition of 
many of his subjects. If ever monarch loved the nation 
over which he ruled, it is Nicholas II. 

Fictions have been put into circulation concerning the 
granting of the semi-constitution which Russia is enjoy- 
ing to-day, and people have been led to believe that it 
had been imposed on the Tsar by the rebellion of his 
subjects. In reality nothing of the kind took place. 
The Emperor had all along cherished the idea of inviting 

13 



Sovereigns and Statesmen of Europe 

the representatives of Holy Russia to help him in his 
stupendous task. It was he who first mentioned it to 
his Ministers ; he who called upon them to draw a plan 
embodying the best means of carrying out his intentions. 
He knew very well that he had to move with his times, 
that the era of absolute, autocratic government was 
passed, and that the sooner Russia tried to follow in 
the footsteps of constitutionalism the better it would be 
for her future security and greatness. 

Nicholas II. had spent some weeks in Great Britain 
during his engagement to the granddaughter of Queen 
Victoria, and he had employed them in a careful study 
of English institutions and the English character. All 
that he had seen had filled him with the greatest 
admiration, and though he realised very well that it was 
impossible to expect Russia to reach at a leap the degree 
of civilisation which had put the British race at the head 
of everything that is free and enlightened in Europe, 
still he believed and hoped that, with time, parliamentary 
administration might become established in his realm, 
and that he might find among the men sent by the votes 
of his people to represent them some fitted to aid him 
in ruling Holy Russia. 

The experiment failed in the beginning because the 
country was not ripe for it, and because that first Duma, 
the assembling of which was compared to that of the 
States General in France on the eve of the great revolu- 
tion, contained no men strong enough to become its 
leaders. There were plenty of intelligent people, but 

14 



The Duma in Evolution 

these mostly were lawyers, and Russia did not yet — 
and, for the matter of that, does not now — appreciate 
eloquence of the order which moves the masses in France 
or even in England. Russia knew and understood that 
she had needs which required urgently to be attended to, 
evils which had to be redressed, and she would not content 
herself with words as the sole reply to her appeals for 
help. 

The Emperor understood, too, perhaps before even 
the nation did. There was no hesitation in his mind on 
the subject. He had willingly abdicated part of his 
authority in order to assure the prosperity of his country, 
and he did not intend the sacrifice to remain a useless 
one. When he realised that the first Duma did nothing 
beyond discussing Utopianisms, he had no hesitation in 
dismissing it and ordering new elections. The action 
caused violent discussions, and was bitterly condemned 
even by people of moderate opinions. Events proved 
that it had been a wise move, because, little by little, 
the country got used to the new machinery which had 
been set in motion, and parliamentary debates assumed 
a dignified character, reminding one, if only from afar, 
of those in other countries where constitutional govern- 
ment had been long established. The Duma ceased to 
be an assembly of talkers, becoming, little by little, a 
parliament worthy of the name, and lately, during the 
debates which took place after the declaration of war, 
it has shown a high patriotism and a strong sense of 
knowledge of its duties. 

15 



Sovereigns and Statesmen of Europe 

That this was so is entirely due to the patience dis- 
played by the Emperor, who, when urged, as he was 
repeatedly, to put an end to the shadow of constitutional 
government which he had evoked, refused to do so. 
Nicholas remained strongly faithful to his opinion that 
the day would come when the Duma would awake to 
the realisation of what Russia expected from it, and that, 
instead of being the danger which some foolish people 
assured the Tsar it would be, it would become a strong 
help to him in administering affairs of the Empire. The 
opinion was criticised even among the Sovereign's per- 
sonal friends, who could not understand the extreme 
patience which he displayed under considerable provoca- 
tion. But Nicholas II. was right, and in the course of 
time he had his reward. 

But, for all its value, the Magna Charta of Russia did 
not bring the Tsar near to his subjects. The famous 
Manifesto of October 17th, which heralded the dawn of 
that new day in Russian history when its monarchy 
passed from absolute autocracy into the freedom of 
constitutional government, was received with immense 
enthusiasm. The fervour did not last, however, because 
the revolution which unfurled its banner at that time 
engrossed public attention, and by the stern repression 
with which it was met gave the nation the idea that 
there had been nothing sincere in the Manifesto, and 
that in reality it had only been an attempt to pacify the 
discontented. 

The Emperor had expected, if not gratitude, at least 

16 



The Magic of War 

justice from his people ; he found nothing but criticism 
of the most bitter nature directed against his person, 
and it is no wonder that this attitude made him sad and 
melancholy, and more than ever inclined to retire into 
a solitude where, at least, he could not hear the clamours 
of discontent with which the whole of Russia resounded 
in those perilous days. 

This estrangement, once it had begun, was not easy 
to put an end to. It is to be questioned whether it ever 
would have ceased, and the good intentions of the Tsar 
become recognised and appreciated at last by his people, 
had not the war of 1914 arrived, and by magic brought 
close together the Sovereign and the whole of the 170 
millions of his subjects. 

By his recent decision to take personal command of 
his armies he has made his people prouder of him, even, 
than when they learned, in the earlier phases of the war, 
that, entirely upon his personal initiative — as was related 
by people familiar with all that goes on at Tsarskoye 
Selo — Nicholas II. determined to pay regular visits to 
the front and to inspect personally numerous of the 
hospitals scattered about Russia, coming thus into 
immediate contact with his people, listening to their 
complaints, entering into the details of their existence, 
and seeing himself into their needs and requirements. 

It is an open secret now that no one, even among 
the extreme Radical party, has anything but kind words 
to say about the Tsar. Russia has learned to know 

him at last. She has met him at the bedside of his 

c 17 



Sovereigns and Statesmen of Europe 

wounded soldiers, lias followed his movements at the 
front, encouraging his army, sharing their perils, and 
hoping together with them for better days. 

Russia has seen that Nicholas 11. is not a hard and 
cruel Sovereign, but a kind father, whose affectionate 
blue eyes tilled with tears whilst looking at the woes o\' 
his Empire, and who, amidst the horrors of a most 
brutal and inhuman war, was occupied in planning how 
to alleviate them and to bring some joy, or at least some 
comfort, to the victims of the conflict. The paternal 
solicitude of the Tsar for his stricken soldiers, the devo- 
tion shown by the Empress and by her daughters to the 
sick and to the wounded, won the day, and at last made 
the country realise that Nicholas II. himself deserved 
nothing but love and respect from everybody, even 
from those whose political opinions were antagonistic to 
monarchical principles in general. 

After the first few months of the war the Emperor 
found, for the first time since his accession to the throne, 
that his authority was no longer disputed, and though 
it is most likely that this present war will, in Russia 
at least, be followed by a revolution, it is certain that 
it will be a revolution which will not aspire to deprive 
the Romanoffs of their crown, though it may aim at 
destroying their former advisers and will make havoc with 
bureaucratic tyranny : and this none hates more than 
Nicholas II. himself. 

The pathetic side oi % the Tsar's life is the scarcity of 
real friends with whom he can discuss current events 

18 



Nicholas II. and His Ministers 

with absolute liberty, and without fear that what he may 
say will be liable to misinterpretation. His relations 
with the Grand Dukes, his uncles and eousins, are more 
or less stiff, and there is little intimacy between them. 
Perhaps the great difference in their rank contributes to 
this regrettable state of things ; but the fact remains that, 
with the exception of the Grand Duke Nicholas, none 
of the members of the Imperial Family find themselves 
called upon by their chief to give him an opinion of their 
own on public affairs. 

Between Nicholas II. and his Ministers no discussion 
is possible; the latter invariably say "Yes" to all the 
Emperor's instructions, and do nothing of what he 
orders them to perform. The solitude of the Sovereign 
is absolute, and, unfortunately for him, the great distance 
which separates him from his cousin, King George V., 
for whom he feels such a deep affection, prevents him 
from resorting to the latter's sound advice as often as 
he w r ould like to do. 

In spite of all these handicaps the authority of 
Nicholas II. increases every day, and when peace comes 
to be discussed he, rather than his Ministers, will have 
the final decision so far as Russia is concerned. The 
advisers of the Emperor will naturally have to conduct 
the negotiations, but it is he, and he alone, who will 
pronounce the last word. The reign of Ministers is past. 
For this the whole of Russia should feel grateful to the 
Tsar, and should accept all that the future holds in reserve 
for the nation, good or bad, without murmuring, as it 

'9 



Sovereigns and Statesmen of Europe 

did after the Treaty of Portsmouth, when Count Witte 
was accused of having sacrificed the interests of his 
country to a false assessment of its strength. 

When one takes into consideration this fact, and also 
remembers that in all things the Emperor Nicholas will 
act in perfect unison with King George V., even the 
anxious and timorous people who keep doubting as to 
the conditions under which, at last, peace will be restored 
to the world need not fear that either the interests of 
Russia or of Great Britain will have to suffer. 

I have mentioned Revolution. Many people think 
that Russia stands on the brink of one, and I am not 
far from sharing the opinion that it is bound to occur 
soon after the war has come to an end, and perhaps even 
before it is ended. But, as I have suggested, it will not 
be a revolution directed against the dynasty. Indeed, 
I believe that, with his strong common sense, the Tsar 
will be able to turn such an event towards the consolida- 
tion of his House upon the throne. 

There has been more than one ministerial change 
lately in Russia, and all the new men who have been 
invited to enter the Cabinet — such as Count Paul 
Ignatieff (the son of the late Ambassador who at one 
time had held Russian prestige so high in Constantinople) 
or Prince Nicholas Stcherbatoff (who recently took upon 
himself for a time the heavy and difficult duties of 
Minister of the Interior) — are of the Liberal thought 
in the sense that they would like their country to be 
governed otherwise than by police methods. Without 

20 



M. Sazonov and Peace 

exception they have been chosen by the Sovereign him- 
self, who during the journeys that he has lately under- 
taken all over Russia has been able more accurately to 
grasp the real necessities of his people. If the ultra- 
Conservative elements which up to the present have 
governed Russia do not succeed in harassing these men 
so much that they will be forced to retire, then it is most 
likely that the revolution which is being prepared at 
present will turn out to be a peaceful one, and that it 
will end by a closer union between the Tsar and his 
subjects. 

Before that day dawns, however, the question of the 
eventual peace will absorb public opinion. We may 
well look around us, therefore, and inquire who will be 
the men whom Nicholas II. will appoint to represent 
him at that momentous conference. 

First and foremost there is M. Sazonov, who perhaps 
has had to bear one of the heaviest burdens of the 
international situation as it has developed since the day 
Germany threw her gauntlet in the face of the whole of 
Europe. There have been many rumours going about 
concerning M. Sazonov lately. The busybodies of 
Petrograd have been saying that his position is shaken 
and that his health has become indifferent, two circum- 
stances which would foreshadow his retirement from the 
political scene. I am not in a position to state whether 
there is any truth in all these reports. That the Russian 
Foreign Minister's health has suffered from the strain to 
which it has been subjected of late would not be a matter 

21 



Sovereigns and Statesmen of Europe 

of surprise for anyone, the more so that he has never been 
a very robust man; but it is hardly likely that the Tsar 
would care to deprive himself, at a moment when his 
experience would be invaluable to his country, of the 
services of the man who, better than anyone else, has 
knowledge of all the intricacies of a situation that has 
developed under his very eyes. 

Ever since the first Balkan War M. Sazonov worked 
in the cause of peace, and it is not his fault that 
he failed. Some of his adversaries assert that in his 
desire to avoid war he went farther than he ought to 
have done, and made more concessions than was con- 
sistent with the dignity of Russia. This may have been 
— it is not for me to judge of this delicate point ; but, if 
he did so, it was entirely from humanitarian motives, 
and perhaps also because he realised, if others did not, 
all the consequences which a conflict with Austria was 
bound to bring in its train. M. Sazonov is essentially 
an honest man ; a kind one, too, and his soul recoiled at 
the thought of the misery which a war, even if triumphant 
for Russian arms, would inflict. He did all that lay 
within his power to avert such a catastrophe, and who 
can blame him for having done so? But at last even his 
long-suffering patience revolted, and with the conscious- 
ness of the dignity of his country he proudly replied to 
Count von Pourtales (the German Ambassador) that he 
refused to recognise the arrogant ultimatum he had 
presented. • 

At this grave juncture M. Sazonov revealed himself 

22 



Personality of M. Sazonov 

such as he was — serious, earnest, gifted with sound 
common sense, and fully alive to the responsibilities that 
lay upon his shoulders. He never belonged to those who 
rush into a decision, and the torrent of complications 
with which he found himself surrounded made him even 
more careful than usual. 

More than once he had been accused of being wanting 
in courage and fearful of expressing his opinions in 
presence of serious opposition. I do not think that this 
reputation was justified at any period of his career. 
M. Sazonov is essentially a cautious man ; but this does 
not mean that he is a timorous one, though his attitude 
gives sometimes the impression that this might be the 
case. He seldom tells you immediately what he thinks, 
and never allows you to guess what it is he suspects. 
His extreme reserve is more reticence than anything 
else, and the thing one is the most inclined to forget 
when talking with him is the position which he occupies 
as the man to whom has been entrusted the task of 
representing Russia in the face of foreign ambitions and 
foreign competition in the domain of politics. 

He is not a leader, and probably realises himself that 
such is the fact. And because he has not the diplomatic 
temperament, and consequently can give his whole care 
to what I would call the drudgery of politics, studying 
them to the core and seeing many pitfalls which a more 
brilliant mind would not notice, he is the greater success 
in his difficult portfolio. His attention to trifles is 
wonderful, and after all it is trifles which often decide 

23 



Sovereigns and Statesmen of Europe 

the most momentous questions in this world. In co- 
operation with Sir Edward Grey, or with Lord Lans- 
downe, M. Sazonov can render inestimable service ; 
whilst, left alone to his own devices, he will never commit 
any serious mistake, because he will always think twice 
before coming to any decision, and so avoid doing any- 
thing capable afterwards of being interpreted in two 
different senses. 

Whether he will remain at the head of the Foreign 
Office until the end of the war it is impossible to tell. 
He has many enemies, especially among the Liberal 
parties, who accuse him of harbouring Slavophil opinions 
to an extent rather alarming for a man placed in his 
responsible position. I do not, however, believe that 
he carries them to a dangerous point, but it is sufficient 
that he is credited with them for people to predict his 
retirement from his office in case the Slavophil policy of 
Russia suffers a check. All the same, it is safe to assume 
that, even in the improbable case that his portfolio passes 
into other hands, he will be called upon to have a voice 
in the negotiations which will precede the conclusion of 
a definite treaty of peace. 

It is hardly possible for M. Sazonov to be passed 
over. He is blessed with a wonderful memory, and 
this quality is more than useful in such grave emer- 
gencies as those which may crop up at any moment 
before peace is at last restored to the world. He is 
thoroughly trustworthy, a man with high principles and 
a strong sense of honour ; no match, perhaps, for an 

2 4 



M. Kokovtsov 

unscrupulous politician, but a respectable figure in the 
sense that he will never commit himself to a reprehensible 
action. His intelligence has been discussed, his person- 
ality has been criticised, but his honesty has never been 
suspected; and though he never understood in what 
consisted the real politics pursued by Germany, yet he 
fought them by instinct, and refused to associate himself 
with them, even where they seemed to everybody but 
himself to be devoid of any evil intentions. 

Next to M. Sazonov comes M. Kokovtsov. It is 
possible that he may be appointed as one of the Russian 
delegates at the peace conference. He was Finance 
Minister for a good many years, and as such acquired a 
profound and intimate knowledge of the economical 
condition of his country. He is very well aware of the 
nature and of the extent of its resources, and from that 
point of view his co-operation might be advantageous 
to the Empire. He is credited, however, with being 
far too fond of the sound of his own voice, and has an 
exaggerated idea of his facility in speaking foreign 
languages — a trait which is noticeable among other 
middle-class people whose early surroundings did not 
entitle them to the right of expressing themselves in 
any other idiom than their own. It is the saddest part 
of M. Kokovtsov that he is middle class, in spite of all his 
efforts not to appear so. His intelligence is like his 
clothes : too well brushed, and seems to come fresh from 
the tailor, or from the school-benches. He was given 
an excellent instruction by his most respectable parents, 

25 



Sovereigns and Statesmen of Europe 

but his education — which is often found where instruction 
does not exist — was acquired later in life, and conse- 
quently has kept the appearance of being something 
new, and quite as uncomfortable. He always seems to 
be wearing his boots for the first time and not feeling 
quite at home in them. 

His career has been one of rapid and well-deserved 
progress. An excellent clerk in his early days, he has 
proved a most capable official in his later ones. As a 
Minister he showed considerable ability, but was perhaps 
more brilliant than was necessary in some cases and 
not impartial enough in others. He had little tact, or 
he would not have been so eager to share his impressions 
with the first person who cared to hear them ; but he had 
a great knowledge of the world, understood marvellously 
how to get rid of rivals, and how to pacify grumblers. 
He administered the finances of his country in a masterly 
way, and diligently fostered both industrial and com- 
mercial development. He took special pains, also, to 
win the favour of all the financial magnates of Europe, 
and the gratitude of the capitalists, great and small, of 
his own land. Jews found him lenient in regard to them ; 
and he never showed himself a fanatic in anything. He 
might have been a statesman if he had only possessed a 
little more backbone, and if he had been born in another 
sphere where the possession of a title is not looked upon 
as the greatest felicity a man can aspire to. As it is, he 
proved himself to be a most excellent functionary, and 
it was not his fault that he came in time to forget that 

26 



Count Kokovtsov and the Emperor 

such was the case, and to fancy himself a leader of the 
men who led him. 

His supreme ability was demonstrated when he 
resigned his functions as Premier, on realising that they 
were too much for him and that his further tenure of 
office might endanger the reputation he had acquired of 
being a great Minister. M. Kokovtsov had never been 
quite liked by the Emperor, but the Minister had never 
given the Tsar real reason to dismiss him, and Nicholas II. 
was far too just to make a man bear the brunt of his 
personal antipathies when there was nothing else against 
him. So that when Nicholas came to say good-bye to 
a Minister who had done his duty all the time that he 
had been in office, he did so with grace, and before 
M. Kokovtsov left he had bestowed upon him the title 
of Count, which had been for long the object of all his 
secret ambitions and longings. 

When the war broke out there were people who 
declared that M. Kokovtsov ought to be recalled and put 
once more at the head of the Russian finances which he 
had conducted with such ability for so long. The Tsar, 
however, would not hear of it, and it is an open question 
whether the former Premier would have cared to accept 
office. He was far too shrewd to desire his return to 
office in the troubled circumstances in which his country 
found itself. There had been a time when he had coveted 
the position of Russian Ambassador in Paris, where his 
thorough knowledge of the French language would have 
proved of good use to him ; but now he congratulated 

27 



Sovereigns and Statesmen of Europe 

himself on this perilous responsibility having been refused 
him. 

It can be assumed with tolerable certainty that 
M. Kokovtsov will be one of the delegates entrusted 
with the mission of watching over the interests of Russia 
in the future congress. He is sure to make his voice 
heard. He is, though pacific and a model of courtesy, 
yet very firm sometimes, and most opinionated in his con- 
victions. He has a more subtle mind than M. Sazonov, 
and in general is a perfect type of that kind of man 
described by Montaigne in the famous words, "ondoyant 
et divers " ; but he hates not to play first fiddle, and for 
this reason may not prove of such assistance as his former 
colleague in the Ministry. 

M. Kokovtsov has one great quality : he never loses 
his temper. He has mastered the science of always 
keeping his feelings under control, and this may prove 
of great service both to him and to his colleagues. The 
financial knowledge and experience of M. Kokovtsov 
are almost unique in Russia at the present moment, 
especially since the death of Count Witte has removed 
the only serious rival whom he had possessed in that 
domain. For that reason I have thought it well to give 
him a few words of description in the gallery of pictures 
which I am trying to present to my readers. Whatever 
may be his defects, he is still an interesting figure. 
Though not a statesman in the real sense, he would no 
doubt make an excellent ambassador, just as he made an 
excellent Minister, but his initiative is extremely limited, 

2S 



M. Bark and War Finance 

and even where it makes itself felt it is only the initiative 
peculiar to the middle ranks of civil functionaries that, 
in Russia at least, constitute quite a small though a most 
powerful caste, and of which M. Kokovtsov is such a 
thorough personification. 

M. Bark, who was appointed to the Ministry of 
Finance in the early months of 1914, has been closely 
associated with the English Lloyd George and the French 
Minister in the financial problems of the present war. 
Nevertheless, I have the feeling that, even if included 
in the representatives of Russia at the Peace Negotiations, 
M. Bark will not have a leading voice on behalf of his 
country. 

Among the other members of the present Govern- 
ment in Russia is one whose name more than once has 
been put forward as a candidate for the Premiership. I 
am thinking of M. Krivochei'ne, one of the ablest men 
among all those who are in the Ministry, a thorough 
gentleman, and an honest functionary in the highest 
sense of that word. Entrusted for a considerable number 
of years with the administration of the domains of the 
Crown, he showed not only great ability in the handling 
of the numerous difficulties he had to contend with on 
the part of the army of small functionaries who work in 
that department, but also an integrity above praise and 
sound principles, which would have shone even in a better 
light if his duties had had to do with higher politics, and 
not been confined to a particular branch of administra- 
tion. M. Krivocheine is respected by all those who 

29 



Sovereigns and Statesmen of Europe 

know him, and enjoys a considerable reputation, not only 
in Petrograd, but all over Russia. He is an enlightened, 
well-bred and well-read man, one gifted with a strong 
individuality, and who, moreover, has the advantage of 
being thoroughly acquainted with the opinions, as well 
as with the hopes and political aspirations, of his country. 
Though a Conservative, he is yet a Liberal in the best 
sense of the word, inasmuch as he professes a profound 
respect for the private convictions of every man or woman 
he meets. There is nothing despotic about him, yet his 
character is wonderfully firm, and when once he has made 
up his mind to do something it becomes excessively 
difficult to persuade him to change. He keeps his word 
when once given, but does not give it easily ; and, intelli- 
gent by nature, he has acquired considerable instruction 
not only on school-benches, but also through contact 
with life and the study of books, of which he is a great 
reader. 

M. Krivoche'ine is the only Minister in Russia at the 
present moment — or, rather, was the only one, because 
the appointment of Prince Stcherbatoff to the Home 
Office has given him a colleague in that respect — 
who, whilst very Russian in all his ideas and views, yet 
has become cosmopolitan in the broad manner in which 
he examines and gives his attention to all the problems 
he is confronted with. He was not a Tchinownik, to use 
the familiar expression employed in Russia to designate 
the class of civil functionaries from which Ministers are 
generally chosen, but he could lay claims to be considered 

30 



M. Krivocheine 

a statesman, as in truth he is. If he were chosen to 
represent his country during the future congress, he 
would defend its interests and carry its flag very high 
whilst doing so, and he would also be able to discuss 
with his foreign colleagues all the knotty and unforeseen 
incidents which would be bound to crop up with a 
warmth and at the same time a coolness and presence 
of mind which they would find more than their match. 
M. Krivocheine seldom gets excited, and cuts short any 
attempts of others to do so with curt, trenchant words 
that bring matters back to a ground where he can 
handle them to his interlocutor's disadvantage. It is 
quite certain that the presence of M. Krivocheine among 
the representatives of Russia at a congress would con- 
siderably strengthen the cause of the Allies, and that 
even first-rate diplomats, such as Lord Lansdowne, for 
instance, would find his co-operation a valuable asset. 

I think that there is very little reason to doubt that 
M. Goremykin will be one of those whom the Tsar will 
entrust with the task of watching over Russian interests 
when peace comes to be discussed. M. Goremykin is 
the veteran statesman of Russia. Under Alexander III. 
he occupied important and responsible posts, and his 
appointment to the leadership of the Russian Cabinet, 
about eighteen months ago, was hailed with enthusiastic 
approval by nearly all parties. He is a clever, an intel- 
ligent, open-minded man, and a conscientious Minister, 
who would never allow himself any arbitrary action, and 
who receives with freedom of mind, and sometimes even 

3i 



Sovereigns and Statesmen of Europe 

with satisfaction, other opinions than his own. Very 
enlightened, very cultivated, veiy well-intentioned, he 
has strongly that high belief of the dignity, greatness 
and resources of his country, without which no statesman 
can be really great nor become truly useful. Everybody 
respects him ; but he is more than seventy years old, and 
at that period of life it is hardly possible to preserve the 
full energy of one's fighting qualities and to hold one's 
own amidst the fire of rival competitors. M. Goremykin 
alone would find far too heavy for his frail shoulders the 
weight of having to come forth as the champion of his 
fatherland's rights and pretensions, but, backed as he 
will be by younger men, his venerable presence will prove 
of immense advantage to the cause of the Allies, as the 
respect which surrounds him will ensure him the privilege 
of being always listened to with attention and care. It 
is known that he is not the man ever to say aught but 
what he thinks, and that he would never consent to dis- 
honour his white hair by telling an untruth. Moreover, 
he enjoys the confidence of his Imperial master, with 
whom he has always talked frankly and whom he has 
never deceived. 

As a matter of course, military experts will have to 
be appointed to discuss frontier limitations, as well as 
other points connected with the establishment of a 
permanent peace. I have no hesitation in saying that 
on that ground there is very little hope that Russia can 
come out with flying colours, and that the best thing 
she could do, under circumstances such as have developed 

32 



The Grand Duke Nicholas 

recently, would be to ask England to defend her interests 
in this respect. The Russian Military Staff are far too 
opinionated to be granted special powers in connection 
with such a delicate thing as a military adjustment must 
necessarily be. For one thing, they do not realise their 
own shortcomings; for another, they do not possess the 
requisite knowledge of diplomacy ; and last, but not least, 
they would ask too much at first, and in the end surrender 
far too willingly what in reality they could hold. Their 
War Office wants a good deal of reconstruction before it 
can expect to hold its own with the French or English 
institutions. 

If the Russian General Staff has to be consulted con- 
cerning the possible conditions under which we could 
consent, with our Allies, to lay down the sword which 
we have been compelled to take up, then it is certain 
that it will be the Grand Duke Nicholas alone who will 
have the leading voice in the matter. This cousin of the 
Tsar is a curious figure, and he has managed to secure 
for himself the hatred of a number of people, whose 
vindictiveness even goes so far as to criticise his military 
dispositions. Placed as he is at a height where criticism 
cannot touch him, and where, on the other hand, flattery 
has been lavished upon him with a profusion which more 
than once has disgusted him, he has nevertheless always 
had the merit of trying honestly and patiently to do his 
duty and of watching over the welfare of the vast armies 
confided to his care with unflagging attention. During 
his military career the Grand Duke Nicholas has tried 
D 33 



Sovereigns and Statesmen of Europe 

by all means in his power to stamp out abuses, to exaet 
from his subordinates strict obedience, and to see that 
his soldiers were properly taken care of, both mentally 
and physically. In carrying out these reforms he showed 
himself merciless in regard to officers who had failed to 
carry his commands into execution, and though he was 
disliked by the latter, the ranks of the army soon learned 
to respect him and give him their affection. 

Trior to the Great War the Grand Duke Nicholas 
was not perhaps considered a great general, but no one 
could refuse him the merit of having been a good 
and conscientious one. What failed him most was his 
inability to carry the masses with him. This, perhaps, 
was more the consequence of his high rank than any- 
thing else. He has been reproached recently for the 
ruthlessncss with which he is alleged to have sacrificed 
human life, but it should not be forgotten that for the 
tremendous slaughter which took place in Galicia, and 
during the long tights in the Carpathian mountains, he 
could not be entirely blamed. Moreover, there were 
high political reasons for Russia's forward movement at 
that period of the war. Those directly responsible for the 
losses were the generals, who had not sufficient courage 
to reveal to him the difficulties of the military situation, 
and who threw their forces against an enemy far superior 
in numbers and in ammunition without referring to the 
Grand Duke as they ought to have done. Only people 
who do not know inner history see something derogatory 
to the military reputation of the Grand Duke in his 

34 



The Question of Munitions 

transference to the Caucasus consequent upon the Tsar's 
decision to assume supreme command. 

Of course, the future position of the Grand Duke 
depends a good deal on the fate of the campaign. Some 
hasty people blame him for want of foresight and for the 
"strategical reasons," to use the phrase employed in all 
the communications from the Headquarters Staff, which 
induced him to withdraw his troops before the advancing 
masses of the German and Austrian armies. The public 
forgets entirely that it required more than ordinary 
courage to start upon such a course in face of the almost 
general opposition with which it was received and met. 
The fact is that Nicholas Nicolaievitch had realised that 
what had to be avoided at all costs was to engage his 
armies in a battle when he had not the absolute certainty 
of victory on his side, and the retreat which he ordered 
was perhaps the cleverest move he could possibly have 
made. 

The question of ammunition was the gravest one that 
had arisen during the whole course of the war up to 
that moment. Had its scarcity been confined to Russia, 
the Russian public would have had the right to blame 
the Grand Duke ; but, as facts have shown, in all the 
countries engaged in the struggle it was the same story, 
and none among the Allies had realised the incredible 
vastness of the number of shells necessary until they 
were brought face to face with the immense superiority 
of Germany in that respect. They all had to resign 
themselves to play a waiting game until they had 

35 



Sovereigns and Statesmen of Europe 

obtained the shell and shrapnel without which it was 
impossible for them to think of advance. 

The Grand Duke was also accused of not having 
gauged rightly the dangers of the military situation ; but 
he absolutely ignored the attacks directed against his 
person, and applied himself with a dogged determination 
to remedy the evils he had not been able to avoid, and 
meantime to play a game of patience, which he had 
every reason to expect would end to his advantage. 

Should, however, his expectations, together with 
those of the whole of Russia, not be realised, the 
great services which he has rendered to his country 
will not be diminished by the fact. On the contrary, 
his strong qualities will shine with even more brilliance. 
He may lose battles, but he will never forgo the esteem 
of Russia or of its Sovereign. It is, therefore, more 
than likely that when peace comes to be discussed his 
views will be consulted and his advice acted upon by his 
Imperial nephew. 

After the Grand Duke Nicholas it is likely that 
General Ruszkv will be consulted upon the military 
aspect of the situation. The General has been so far the 
only lucky commander in the war. It was he who at 
the beginning of the campaign brought his army under 
the walls of Lemberg and entered that town as its 
conqueror. Ruszkv is an excellent tactician and an able 
administrator, and it is very much to be regretted that 
his health broke down and obliged him to seek a rest he 
much needed. 

36 



General Beliaev 

Another who will be asked to advise will probably be 
General Beliaev, one of the ablest officers whom our 
staff possesses, and who was called upon not long ago 
to be the right-hand man of the newly appointed War 
Minister. General Beliaev is relatively a young man, 
hardly more than fifty, I should think. He has a 
pleasant, gentlemanly, sympathetic appearance, and his 
strategical talents are declared by competent people to 
be something quite out of the common. 

I have spoken about those statesmen to whom public 
opinion points as likely to be put on the list of candidates 
for the responsible task of discussing with Germany the 
conditions under which the world may hope to see the 
end of the carnage ; but there are other men in Russia 
who most probably will have a good deal to do with the 
future development of the Empire. These are mostly 
new-comers, in the sense that they have not made their 
career in the different public offices of Petrograd, whence 
it was a tradition that Ministers were to be chosen. 
There is Prince Stcherbatoff, an accomplished gentle- 
man, whose intellectual leanings and quick and sound 
comprehension of the requirements of his country assure 
him quite an exceptional place. He is the scion of an 
old aristocratic house, is clever and cultured, and through 
his long sojourns abroad has been able to appreciate the 
advantages, and also notice the errors, into which a Con- 
stitutional government may fall. The political opinions 
of Prince Stcherbatoff are sound, and he is a sincere 
admirer of British civilisation and liberty. Having lived 

37 



Sovereigns and Statesmen of Europe 

■ good deal in rural districts of Russia, he understands 
the nature of the Russian peasant most thoroughly, 

knows what can be expected and what cannot, be required 
from him, and will be, perhaps, the first Minister of the 
Interior who will have seen Russia otherwise than from 
the bureaucratic point of view. This fact, gives him a 
considerable superiority over his predecessors. 

Side by side with him there is Count Paul Ignatieff, 
the distinguished son of most distinguished parents, who 
in the question of public instruction will bring the sound 
ideas of a man to whom none of the refinements of the 
West are unknown, and who understands that it is not 
sufficient to instruct a nation, but that one must also 
educate it and bring it to a true appreciation of its 
duties in regard to the State anil to itself. 

The choice of these two distinguished personages was 
entirely due to the action of the Emperor, from which 
we must conclude that those who say that Nicholas II. 
has no initiative talk about what they do not understand, 
because if there is one quality which the Tsar most 
certainly possesses, it is a soundness of judgment in the 
choice of his friends and collaborators. 

I think that so far T have given to my readers a 
short sketch of the principal people upon whose efforts 
the conduct of the State affairs of Russia will depend for 
the next ten years or so. Among them are some who, 
should a revolution break out, will have to disappear 
from the political scene, whilst others will most likely 
come into stronger prominence; and, indeed, the future 

3 



Count Benckendorff 

may also bring forward men as yet unknown, hut one 
can safely assume that it will he among the statesmen J 
bave mentioned that the Emperor will seek the people 
on whose efforts he will have to rely to restore order in 
his Empire after the war is over. 

The Russian Ambassador in London, Count Bencken- 
dorff, and M. I/volsky, the Ambassador in France, will, 
of course, be called upon to take part in the delibera- 
tions of an eventual congress. Count Benckendorff is 
i ^sentially a gentleman, an ideal upholder of the great 
traditions of the Russian Foreign Office. He is a 
shrewd, keen politician, one who never loses his head, no 
matter to what kind of provocation he may be subjected, 
very English in his tastes and in his personal appearance, 
speaking the language perfectly, and understanding better, 
perhaps, than any other man in Russia the English charac- 
ter and the great part played by Britain in the onward 
march of civilisation. Count Benckendorff is essentially 
a moderate man; he will never allow his personal feelings 
to sway him when looking into the facts of a case, and 
he will take good care not to lose the impartiality of his 
judgment in matters where the welfare of his country 
will be concerned. 

During the moments that preceded the war, when 
the Austrian ultimatum was staggering the public by its 
insolence, Count Benckendorff was perhaps the only man 
who did not underrate the situation, and Sir Edward 
Grey must have found him a valuable help during the 
anxious days when both Russian and English diplomacy 

39 



Sovereigns and Statesmen of Europe 

tried their best to avoid the impending catastrophe. His 
place is quite certain among the men whose duty it will 
be to oblige Prussian diplomacy to submit to conditions 
capable of assuring lasting peace to Europe, 

M. [zvolsky is different by nature from the Count. 
He is anything but B quiet man- -and quietness is the 
quality which will be required more than any other when 
the diplomacy o( the world shall meet, lie has always 
seemed to me to possess a positive genius for inventing 
difficulties where no one else would have seen any, and 
is credited with enjoying intrigue. lie is one of the most 
intelligent men the Russian Foreign Office possesses; his 
skill in writing a dispatch is something quite wonderful, 
ami his knowledge o( all the " finesses " of the French 
language invaluable, lie is fond of unravelling situations 
which, with the exception of himself, no other person 
would be daring enough to attempt to clear; and has, if 
an exaggerated idea of his personal importance, at least 
no mean one concerning his country's greatness. 

A long diplomatic experience of men and of politics 
has not softened M. Izvolsky's impetuosity of character, 
which makes him embarrassing at times. If he could be 
made to work in the background . without coming for- 
ward in any capacity save that oi' one o{ the best linguists 
which Europe possesses, then certainly he would render 
invaluable service; but this is hardly to be expected. 
M. [zvolsky might well prove the enfant terrible of the 
congress. 

T venture to put forward the opinion that in one 

40 





■BJHR 



* 



A Settlement by Kings 

respect at least the peaee congress, when it comes, will 
be totally different from any which has preceded it. It 
will not remain confined to the decisions of politicians ; 
Royalty will assert itself. The Sovereigns who, together 
with their subjects, have borne the brunt of the battle, 
and have identified themselves with the cause of the 
countries over which they rule, will certainly express 
their desires and opinions and defend the interests of their 
peoples. They will perforce come into personal inter- 
course with each other, and from their joint action great 
results can be expected. In difficult situations there is 
nothing like King to King conversations. 

In the better and happier world which we all expect 
to see when things have settled down after the war 
the prestige of Royalty will most certainly recover some 
of its lost ground, owing to the spirit of self-sacrifice 
displayed by Kings and Princes. The influence of 
Monarchs in this historical moment will prove far more 
beneficial than the cleverness of £he cleverest Minister. 
Whatever comes to be settled in the matter of that future 
peace, it is certain that heavy sacrifices will have to be 
made by one side as well as by the other. 

These sacrifices, before they are finally accepted, will 
have to obtain a higher sanction than that of a Ministerial 
signature. I hope I may be forgiven for saying that I 
feel proud to think that it is the combined effort of my 
Emperor and of his Royal Cousin of England that more 
than anything else will at last bring rest to a weary 
world. 

4i 



II 
FRANCE 

IT is related that when Prince Bismarck was told of 
the death of M. Thiers he exclaimed that France 
had lost its last statesman. Indeed, it had long been a 
tradition in Germany that France was no more than a 
nation of politicians, who thought only of the interests 
of the different parties to which they belonged whilst 
troubling little about the welfare of the country in 
general. German diplomats despised French statesmen, 
and though they might and ought to have known better, 
they remained imbued with the idea of the inferiority of 
France, not only in military matters, but also politically. 
This strange delusion was certainly one of the 
factors which brought about the present war, and it 
illustrates the utter want of foresight and of judgment 
which prevailed in German official circles in regard to 
what was going on abroad. In spite of their wonderfully 
organised spy system, they remained either in ignorance 
or supercilious indifference of the steadfast manner in 
which France had been adding to her military strength 
and efficiency. They had failed to grasp the French 
character, which, frivolous in appearance, yet has an 

abundant endowment of perseverance, and which is apt 

42 



German Delusions 

on occasion to rise to a higher degree of patriotism than 
is known in almost any other nation, England excepted. 

Right up to the days immediately before the war the 
Teuton still believed that France was a land of amuse- 
ment and Paris a city of pleasure, where the inhabitants 
preferred the enjoyment of the passing moment to any 
serious occupation. They flouted any suggestion that 
the Republic could consolidate itself on French soil, and 
treated Republican institutions with disdain, being con- 
vinced that in the long run they could only prove a source 
of disunion to the country. The alliance with Russia 
was particularly displeasing to Germany, not because 
they had feared France could help Russia, but rather 
because they did not wish Russia to come to the help 
of France. In that lay the salient miscalculation of 
Germany. 

The fact was that after the war of 1870 the Germans 
had ignored France from the height of the superiority 
which they imagined themselves to possess over her. 
To this was added a preconceived opinion that no 
Frenchman could put his patriotism above his party. In 
short, German Ministers did not think it worth the 
trouble to cultivate French friendship. The German 
military attaches, who took such care and trouble to 
find out the secrets of Russian armaments, never quite 
believed that by any possibility the French could raise 
their armaments to any degree of formidability. The 
prevailing feeling which existed in the German War 
Office was one of irritation that such a despicable enemy 

43 



Sovereigns and Statesmen of Europe 

as they thought the French to be could at the same time 
become so audacious as to show its teeth to the colossus 
by whom it had once been defeated. 

It was only when German diplomacy began to realise 
that in M. Delcasse was an opponent who was not to be 
despised that the Wilhelmstrasse showed some anxiety. 
But still it would probably have returned to the happy 
unconcern with which it had always treated the many 
administrations that had succeeded each other on the 
banks of the Seine had not King Edward VII. worked 
toward the establishment of an understanding between 
Britain, France and Russia sufficiently powerful to keep 
in check the Triple Alliance, about the solidarity of which 
no one at the time ventured to cast any doubt. 

This displeased the ruling oracles in Berlin. It dis- 
pleased Kaiser William II. even more, perhaps, because 
the latter instinctively felt that the antipathy which he 
inspired personally in his Royal Uncle had something 
to do with the hitter's political schemes. At all events, 
it was dating from this period that the German Govern- 
ment began seriously to think of the possibility of another 
war with France. With an aberration of mind which it 
is most difficult to explain, it never gave a thought to 
the contingency that such a war would mean another 
conflict with Russia, and most likely one with England. 

The last probability, in particular, never crossed any 
German brain. Great Britain, they believed, was far 
too selfish a nation ever to risk the bones of its soldiers 
in the cause of an ally. As for Russia, because she was 

44 



Prince Radolin 

supposed to stand always on the brink of a revolution of 
some kind, Germany was fully satisfied that her defeat 
would present no considerable difficulty. Another curious 
symptom in the relations between France and Germany 
during the last ten years or so was the care that the 
latter country took to establish social relations with the 
former, without giving any serious thought to cultivating 
a better political understanding. All the Ambassadors 
who were sent to Paris were told to cultivate the good 
graces of its fashionable set, but were never advised to 
frequent the Republican salons, where they could have 
had the opportunity of meeting the members of the 
Government apart from official intercourse. Prince 
Radolin, in fact, who was for something like ten years 
in possession of the German Embassy in France, had 
been chosen because he was married to a lady who was 
half French, and who, through her mother, had numerous 
relatives in the Faubourg St. Germain and among the 
old French aristocracy. 

That Germany treated the Republic as quite a 
negligible quantity was, perhaps, the best thing that 
could have happened for our Ally. France could, there- 
fore, develop herself undisturbed and perfect, without 
hindrance, the reorganisation of her army, her finance, 
her industry, and all the other material matters which 
stood in need of strengthening. The Republic had 
gradually established itself in the country, and established 
most strongly, in spite of the great differences which 
divided it. After the reverses of 1870 the nation had 

45 



Sovereigns and Statesmen of Europe 

realised that, whatever it might think individually, there 
was one point upon which it ought to be united, and 
that was in its love for its native soil. France had become 
the first thought of every man and woman. 

As years went on the chances of the various pretenders 
to Monarchical rule became more and more slender, until 
at last they dwindled down to nothing. The old parti- 
sans died ; their children resolutely gave their adhesion 
to the Republic. Compulsory military service did more 
than anything else to obliterate old memories and to draw 
together all the classes of the nation, until gradually 
the whole of France became saturated with democratic 
ideas. 

As this transformation took place new men came 
forward ; a young, energetic generation stepped into the 
arena, and began to make its influence felt everywhere. 
It was a studious generation, too, and it had done some- 
thing more than learn history in school ; it had associated 
itself with the people — the middle classes in most cases, 
and the lower ones in some — and thus had learned to 
know France as she really was. The ambition of these 
men was to lead France toward prosperity, to restore 
somewhat of her past glories, and who, whilst not frequent- 
ing the houses of the upper ten, prepared themselves in 
the silence of their studies for the day when they would 
stand side by side with these same upper ten in order 
to wipe off the memory of Sedan and of all the sad 
events which had followed upon that great disaster. 
These men, nor the mould of their character, did 

46 



France Reveals her Strength 

not enter into the calculations of German statesmen or 
German diplomats, who proved themselves, indeed, to 
be, if not absolutely incapable, at least deficient in that 
spirit of observation which ought to have been their first 
care. Had such a faculty been properly exercised, it 
would have revealed to them a France absolutely different 
from the one which they pictured : a France both earnest 
and courageous, determined to do her duty, and to do it 
well ; full of energy, of patriotism, of devotion to the 
great cause which she meant to defend ; relying not on 
others, but on herself, and trusting more to her spirit 
of self-sacrifice than to all the alliances which she might 
eventually make. That such a France existed was not 
suspected in Berlin ; it was hardly known to many 
Frenchmen themselves, and she was to reveal her strength 
in the hour of peril with an energy which proved that 
she had never ceased to be a great nation. 

French statesmen, too, showed themselves to be 
worthy descendants of the clever men who had upheld 
in the past the prestige of French diplomacy. They 
might not, perhaps, have been as polished as the 
seigneurs who had formerly presided over the Foreign 
Office, but they were strong men, clever men, men of 
action, who did not waste their time in trying to parry 
difficulties which did not exist, who paid no attention 
to trifles, but who seldom allowed anything to escape 
them out of which might have arisen a danger of some 
kind to their country. 

M. Delcasse, for instance, is a type of a great 

47 



Sovereigns and Statesmen of Europe 

Minister, and, though the age of Richelieu and Mazarin 
is past, he can still live in history as a man who, earlier 
than others, guessed the danger which threatened Europe. 
The personality of M. Delcasse has been very much dis- 
cussed. He has been accused of strong anti-German 
feelings ; and perhaps in a certain sense this accusation 
was deserved. Yet I do not think that he would have 
done anything to hasten the hour of a struggle which 
he, for one, guessed would be inevitable in the long 
run. He certainly did all that he could to win allies for 
France, and he undoubtedly worked toward securing the 
sympathy and the support of the Russian Press during 
his stay in Petrograd, whither he had gone as Ambassa- 
dor with considerable reluctance. He never felt happy 
far from his beloved Paris, and, further, he was a man 
who required to have his energies sustained by the 
excitement of parliamentary debates and parliamentary 
criticism, in which he was in his element. 

M. Delcasse has a strong character : he could carry 
through to its end any plan he had set himself to 
follow out. He has considerable self-assertion and no 
lack of masterf uiness, in the sense that where he met 
with opposition he never hesitated to destroy his adver- 
saries when he could not convince them. He understood 
admirably the difficult art of handling humanity, but 
he was not the intriguing individual the German Press 
has represented him to be. Indeed, he was far too 
violent to be able to indulge in intrigue ; and, besides, 
had not nearly sufficient patience or subtlety to play 

4 S 



M. Delcasse 

that game with advantage to himself or to his country. 
He would never have been able to wait long and patiently 
for something he had made up his mind to get, and he 
would rather have broken windows than have asked some- 
one to come and open them for him. When he was a 
member of the Cabinet he tried to carry through his 
naval programme against all advice to the contrary, and 
when he was an Ambassador in Petrograd he persuaded 
those with whom he was brought into contact to accept 
his opinions, and to back him in his determination to 
check German advance in the domains of industry and 
commerce with a strenuous thoroughness that was apt 
to overlook the fact that by doing so Russia might be 
endangering her own interests. 

And yet this man, who, as some of his friends 
declared, could never resign himself to a passive attitude 
no matter how important it might be for him to do so, 
has given a rare example of self-control since he joined 
the Viviani Ministry. He, who was so fond of speaking 
and of putting himself forward, has effaced himself, and 
applied all his energies to the administration of the 
department of which he has control. M. Delcasse has 
sacrificed his individuality with a truly grand abnegation, 
and has allowed himself to become entirely absorbed in 
the Cabinet of which he is a member. He has worked 
for France, and, whilst never forgetting that he is her 
servant, has never asked her to remember that such was 
the case or to offer him any reward for his efforts on 

her behalf. 

e 49 



Sovereigns and Statesmen of Europe 

When peace will have to be discussed there is no 
doubt but that M. Delcasse will be one of those who 
will have to defend the interests of his country on that 
occasion. His diplomatic experience, combined with 
his knowledge of humanity, will make him a powerful 
advocate. More so because he will know how to keep 
in check his natural impetuosity, and will never again 
allow himself to be carried away by his personal feelings, 
affections or aversions. Despite his hery disposition, he 
has learned a splendid self-control, and it is safe to 
prophesy that he will not even let his indignation burst 
forth, but will show himself throughout courteous, polite, 
conciliating even, but — inflexible as Fate. 

If M. Delcasse is a great Frenchman, M. Viviani is 
a great patriot, which is not quite the same thing. The 
entrance into the Radical Cabinet of this formerly 
Socialist lawyer created a scandal even among Republican 
circles in Paris society. Everybody had heard about 
M. Viviani. but no one knew him, when he suddenly 
accepted office, and everybody declared that it was a 
shame to allow such an outsider to rule in France. 
Naturally, being almost unknown, he was supposed to 
be an Anarchist, if not something worse ; he certainly 
was not suspected of being a clever man, capable of 
adapting himself to circumstances and of learning from 
others concerning matters which had not been taught him 
by his early masters. His education had been entirely 
self-acquired, and he had such a keen sense of what 
was required . of him that he quickly made up for the 

5° 



M. Viviani 

deficiencies of his training and adapted himself to his 
new position. 

I remember an amusing conversation about him 
which took place in the house of a lady (Madame de 
Caillavet) who enjoyed a considerable reputation for 
cleverness in Paris, where, so long as she lived, her 
salon was the meeting-place of all that was considered 
intellectual in France. It was about a month or two 
after M. Viviani had become a Minister, and a man — 
whose name I refrain from mentioning for obvious 
reasons, but who was not supposed to like M. Viviani, 
having had the opportunity to meet him at the house of 
an Ambassador where they had both been guests at a 
dinner — was asked by the hostess to tell her what he 
thought of him. " I think that he will go far," was 
the reply. "Why?" inquired Madame de Caillavet. 
" Because the first time I saw him he was still eating 
with his knife, whilst yesterday he did not even attempt 
to do so with his fish-knife," was the unexpected reply 
which delighted all in the room. 

This paradox had a deep meaning. M. Viviani's 
great merit has been to adapt himself not to circum- 
stances, as so many people merely do, but to the customs 
of good society and to the traditions of diplomatic and 
ministerial existence. Even when quite unaccustomed to 
the duties of his office he hardly ever made a mistake, 
and, fully conscious of the deficiencies which he owed to 
a youth spent in quite different surroundings, he at 
once grasped that it would not do to affect Republican 

5i 



Sovereigns and Statesmen of Europe 

manners and Republican disdain for conventionalities 
when talking with people who, nine times out of ten, 
paid more attention to outward trifles than to the real 
worth of a man. Moreover, M. Viviani was a great 
patriot, and he would not have cared to see France dis- 
paraged in his person. He wanted to appear irreproach- 
able in his manners and in his appearance for her sake, 
and he had shown of what stuff he was made when he 
applied himself not to allow the choice she had made of 
him to be either laughed at or discussed from the 
ridiculous point of view. 

When M. Viviani arrived in Petrograd last summer 
with M. Poincare he impressed most favourably all those 
who saw him, and who, after having expected to find 
an uncouth, unwashed, unshaven man, were pleasantly 
surprised to see that they had to deal with a gentleman 
of excellent manners, who made a charming companion, 
and was a politician of uncommon acumen, gifted with 
sufficient tact not to air opinions that might have clashed 
with those of the people whose guest he happened to be. 
He soon became a favourite, and those who had hoped 
to see France laughed at in his person were disappointed. 
M. Viviani proved to be more than a match for his 
detractors. 

He is, perhaps, one of the best politicians France 
has possessed for a long time. Not so brilliant as 
M. Delcasse\ he is nevertheless a good orator, capable 
sometimes of rising to real eloquence, and he has broad 
views which on occasion attain to grandeur. Not a 

52 



M. Jules Cambon 

refined man, he possesses that unerring instinct of 
primitive natures which makes them guess danger where 
others do not suspect it to lurk. He is quick in his 
decisions once he has made up his mind, but he is slow 
in coming to a decision, weighing with unusual prudence 
the pros and cons of every situation. Not so violent as 
M. Delcasse, he sometimes sees more quickly than his 
colleague the consequences of a political line of action, 
as well as the interpretation which the man in the street 
can eventually put on it; and, being himself a child of 
the people, he realises better than an aristocrat would 
what will be the opinions of the people on one subject 
or on another, and he is, therefore, able more acutely 
than any other man in France, perhaps, to interpret 
her feelings on the day when she will begin to square 
accounts with her enemies. M. Viviani is not likely to 
consent to represent his country at the peace congress, 
but most certainly he will be able to guide his colleagues 
who will do so, because he will intuitively know what 
the nation will be ready to sanction or not. 

Should M. Delcasse have to stand for the rights of 
France during the peace negotiations, it would surprise 
no one were he to ask M. Jules Cambon, who for so 
many years was French Ambassador in Berlin, to help 
him in his task. M. Cambon is one of the best 
diplomats of whom France can boast. 

It is due to the efforts of M. Cambon that Franco- 
German relations assumed such a courteous form during 
the years previous to the war. He worked conscientiously 

53 



Sovereigns and Statesmen of Europe 

at a rapprochement between his country and the one to 
which he was accredited, but at the same time he was 
not simple enough to believe implicitly in the protesta- 
tions which were made to him upon the subject by the 
German Foreign Office, and even by the Emperor 
William II. himself, with whom M. Cambon was a 
favourite. 

M. Cambon, with his quiet manners, was a wonderful 
observer, and he had noted, as his secret reports to his 
Government — if ever they are published in their entirety 
— will prove, a variety of small symptoms that had given 
him a good deal to think about. He had seen the military 
preparations of Prussia, and, though assured to the con- 
trary, had never doubted but that they were directed 
against his country. At the same time he always hoped 
that the catastrophe which he foresaw might yet be 
avoided, and had tried to dissipate as far as possible the 
supposed apprehensions which, as the German Govern- 
ment declared to him, the close relations existing between 
the Paris and the Petrograd Cabinets inspired in Berlin. 
He had done his best to prove that no change had taken 
place in those relations, and that France harboured no 
sinister designs against other countries. And when Herr 
von Jagow expressed to M. Cambon the opinion that 
the projected journey of M. Poincare to Russia consti- 
tuted a threat to Germany, M. Cambon used all his 
eloquence to explain to the Prussian Secretary of State 
that this trip was nothing else than a mere visit of 
courtesy, such as had become traditional for every 

54 



Rushing into War 

President of the French Republic to make after his 
election, ever since the time when M. Faure originated 
the custom. He added that in the case of M. Poincare 
it had not even been followed in its former details, 
because the latter had begun his wanderings abroad by 
going to London instead of showing himself first in 
Petrograd as his predecessors had done. Herr von 
Jagow sighed, but answered not a word, yet he allowed 
M. Cambon to guess that this explanation had not 
removed the bad impression which prevailed in the 
Wilhelmstrasse as well as in Potsdam. 

During the days that followed upon the Austrian 
ultimatum to Servia the position of M. Cambon was a 
most painful one, but he bravely stopped at his post to 
the last moment, and, together with Sir Edward Goschen 
and their Russian colleague, he worked unceasingly 
toward the solution of the artificial differences which, 
thanks to the encouragements received from Berlin, had 
arisen between Vienna and Belgrade. The Russian 
Orange Book and the other official documents published 
in London and in Paris prove that, so far as the French 
Government is concerned, it did not do a single thing 
which could have been construed in the sense of a provo- 
cation addressed either to Austria or to Germany. Not 
only it did not rush into a war, but on the contrary it 
bore with the utmost patience and dignity accusations 
and reproaches which were not only devoid of common 
sense, but simply launched at its head in order to 
exasperate it into doing or saying something which 

55 



Sovereigns and Statesmen of Europe 

Germany could have interpreted as an affront for which 
the only redress could be a call to arms. 

M. Cambon saw through that game, and made up 
his mind not to accept the challenge which his adver- 
saries wanted him to take up. He was of opinion that 
in the conflict which was going to begin France ought 
to place herself in the position of the attacked party, 
and not to fall into the mistake her politicians had made 
in 1870, when she had fallen into the snare set before 
her by Prince von Bismarck, and had declared war to 
Prussia as foolishly as uselessly. He meant to establish 
before the whole world, and before history later on, 
that France had been attacked, and attacked shamelessly 
and unscrupulously, at the very time when she had been 
doing all that she could do in order to save Europe the 
horrors of the most terribly devastating war it had ever 
seen. 

When the true history of the war comes to be written 
one of the facts that will strike most of its readers will 
be the dignified attitude which the French Government, 
and indeed the whole of France, contrived to maintain 
during the trying days that preceded the declaration of 
war. 

The Parisian population, which was supposed always 
to be ready to plunge into excesses, did not allow itself 
the slightest manifestation against the German Ambassa- 
dor nor any of his numerous compatriots, with whom, 
as usual every summer, the capital was quite full. Baron 
von Schoen was offered a special train on his departure ; 

56 



A Sacred Idea of Duty 

and whilst poor M. Cambon had to submit to any number 
of annoyances before he was allowed to leave Berlin, the 
representative of the Emperor William II. started on 
his journey in state, and was given every facility to 
rejoin his Sovereign. 

The truth of the matter was that France, whom her 
enemies had believed to be so careless and so light 
hearted, had understood, from the first moment that 
the text of Austria's ultimatum to Servia had become 
known to the general public, that she was standing on 
the threshold of a new and most important chapter of 
her history, and that she was going to pass through a 
crisis of unusual magnitude. This crisis she determined 
to meet earnestly, seriously, without bragging of any 
kind, and with the consciousness that, since it could not 
be avoided, it must be lived through and surmounted 
at any cost. She did not want to dishonour the mis- 
fortune that had befallen her by any unruly actions or 
by excesses which would be a reproach to her later on, 
and so she bravely set her back to the wall, and awaited 
the fate to which events had doomed her with a quiet 
courage. The cry of "A Berlin, a Berlin! " which had 
resounded day and night in the Paris streets in 1870 
was not heard in 1914. No one even gave a thought to 
the possibility of getting there, and the only eventuality 
one was looking forward to was that of bravely defending 
oneself, without any other aim than that of doing one's 
duty. This sacred idea of duty animated the citizens of 
France during that month of August, 1914 ; the nation 

57 



Sovereigns and Statesmen of Europe 

rose as one man to show her enemies that she had made 
up her mind not to be defeated a second time. 

M. Cambon at this critical period proved himself 
a worthy representative of his beloved land. To the 
insinuations and reproaches of Herr von Jagow he 
opposed simply a polite indifference, against which all 
the German's efforts broke down. M. Cambon did not 
defend the policy of the Government which he repre- 
sented; he simply defended France against unjust and 
false accusations, and he did so in a courteous, gentleman- 
like manner that left to the German Secretary of State 
no loophole for escape. So long as he could reasonably 
hope for a peaceful solution of the crisis, M. Jules 
Cambon worked for its attainment ; but when the gaunt- 
let was at last thrown violently into the face of Russia, 
then he gave the powers that ruled at the Wilhelmstrasse 
distinctly to understand that France was not going to 
abandon her ally, and that whatever happened to the 
latter would be considered as a provocation and an insult 
addressed also to France. At the close of his ambassa- 
dorial career in Germany, M. Cambon proved himself to 
be a first-class politician, as well as a diplomat of the 
highest order. During his long stay in Berlin he had 
studied the Prussian character, and if France was not 
quite so well prepared for the war as she had been led 
to believe was the case, it was certainly not the fault of 
M. Cambon, who had done his best to open the eyes of 
his Government to the imminence of a rupture with 
her Eastern neighbour. He had never believed in the 

58 



Indifference of Herr von Jagow 

protestation which at one time Dr. von Bethmann- 
Hollweg had made to him in regard to the pacific 
designs of Germany. His clear outlook and his diplo- 
matic experience had made him realise all that lurked 
behind the apparent frankness. 

M. Cambon was perfectly well aware of the different 
subterfuges resorted to by an opponent whose unscru- 
pulousness equalled his arrogance. He applied all his 
efforts to induce Herr von Jagow to accept the offer of 
a conference made by Sir Edward Grey. 

As we all know, the efforts of the French Ambassa- 
dor in those later days of July, 1914, came to nothing 
in the face of the attitude of indifference assumed by 
the German Secretary of State, Herr von Jagow, who 
was acting according to orders received from the Emperor 
and confirmed by the General Staff. Rightly or wrongly, 
the military party in Berlin was convinced that it would 
emerge with new laurels from the war which it intended 
to provoke, and every diplomatic action, therefore, was 
bound to break down before the preconceived determina- 
tion at which the rulers of Germany had arrived. 

It is, nevertheless, to be questioned whether anyone 
except M. Cambon would have been able to prevent the 
explosion of the catastrophe as long as he succeeded in 
doing, and it is impossible to admire sufficiently the 
ability which he displayed in those trying moments, 
when he never allowed himself to be carried away by 
the just indignation he must have experienced, but, with 
an inflexible determination, always kept Herr von Jagow 

59 



Sovereigns and Statesmen of Europe 

to the point under discussion. M. Cambon showed him- 
self worthy of France, just as much as France, in this 
decisive crisis in her national existence, deserved to see 
her interests defended by a man so well aware of the 
importance for her future reputation and for her place in 
history it was that his country should emerge with un- 
tarnished honour from the snare into which her traditional 
enemy had tried to entangle her. 

M. Jules Cambon 's brother Paul is equally clever and 
just as alive to the dangers and necessities of the hour 
as Jules. He represents his country at the Court of St. 
James's. M. Paul Cambon will also, most probably, have 
a word to say when peace comes to be discussed. France, 
indeed, has had rare luck in her choice of ambassadors. 
M. Barrere, for instance, in Rome, revealed himself to 
the world as a man of unusual ability. In the duel of 
diplomacy which he found himself called upon to fight 
with Prince von Biilow, and which did not turn out to 
the advantage of the German statesman, M. Barrere 
displayed quite wonderful skill, and contrived to win over 
to his side those in Italy who were still hesitating. The 
Latin sympathies of the subjects of Victor Emmanuel 
won the day, but it is still a question whether this would 
have happened so quickly had not M. Barrere succeeded 
in interesting the Italian Press in the cause of the Triple 
Understanding and in persuading it to stir the Italian 
nation to a conviction that she would commit a crime 
against all her past traditions were she to forget her old 
animosities against Austria, and to side with the enemies 

60 



More German Intrigues 

of France, to whose efforts on her behalf she owed her 
liberation from the Austrian yoke. 

Although the Teuton steadily refused to believe it, 
the statesmen in whose hands rested the destinies of 
France were far and away superior to those of Germany. 
In the presence of a diplomat like M. Cambon both the 
Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg and his aide-de-camp 
Von Jagow cut rather a sorry figure. The latter, by 
their conduct all through the crisis, made themselves 
odious where they did not appear ridiculous, while the 
leaders of French politics proved to the world that the 
best traditions of the Due de Talleyrand and of the Due 
Decazes were not forgotten at the Quai d'Orsay. 

Later on the world will learn that just before and 
immediately after the Austrian ultimatum had been sent 
to Servia, Germany attempted to enter into closer rela- 
tions with France and to win her by vague promises, 
which evidently were uttered either to mislead the French 
Government as to her real intentions, or else to make 
France appear in a false light before her Allies. Only 
very few of the inner circle of statesmen know the precise 
facts, but there are documents to prove to the hilt that 
Germany tried to sow dissension between Petrograd 
and Paris ; and if she did not succeed in this diabolical 
plan it was only because her diplomacy was conducted 
in the crude and coarse way that appeals to the German 
mind — and to no one else. 

There was one personality in Paris, M. Poincare, whose 
very name was hated in Germany with an impetuosity 

61 



Sovereigns and Statesmen of Europe 

which was akin to the ferocious. From the very first 
day of his election to the Presidency of the Republic he 
had become the bugbear of the German Press, as well 
as of the German public. Whilst M. Loubet and M. 
Fallieres had been spoken of with a certain courtesy — 
which, if not entirely respectful, at least could be inter- 
preted in that sense — their successor became the pet 
abomination of Prussia. M. Poincare was credited not 
only with bellicose intentions, but also with the most 
Machiavellian designs in regard to the whole of Europe. 
Some organs of the German Press had even gone so far 
as to accuse him of wishing to change his title of President 
into that of King, and of founding the dynasty of the 
Poincares, a flight of imagination which was the more 
delightful as M. Poincare has no children. 

A lady living in Berlin, who was ate fait with all that 
was going on, was writing to me on that subject at the 
time when the French President was about to pay his 
famous visit to Petrograd which provoked so much anger 
in Berlin, and she added that it was an open secret there 
that the Wilhelmstrasse intended not only to follow all 
the incidents of the visit with great attention, but also 
was determined to seize hold of the smallest excuse to 
provoke a conflict, either with France or with Russia. 
The Wilhelmstrasse felt afraid of M. PoincanTs activity, 
and circulated in quarters where they would spread hints 
of the President's dark designs in regard to the peace of 
the world, although, in reality, he was far from being the 

great Chauvinist his enemies liked to represent him. 

62 




M. Raymond Poincar£ 

President of the French Republic 



M. Poincare 

M. Poincare, however, was not the man to fall into 
any snare, and he was also wonderfully well informed as 
to all that was going on at Berlin. He did not wish for 
war, and was far too good a patriot to care to see his 
country entangled in conflict. He loyally stood by the 
side of his Ministers throughout the trying days when 
there was still some hope of avoiding the general con- 
flagration of Europe, and he certainly never encouraged 
them to do aught else than persevere in a most con- 
ciliating attitude, whilst keeping true to the engagements 
with her Allies, Russia and England, into which France 
had entered. 

It is to the eternal honour of Republican France 
that she proved to the world that her diplomats, though 
belonging to the middle classes, could maintain the same 
high sense of honour and dignity which characterised her 
Ministers and her ambassadors in early days when the 
statesmen of France belonged to her oldest aristocracy. 
Since 1870 a good deal has been done in the way of a 
total transformation of social scenes in France, and not 
the least among these transformations has been the quick 
manner in which young men born among the bourgeoisie 
have assimilated themselves with those whose earlier asso- 
ciations had been connected with the palaces of kings 
and the intimacy of sovereigns. Even the famous Jaures 
himself, who was supposed to be the leader of all the 
Socialist and Anarchist circles of his country, could boast 
of the manners of a gentleman, and certainly possessed 
the instincts of a true statesman. 

63 



Sovereigns and Statesmen of Europe 

Talking of M. Jaures reminds me of M. Clemenceau, 
who is the incarnation of French wit allied to French 
solid qualities. M. Clemenceau is one of the most original 
individualities of his time. For many years he destroyed 
by the sheer force of his inimitable sarcasms almost every 
Government he chose to attack — and hardly one of them, 
during the last twenty-five years, found grace in his eyes. 
When M. Clemenceau himself became the leader of a 
Government, he did not cease the criticisms which, all 
through his political life, he had enjoyed levelling at his 
colleagues and at the different Cabinets which he had 
helped to make or to unmake. 

Since the war began M. Clemenceau has continued 
criticising the Government, together with all that the 
latter had thought it useful to do in view of the national 
defence. After his paper, L'Homme Libre, had been 
repeatedly suppressed by the Censor, he changed its 
name to U Homme Enchaine, and continued most 
cleverly and wittily to draw the attention of the public to 
all that he thought worthy of the scathing irony of which 
he is a past master. If, however, one cares to study a 
little attentively the clever, sarcastic articles he writes 
with that entrain and that careful attention which he 
devotes to all products of his pen, one will find that at 
the bottom of the ridicule which he showers upon the 
people and the things which displease him there lurks a 
deep patriotic feeling and the passionate desire to be 
useful to his country. He knows very well that with 
French people the proverb that it is only ridicule which 

64 



M. Clemenceau 

kills is an exact description of the different impressions 
that move the crowds and make them appreciate the real 
worth of this or that thing. Whilst he hastens to laugh 
at the mistakes committed by his neighbour, it is only 
because he does not care to cry at them, to quote the 
words of Beaumarchais in the Figaro. 

M. Clemenceau is far too thorough a politician to 
indulge in tears, and, besides, is fully aware that the 
future in France belongs to men of action, and to them 
alone. Gifted with singular perspicacity and unusual 
shrewdness, he realises that the only means to keep the 
attention of his compatriots riveted on the extreme 
earnestness of the present situation is to talk to them 
continually about it, and to induce them, whilst discuss- 
ing the asides of a great drama, to interest themselves 
in its great issues constantly and without interruption. 
Fully conscious that his country stands in peril, he works 
in his own way at her salvation by never allowing her to 
forget that such is the case. 

With all his brilliant qualities, and perhaps on account 
of them, M. Clemenceau would never have made a good 
diplomat. He could not have resisted the temptation to 
make a witty remark about the very people he ought to 
have propitiated, and he could not have understood the 
art of keeping silent at times. But, for all that, he is 
a statesman, with the temperament of a statesman, and 
with all the broadness of view indispensable when one 
wants to play a prominent part in the conduct of the 
affairs of the world in general and of one's own country 
f 65 



Sovereigns and Statesmen of Europe 

in particular. When the question of peace arises, his 
quick grasp of the consequences of every resolution will 
prove of immense use, and, even if he is not among the 
delegates, he will be able to give them some sound advice, 
and at the same time to stimulate their energies, should 
these show a tendency to fail. M. Clemenceau is not 
only a statesman ; he is also the inspiring genius of other 
statesmen. 

In speaking of French statesmen I must not pass by 
M. Briand, who, though he has not made himself talked 
about as much as was the case at the beginning of his 
career, may be called to take a part in the work of the 
future congress. He is a wonderful example of a self- 
made man. Intelligent to an uncommon degree, he has 
risen step by step in the hierarchy of Society, and, having 
passed through all its degrees, has acquired a perfect 
knowledge of its weaknesses, meannesses, and also of its 
various intrigues. M. Briand understands to perfection 
the art of leading the masses and of securing their friend- 
ship and support, while at the same time he despises 
them. Having begun life as a workman, he has learnt 
how to speak with workmen, how to appeal to their feel- 
ings as well as to their instincts, and especially how to 
make them realise their own strength. He is cutting 
and even callous at times, but not often unjust. Being 
a fair-minded man, he resented deeply certain dark 
accusations which were made against him at a time when 
self-defence was impossible for reasons which could not 

then be revealed. Indeed, it is said that, even though 

66 



M. Briand 

he has high ambitions, he accepted a seat in the Cabinet 
less from ambition than because it afforded him the 
opportunity of meeting his enemies and crushing the 
cruel lies that were told about him. 

M. Briand has given proofs of his belief in his own 
capability when the right moment should come by the 
modesty with which he has taken a seat in the back- 
ground. It was thought at one time that he would only 
accept a place in the front row of the theatre where the 
great Comedie Humaine is played, but M. Briand is quite 
content to wait his time, certain, as he must feel, that his 
hour will come yet. He has by no means exhausted his 
capacity as a leader of men, and so far he has not compro- 
mised himself with any party. He is not a man of the 
past, hardly yet a man of the future, and he disdains to 
be a man of the present. 

M. Briand knows the golden value of silence and self- 
restraint, but he is decidedly not a weak man; he is 
ambitious, too, and this to an uncommon degree. He 
aspires to wield a dominating influence on his generation, 
and, in truth, he has more chance of becoming head of 
the State after M. Poincare than any other statesman in 
his country. His only serious rival as a possible President 
of the Republic would be a victorious general to whose 
successes the nation would owe the conclusion of an 
honourable peace with Germany. 

General Joffre has a strong though simple individu- 
ality. Up to last year he was almost unknown to the 
general public, who, though it knew he had been selected 

67 



Sovereigns and Statesmen of Europe 

for the post of Generalissimo in case of a foreign war, 
did not attach more importance to him than to any other 
general. At first, when the Germans tried that march 
on Paris in the summer of 1914, Joffre found many de- 
tractors who declared that he understood nothing about 
military matters and science, and that, had he really 
tried, he could have stopped the invading armies of the 
enemy at the frontier. When the battle of the Marne 
had obliged General von Kluck to retreat, Joffre became 
a popular hero ; then his enemies murmured he was far 
too slow in all his movements. His reputation has shared 
quite a barometric variation, fluctuating between good 
and bad weather with a mobility which would have 
shattered the nerves of any other man than himself. He 
bore with criticism, was never elated by praise, and he 
has gone his way slowly and quietly ; but it is to be 
questioned whether anyone but himself is aware of his 
ultimate intentions. 

When all the details of the diplomatic negotiations 
which preceded the declaration of war by Germany are 
recalled, a strong admiration is felt for the moderation of 
the French Government, against which stands out in 
vivid contrast the forgetfulness of the most elementary 
principles of diplomacy which, from the beginning to the 
very end of the crisis, signalised the conduct of the Berlin 
Cabinet. The world is now familiar with an abundance 
of examples of Germany's obtuseness in this way, an 
obtuseness which, were it not for the tragedy involved, 

became amusing at times. There was a distinct spice of 

68 



Tortuous Diplomacy 

humour in the assumed guilelessness with which — after 
the war had been going on for some time — Dr. von 
Bethmann-Hollweg made his vain endeavour to explain 
the unexplainable by reproaching France for not having 
exercised a moderating influence at Petrograd, where, 
according to the point of view the Chancellor then 
adopted, she could have induced Russia to give up her 
intention to stand by Servia. It raises a laugh, though 
a sad one, to think that Germany, who all the while 
had been entreated by England, Italy and France to 
persuade Austria to show herself moderate in regard to 
Servia, had bluntly refused to do anything of the kind. 
If ever there arose a question of two weights and two 
measures, it was during those days when the Berlin 
Cabinet insisted on others performing duties of honour 
it had refused to do on its own account. 

The successive stages of the diplomatic course which 
ended in the outbreak of hostilities furnish many a proof 
not only of German shiftiness but also of the honourable 
conduct of France. The details have been given to the 
public in Blue Books, Yellow Books and books of all 
the colours of the rainbow, but I have seen nowhere the 
following incident of those memorable days. 

I must ask the indulgence of taking no responsibility 
for the incident, but it reached me from a source I have 
good reason to trust. It seems that when the German 
ultimatum was sent to Russia a great friend of the 
German Chancellor called upon him to discuss the situa- 
tion, the extreme seriousness of which did not seem to 

69 



# Sovereigns and Statesmen of Europe 

strike Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg as it ought to have 
done. The gentleman in question, who had lived many 
years in Russia and who knew the country well, tried to 
explain to the Minister that it would not be such an easy 
matter to get the upper hand in a war with Russia, as 
both the people and the army had vastly improved since 
the war with Japan. " You will find that you have to 
do with a formidable adversary, who will not yield one 
inch of ground without making you pay most heavily for 
it," he said; " and you must not forget that you will 
have to defend yourself on two fronts, and that France, 
if not better organised than Russia is nowadays, is at 
least her equal. Are you sure it will be possible for you 
to carry on war with the whole of Europe, for this is 
practically what will happen? England will not remain 
indifferent to the fate of her neighbour across the 
Channel, and, as for Italy, it is an open question whether 
she will keep true to her engagements." 

" But suppose that all you tell me is true," replied 
Bethmann-Hollweg, ' ; what would you advise us to do in 
the present dilemma?" 

"What I would propose to do? It is quite simple. 
I should offer immediately to France — in an official note 
which I would cause to be published in all the newspapers 
of the world — to take part in a conference as to the possi- 
bility of granting autonomy to Alsace Lorraine. This 
conference could always be dragged on, and finally would 
lead to nothing; but the moral effect would have been 
produced, and in the meanwhile France would not have 

7o 



What Edward VII. achieved 

helped Russia, with whom you would have fought single- 
handed. No Government would have lived an hour in 
Paris if it had sided with that of the Tsar and not accepted 
your offer. You could have done what you liked after- 
wards, and this bold step would put an end once for all 
to the Franco-Russian alliance and to all the political 
coalitions which the cleverness of King Edward VII. 
brought about." 

The German Chancellor sighed, but, though he made 
no reply to this Machiavellian proposal, it was evident 
that it impressed him deeply. As was to be expected, 
the proposal itself remained a dead letter. Bismarck 
would have understood its deep meaning and appreciated 
it; Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg, very probably, did not 
even mention it to the Emperor. 

This war has revealed the French character as far 
more earnest, steady and courageous than one had sup- 
posed. Frenchmen, when they saw themselves confronted 
by a crisis upon which their future existence as a nation 
depended, forgot even to boast about their patriotism*, 
but simply took up their rifles or volunteered for other 
work than soldiering if they were past military age. 
They forgot their personal grievances, the differences of 
opinions which had divided their political parties ; and 
statesmen, diplomats, generals, private men, delicate 
women, boys and girls — one and all flew to defend their 
beloved land in the hour of her peril. If ever a nation 
deserved to win a war that had been forced upon it, it 
is the France of the twentieth century. 

7i 



Ill 
AUSTRIA 

FROM the days of Metternich Austria held credit 
for possessing an unrivalled knowledge of all the 
ins and outs of diplomacy. Recently, however, she 
has cut a more than sorry figure in the events that, 
either directly or indirectly, have led to the present crisis. 
Her attitude during the Balkan War was hardly less than 
stupid and unscrupulous, and in the first movements 
she, more than anyone, was responsible for the universal 
conflagration of Europe. 

The fact is that Austria has lived on the tradition of 
a past greatness which not even existed, but which had 
been artificially manufactured at the beginning of the 
last century by that veteran of diplomacy, Prince 
Metternich. 

The personality of the present Austrian Monarch 
deserves a few words of description. Francis Joseph 
was but a youth of eighteen when he found himself called 
upon to ascend the throne which his half -imbecile uncle, 
Ferdinand, had been compelled to abdicate. He had 
been almost entirely brought up by his mother, the Arch- 
duchess Sophy, a clever, ambitious, hard woman, who 
could never resign herself to the loss of an Imperial rank 

72 



Archduchess Sophy 

to which she had believed, when she married, that she 
would be raised one day. She had been obliged to give 
up that hope, and had determined, at least, to rule under 
the name of her son, whom she succeeded in keeping 
under her influence up to the day of her own death ; and 
this notwithstanding the beauty, charm, cleverness and 
general attractiveness of her daughter-in-law, the lovely 
Empress Elisabeth, who could never get her own way so 
long as her formidable mother-in-law remained alive. 

The Archduchess, in spite of what has been said to 
the contrary, was never fond of her children, in whom 
she only saw the means of satisfying her ambitions, but 
nothing else. She had been very beautiful in her youth, 
and remembered it still, and perhaps this accounted for 
the absence of charity which she displayed in all her 
criticisms of other women. She had been very fond of 
Prince Metternich, and had especially appreciated his 
politics, and when the revolution of 1848 forced the 
Prince to go into exile it was a great source of grief to 
her. She was most autocratic by temperament, and 
sympathised with the ultra-conservative principles of the 
old statesman and with his fear and abomination of every- 
thing which savoured, if even from afar, of Liberalism. 

When the Hungarian mutiny broke out, she urged 
her son and his advisers to adopt violent and severe 
repression, and it was partly at her suggestion that the 
cry for help, to which the Tsar Nicholas I. responded so 
generously, was uttered by Francis Joseph. 

This dispatch of Russian troops to Hungary was one 

73 



Sovereigns and Statesmen of Europe 

of those mistakes for which there is no excuse from the 
political point of view. Nicholas I. himself was partly 
aware of it, but, chivalrous as he was by nature and by 
temperament, he believed he was performing a duty in 
rushing to the rescue of a brother Sovereign threatened 
by rebellious subjects. He never thought that the reward 
which his descendants would reap for this generous step 
would be the perfidies which resulted in the great war 
of 1914. 

But the present head of the Habsburg dynasty has 
been one of the most criticised Monarchs of the last 
half -century. It has been freely stated that his mental 
standard is at fault, while others blame his moral outlook ; 
perhaps he thinks himself above the ordinary rules which 
govern mankind. Whatever the cause, the fact remains 
that, rightly or wrongly, his private life and his public 
career have often been presented in hardly creditable 
aspects. 

Among the incidents which are still remembered by a 
world not given to charity and always eager for gossip 
is the attitude of the Emperor Francis Joseph in regard 
to his accomplished consort, who was so unhappy in her 
married life with him, and his conduct in regard to his 
only son, for whose tragic death a great deal of the respon- 
sibility is said by some people to be the Emperor's. His 
relations, too, with other members of his family have been 
harshly domineering ; such, for instance, as the incident 
of the unfortunate Crown Princess of Saxony. As head 
of her house, he ought to have taken her part when she 

74 



Royal Family Squabbles 

appealed to him. Instead, he deprived her of her title 
of Archduchess before even it was officially known that 
she had fled from Dresden. It is sufficient to recall these 
few incidents to come to the conclusion that Francis 
Joseph, the chief of the Habsburgs, has not cultivated 
the virtue of charity with as much assiduity as becomes 
those who live in glass houses. As for his public career, 
it would require a volume longer than I would care to 
write to relate all that could be said of its episodes. 

Old as he is, the Emperor is far from being the 
political nonentity which he is sometimes represented by 
his subjects. On the contrary, he takes a keen interest 
in all that goes on in his monarchy, so long as it does not 
interfere with his personal comfort, his summer vacation 
at Ischl, and his friendship with Frau Schratt, the clever 
Vienna actress, who for more years than they would 
both care to count has been his adviser in all matters, 
whether private or public. 

In spite of his eighty-odd years, he is still ambitious, 
and, strange as this may seem, he dreams of the day when 
he will be able to call himself the conqueror of Russia, 
putting behind him the thought that had she not given 
timely help in the past he would not be to-day in posses- 
sion of his throne. 

When his only son perished under such tragic 
circumstances he naturally felt sorry, but it is certain 
that a source of considerable anxiety ceased to exist, as 
the strongly divergent political opinions of the Crown 
Prince had caused a good deal of annoyance to his father. 

75 



Sovereigns and Statesmen of Europe 

The Emperor Francis Joseph had few intellectual tastes, 
and therefore could hardly be expected to sympathise 
with his son's temperament or with the artistic instincts 
of his wife. He was hardly ever seen to take up a book, and 
when he had read the short reports his Ministers presented 
to him respecting the affairs of State he believed that he 
had done his share of brain-work for the day. Sometimes 
he would take up a newspaper, such as the Vienna 
Fremdenblatt, but this was seldom. He used to get up 
earlier than the lark, and retire at sundown. He liked to 
drive in his park, to roam about looking at the deer, and 
sometimes to exchange a remark with one of his attend- 
ants. He was considered to be most tyrannical in his 
family circle, and he was perfectly aware that none of his 
relatives cared for him ; but he did not mind in the least, 
seeing that the fact could not influence any of his bodily 
comforts. 

He had little love for his son. He detested his 
nephew, the late Archduke Francis Ferdinand, whom he 
reproached with trying to make himself popular at his 
uncle's expense, and whom he secretly envied for the 
success which he had achieved among the chauvinistic 
circles of Vienna Society. The Emperor was very well 
aware that only a few years ago it was openly said that 
he had survived himself, and that the Empire required 
for its leader a younger and more energetic man. These 
sayings were reported to him by his own small circle of 
personal friends, among whom the Archduke Francis 
Ferdinand, and especially his wife — the clever and 

76 



Archduke Francis Ferdinand 

ambitious Countess Sophy Chotek — were both intensely 
disliked and even more feared. Francis Joseph was not 
in the least disturbed, though such gossip angered him, 
as he considered that so long as he was alive no one had 
the right to be anything else but intensely pleased. 

Though this fact has not, so far as I know, been 
made public, it was in reality owing to the old Emperor 
that the Archduke Francis Ferdinand was given the 
reputation of being a partisan of war, for in fostering the 
idea Francis Joseph thought he was diminishing the popu- 
larity which he believed the Archduke was beginning to 
enjoy at his expense. 

In reality, Francis Ferdinand, far from wishing 
Austria to go to war, used his best endeavours at the 
time of the Balkan crisis to prevent her from doing so. 
A war did not in the least enter into his programme, nor 
that of his consort. The latter aspired to be recognised 
one day as Queen of Hungary, in case it should be found 
quite impossible to become Empress of Austria, and she 
also wished her children to be given the right to succeed 
to their father in all his titles and dignities. She was 
confidently optimistic in her belief that ultimately she 
could brush aside the renunciations of succession that 
Francis Ferdinand had already made, but she understood 
quite well that she could never do so if Austria were 
defeated in a war, the onus of which would rest on the 
shoulders of the Archduke, and injure his reputation and 
authority in the country so fearfully that he could never 
afterwards run the risk of attempting to raise to his own 

77 



Sovereigns and Statesmen of Europe 

rank the lady whom he had wedded in defiance of the 
wishes of his family. The influence of the Duchess of 
Hohenberg was, therefore, directed toward peace in 
general, and she did all she could to persuade her husband 
to throw cold water on the clamourings of the military 
party, which in Vienna was doing its best to induce half 
the world to begin fighting with the other half. 

Had not the Archduke Francis Ferdinand been 
murdered at Sarajevo, it is likely that Europe would have 
been at peace to-day. With all his defects, he possessed 
a good fund of common sense, and not only a high idea 
of his personal responsibility, but also strong humani- 
tarian feelings. He was a better man than he was given 
credit for being ; he was honest and kind ; he loved his 
country sincerely, earnestly, with the steadfast purpose 
to work toward its prosperity and welfare. He had less 
ambition than his aged uncle, and certainly was more 
scrupulous. At heart he despised Francis Joseph, though 
in some things he resembled him ; for instance, in his 
bigotry, and in his hatred of Russia and of the dynasty 
that occupied her throne. The Archduke cherished the 
idea of forming a union of all the Slav populations of the 
Balkan Peninsula under the wing of Austria, and so to 
snatch them away from the sphere of influence of Moscow 
and of the Slavophil committees. He was more than 
friendly with King Ferdinand of Bulgaria, whom he 
hoped to see come forward and boldly claim the succes- 
sion to the throne of ancient Byzantium. But though he 
hoped thus to find Russia ousted from her traditional role 



Emperor versus Archduke 

of protector of the Greek communities in the Near East, 
it is yet to be questioned whether he would have made 
war upon her to further his plans. He disliked adven- 
tures, and made no secret of the abhorrence with which 
they inspired him. 

Right up to the last day of Francis Ferdinand's 
existence he and his uncle, the Emperor, were in conflict 
with each other; not openly, perhaps, but under cover 
of the purely official relations which they entertained in 
regard to one another, very effectively, and they never 
missed an opportunity to show it to the world. The 
Archduke kept shrugging his shoulders in a deprecating 
way whenever anything connected with the old Sovereign 
was mentioned ; and, as for Francis Joseph, he made no 
secret, before his friends, of his opinion of his nephew, 
whom he accused of wishing to lead the Austrian 
Monarchy to its ruin. 

Antagonism of this nature, and from such a high 
source, naturally complexed the difficulties of the Arch- 
duke and his Duchess, who already were under a certain 
measure of ostracism because of their morganatic mar- 
riage. Nevertheless, they made friends for themselves 
and won partisans in those circles which did not compose 
the ultra-select circle of Viennese Society. New men 
of progressive principles gathered round the Archduke 
Francis Ferdinand and his wife, whilst old politicians 
tried to win their favour, and soon the Archduke found 
himself the central figure of a small but powerful party 
who adopted for its slogan, " Avanti! Avanti! " (" For- 

79 



Sovereigns and Statesmen of Europe 

ward! Forward!"), the motto which belonged to the 
House of Savoy, to which Francis Ferdinand himself was 

distantly related through his mother, a Princess of the 
Two Sicilies. 

Strangely enough, though personally the Archduke 
had absolutely no influence on the course of affairs, and 
though he was never allowed by his uncle to proffer 
advice upon any important political question, it was the 
men who belonged to the small set that gathered round 
him and his accomplished wife who ruled Austria. State 
Ministers and officials who were responsible for the 
politics of the country — the whole of official Austria, 
indeed — sided with the Archduke. 

Francis Joseph himself, though secretly desirous of 
war, did not care to see it published abroad that that 
was his aim. He therefore declared that he was doing 
all that he could to persuade the different Balkan States 
to live at peace with each other, yet all the time he kept 
secretly fomenting their divisions and setting them at 
loggerheads. The aged Monarch, who would have felt 
most disappointed had the Servian incident come to an 
end without setting lire to the four corners of Europe, 
spent his days in solemnly declaring that he was doing 
everything that was possible to eliminate all danger oi' 
a war — if, after all, it broke out, it would not be his 
fault, but that of France and Russia combined. 

Some people have wondered whether Francis Joseph 
was conscious of his acts, and have attributed to senility 
the erratic manifestations of his strange character. This 

80 



Rudolfs Dreadful End 

false opinion must not be allowed to remain. The 
Austrian Monarch is not different to-day from what he- 
was thirty or forty years ago, when, at the time of the 
Hungarian mutiny, be caused delicate women to be 
publicly flogged and sent to the scaffold the noblest 
representatives of the aristocracy of that land. 

The Emperor Nicholas I. had befriended and pro- 
tected him, treated him as a brother, and finally consoli- 
dated him on his throne. Less than ten years after that 
time, on the outbreak of the Crimean War, his conduct 
reached the extreme limits of indecent ingratitude. Later 
on, when the Archduke Maximilian had started on that 
ill-fated expedition to Mexico, his brother Francis Joseph, 
who might have come to his rescue, allowed matters to 
diift until the consummation of the tragedy that, under 
the walls of Queretaro, put an end to so many legitimate 
ambitions. If all that was told on this occasion can be 
believed, Francis Joseph — who always saw a rival in his 
brother because of his greater culture and intelligence — 
accepted with utter indifference a stroke of fate that 
destroyed a life which might still have been exceedingly 
useful. 

When his son Rudolf came to his dreadful end lie 
showed just as deep resignation. When his wife fell 
under an assassin's file he received the news with a melo- 
dramatic phrase that was reproduced in all the newspapers 
of the world, but never thought of starting for Geneva 
in order to look upon her dead features for the last time. 
When, at last, his nephew and future successor was killed 
g 81 



Sovereigns and Statesmen of Europe 

in that small Bosnian town he used the crime as an oppor- 
tunity to satisfy his long-dormant ambitions, and to 
precipitate nearly the whole of Europe into a disaster for 
which there exists no parallel in history. So much for 
the principal actor in the drama. Posterity shall judge 
him. 

Next to the Emperor stand other figures, the principal 
of whom has already gone to his rest. Baron (afterwards 
Count) d'Aehrenthal was certainly a curious type of the 
self-made man in a country where aristocratic prejudice 
plays such an important part in everything that takes 
place, not only in Society, but also in public life. A 
Hebrew by origin, he spent his life in denying the race 
which gave him birth. A pupil of the Jesuits, he gave 
most of his time to the task of winning the support of 
the Clerical party in Austria, and succeeded in doing so 
to a certain extent. He was clever, with a tolerable 
physique, in which, however, the Jewish type was 
strongly noticeable. He was an accomplished man of the 
world, a great admirer of the fair sex (which circumstance 
proved of infinite value to him in his official career), and 
a very keen observer, though he secured the reputation 
of never doing anything at the right moment. He looked 
at nothing so much as his personal success in all that he 
was called upon to do; he was very quick at perceiving 
the weaknesses of every person and every situation, and 
he hastened to appeal to them whenever he believed that 
this might become profitable to his schemes, of which he 
had many more than the world gave him credit for. He 

82 



Count cTAehrenthal 

was intelligent to an uncommon degree, but too personal 
and without enough application ever to carry through 
those schemes of which he felt so inordinately proud. 

As a diplomat he was successful, but as a man he was 
hardly anything else than a sorry failure, owing to his 
limited tact and unlimited insolence. His enemies, of 
whom he had many, criticised him unmercifully ; his 
adversaries always suspected his veracity ; his friends 
doubted his sincerity, even when convinced of his abilities. 
II is propensity for intrigue enabled him to achieve in the 
course of his rapid career several unmistakable triumphs, 
but it deprived him of the esteem of his contemporaries. 

A great part of Baron d'AehrenthaPs diplomatic 
experience had been gained in Russia, but this did not 
help him to understand the Russian character, which he 
judged according to what he had seen in Petrograd. He 
had taken no care to study Russian middle classes or 
Russian intelligentzia — to use the word commonly em- 
ployed when speaking of the Liberal and intellectual 
elements in the country. He had listened only to those 
who had never mixed with the people and who had 
no interests outside their own. He only gained know- 
ledge of the cosmopolitan Society of Petrograd, and, 
when he found himself at the head of Austrian foreign 
affairs, he used this limited knowledge in all his sub- 
sequent actions as if it were typical of Russia as a 
whole. 

Count d'Aehrenthal had been a great favourite among 
smart people in the Russian capital, and this fact had 

83 



Sovereigns and Statesmen o( Europe 

cured his perceptions in rejiard to the importance 01 
the thinking people of the nation. When he returned to 
V enna it was with the conviction thai he had acquired 
a thorough knowledge] not only of the Russian character, 

but also of the country in general, its resources, and its 
weaknesses, politically and economically. During his 

tenure of office in Russia he had been I guest at various 
country houses, during the course of which he had 

imagined he had learned enough to understand the 
material conditions of the vast Empire against which he 

meant to throw the Habsburg Monarchy ; and when he 
found himself once more in his native country he hastened 
to use his fancied experience to start a new policy, more 

independent, more aggressive, more ambitions than the 
one which until then had been followed at the Ball 
Plata. 

It has been said that Count d'Aehrenthal had 
ingratiated himself with the then heir presumptive to 
the Austrian Crown, the Arehduke Francis Ferdinand, 
and that it was partly owing to the tatter's support that 
he had been chosen for the important position o( Minister 
for Foreign Affairs. This is an absolute mistake. The 
one person whose protection did more for him than any- 
thing else was Fran Sehratt. formerly an actress in one 
of the small Viennese theatres. Fran Sehratt is in her 
way a remarkable woman. For years she has been a 
friend of the Emperor Francis Joseph, with whom she 
has considerable influence. She is also upon exceedingly 
good terms with the other members of the Imperial 

84 



r Jfjc Emperor and J ; rau Schratt 

1 BMly ! ' fhty Arehdueb' 

one time bad looked ad t her* 

Fran Schratt ii no courant of all that goes on in the 
r of politics in og more than disc 

keep* that knowledge to herself. She u not ambitious 
in the lense of granting bet influence to be recognised or 
acknowledged, neither u ibe n entful, and her invariable 
good nature bat made her forgive the many attempt. 
oust her out of \\<-.v position as the Sov< r< ign J best friend 
arid counsellor. Without being an avaricious woman, she 
bai nevertheless contrived to gather up a comfortable \ 
fortune, and .fie can afford to look upon the future with 
equanimity and surely this is all that a woman wl 
youth is a thing of the past can hope or wish for, especially 
when, as is the case with Frau Schratt, she can boast of 
a peaceful conscience and of the knowledge that she has 
never, willingly, done harm to anyone, not even to U. 
who tried their best to vilify her. 

It was to the good offices of this lady that Count 
d'Aehrenthal hud recourse on more than one occasion at 
the time irhen he was still a struggling young diplomat, 
with hardly any other prospects in life save those of 
trudging through the different stages of his career until 
the time arrived when he should feel compelled by old 
age to retire upon the moderate pension which hisservu 
would procure. He was an amusing talker, as J think I 
have remarked already; he knew how to relate anecdotes 
in bright, pleasing language, and lie had seen enough of 
foreign countries and of foreign Courts to have gathered 



8 



5 



Sovereigns and Statesmen oi Kurope 

thing through tho wt] 
ri-.e Count was, i^w .-. i 
sumi Batterer of the fair sex. to whom he adopted 

ss iming homage which hud I particular 
•-.. When he found himself in the presence of i 

- to let her .. ess thai he 
lik< - • . - • as to \x vn - d to fall in 

love with her! and - when he met a less 

prepossessing one he instantly declared to her that he 
had so from the tirst minute that he had set exes 

o her. Tins manoeuvre pre the effect that he 

wanted, and made him a general favourite even with 
persons who were already seasoned with considerable 
experience, and who were amused rather than deceived 
by his tactics. 

Wl tin exigencies of i smooth career brought 

( i at d'Aehrenthal to Vienna, his tirst call was on Fran 
Schratt, and. clever enough never to ask her point-blank 
to help him in any way, he yet contrived to imbue her 
with the feeling that she ought to do so. To tell the 
truth, the lady welcomed with an unusual pleasure the 
advent into her eirele of intimate friends of the young 
diplomat, who. without any ostentation, gave her many 
useful details that proved of immense value to her in her 
conversations with the Emperor. 

When, therefore, he left Russia to occupy a post in 
the Austrian Foreign Office at Vienna, she contrived to 
introduce him to Francis Joseph and to arrange several 
informal meetings between them at her own house: and 

86 



The hmperor's Undying Grudge 

thui granted to him to earn 

• i 

and to irhi< . : < 

I have aln Emperor had n 

an undyinj B iat a 

Romanoff had rushed to hif 

order among bit revolted Elungariai ijed Prai 
Joseph, moreover, was most anxious to pei 
to take the lead in Balkan affairs not, perhaps, 00 much 
out of personal ambition at from bis conviction that it 
the only way to thwart tl I of the 

Greel religion in th< I-.- t. The Emperor's con- 

fessor •'■ J< lit who had imbued Pranci Jo eph with 
the sophistical thinking peculiar to his order and which 

lal to his own temperament. Under the u 
of working for the benefit of the Roman Catholic faith, 
the Emperor of ilf- dual monarchy followed the example 
set to him by his ancestress Marie Therese, who, according 
to the words of Frederick the Great, was "always weep- 
ing when talking of the misfortunes of Poland, but at the 
same time taking what she could out of its t e rri to rv," 
and be caught eagerly at the idea of annexing to his 
dominions the two unfortunate Slav provinces which, 
through an aberration of European politicians, had been 
handed over to liis tender care as a result, of the delibera- 
tions of the famous Congress of Berlin. 

The possibility of taking this important political step 

began to haunt the imagination of the old Sovereign, 

*7 



Sovereigns and Statesmen of Europe 

who even wont so far as to discuss it with his future 
:essor. The latter, however, did not accept the idea 
with the alacrity which his uncle had expected. The 
fact was that Francis Ferdinand did not care to have 
Austria enter into new complications at a time when a 
change in the person of the Monarch might reasonably 
be expected to occur very soon. The Archduke Francis 
Ferdinand had in mind his own plans and ideas and 
ambitions, in which a policy o( rivalry with Russia did 
not play any part for the moment. He was not a lover 
of this particular enemy of his country and ol' his race, 
but his common sense told him that, as things stood, it 
was far better and far wiser to leave them alone, and not 
to raise a ghost that it might become very difficult to lay 
later on. The Archduke, though a strong personality, 
stronger than clever, and though not devoid of the desire 
to leave his mark in the history o( the world, had latterly 
begun to distrust the feelings of the Emperor William, 
without whose help it was impossible for Austria to think 
upon launching into any adventure, and he would have 
infinitely preferred his uncle to throw cold water upon 
the bellicose plans of Count d'Aehrcnthal. 

Count d'Aehrcnthal, however, was not a man to give 
up any of his plans unless it suited him to do so. He 
therefore began to represent Francis Ferdinand to the 
Emperor as wanting in determination on account oi^ the 
false position into which his morganatic marriage with 
the Countess Sophy Chotek had thrust him. This con- 
tention was not, perhaps, so untrue after all, because it 

88 



Bosnia and Herzegovina 

is certain that the marriage played a great part in the 
conduct of the Archduke and made him more susceptible 

to the influence of those who were of opinion that the 
peaee of Europe ought to be guarded at all costs than 

perhaps would otherwise have been the ease. 

In any rase the Archduke would be allowed very little 
say in the affairs of State, as the Emperor, always of a 
tyrannical nature, was not at all inelined to allow his 
nephew's voice to be heard; but the aeceptability of 
Count d'Aehrenthal's insinuations led the Emperor to 
become persuaded of his (the Count's) political acumen, 
and he put himself blindly into his hands, thus laying 
the first stick to the fire that was so soon to set Europe 
ablaze. 

The annexation of Bosnia and of Herzegovina, to the 
great surprise of many politicians, passed off without 
bringing any further complications. The fact was that 
no one wanted to go to war for the sake of these two 
provinees, and if Count d'Aehrenthal had hoped this bold 
movement would furnish the pretext for an attack by 
Russia on the realm of the Habsburgs, he was vastly 
mistaken. The fact had been discounted and discussed 
in all the different chancelleries, and it had been decided 
that it would be stupid to play into the enemy's hands 
and to give the Austrian Government the satisfaction of 
finding that its schemes had met with the success which 
it had expected. 

The failure of his scheme caused a deal of sorrow to 
Count d'Aehrenthal. He had told any number of un- 

89 



Sovereigns and Statesmen of Europe 

truths to his Sovereign concerning the materia] resources 

of Russia ; he had lured him on with the hopes of an 
easy victory over the Muscovite forces, and he became 

deeply concerned to find that, no matter what he 
attempted to do, no one seemed to take the least notice. 
It was then that were started, not only in Vienna itself, 
but all over the Balkan Peninsula — at Constantinople, 
Bucharest, Belgrade and Sofia, intrigues that culminated 
in the first, and very soon afterwards in the second, 
Balkan War, which could never have taken place had inn 
King Ferdinand of Bulgaria been encouraged in his 
scheme of destroying Servia by the assurances of the 
Austrian Minister, Count de Tarnow-Tarnovski, a Pole 
who, besides his Austrian sympathies, was actuated in 
all he did by the traditional enmity which existed between 
Russia and his own race. 

It is difficult to imagine what would have happened 
had Count d'Aehrenthal remained in the land of the 
living. Perhaps the war that broke out last year might 
have done so earlier ; perhaps it would have been delayed ; 
no one knows. But though relatively a young man, the 
Austrian Minister was carried off after an illness of con- 
siderable duration. He left behind him an inheritance 
embarrassed by many mistakes and endangered by many 
follies. 

The question as to who should be his successor became 
one of absorbing interest, and was followed every where — 
in Berlin, as well as in Paris, London and Petrograd 
— with considerable anxiety. Many names were put for- 

90 



Count Berchtold 

ward as men likely to eontinue the policy which, in the 
opinion of the Emperor Francis Joseph, had been so 
successfully inaugurated by Count d'Aehrenthal. None 
of them, however, found favour in the Emperor's 
eyes, until at last, to the surprise of some people who 
believed he had insufficient experience for such a post, the 
Austrian Ambassador in Petrograd, Count Berchtold, 
was appointed by Imperial rescript Minister for Foreign 
Affairs and head of the Imperial Household, two offices 
which by tradition are always linked together. 

Count Berchtold was very different in character from 
his predecessor. First of all, he was a gentleman, not 
only by education, but also by birth, and belonged to 
the highest social sphere. There was nothing of the self- 
made man about him, but a good deal of that arrogance 
which is so characteristic of the Austrian aristocracy, and 
which combined, as is so often the case, with inexperience 
of the realities of life makes it such a dangerous element 
in the political arena of Austria. He was fairly intelli- 
gent, well intentioned, and he had too much to lose to 
adopt on his own initiative an aggressive attitude in regard 
to the people he had to deal with. When he assumed 
office he earnestly intended to apply his efforts toward 
establishing good relations between his country and her 
neighbours. His stay in Russia had given him a strong 
sympathy for that nation, and he was far too much of a 
grand seigneur not to have accepted with a grateful 
courtesy the attentions that had been showered upon him 
during the years which he had spent in the Russian capital. 

91 



Sovereigns and Statesmen of Europe 

On entering office at the Ball Platz he found that, owing 
to the influence of Count d'Aehrenthal, there existed 
among its leading officials an atmosphere of hostility 
against the Triple Understanding, which personally he 
did not share and which he applied himself to destroy. 
Unfortunately, he had to deal with such strong prejudices 
that he very soon relinquished the attempt, and, un- 
recognised by himself, people contrived to impose their 
points of view upon him and applied themselves to thwart 
his plans, to twist his words and intentions into something 
considerably different from what he had intended them 
to be. 

The first person with whom he had to contend was 
the Emperor himself, who, in spite of his age, kept him- 
self well informed as to all that was going on, and who 
meant the foreign policy of Austria to be conducted on 
the lines which Count d'Aehrenthal had sketched and of 
which he had approved. He was encouraged in this 
determination by the German Ambassador, Baron von 
Tschirsky, who played an important part in all the events 
which preceded the breaking out of the war, and to whose 
advice and intrigues a goodly proportion of the compli- 
cations and difficulties under which the world is labouring 
at the present moment are due. Count Berchtold, weak 
and distrustful of his own strength, very soon found 
himself unable to find his way among all these different 
obstacles, the significance of which he had not gauged 
when he had consented to abandon his snug position 

in Petrograd for the difficult and responsible post of 

92 



False Hopes 

Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Austro-Hungarian 
Monarchy. 

Nevertheless, he did his utmost to overcome certain 
prejudices and to throw down certain barriers erected by 
the want of good faith of other people. He used for his 
purpose the personal relations he had entertained with 
M. Izvolsky, at that time head of the Russian Foreign 
Office, with whom he had always been on quite good 
terms. Count Berchtold invited M. Izvolsky to confer 
with him in an informal and friendly way at his country 
seat in Bohemia, where a sort of mutual agreement was 
come to which, as the Press was informed, assured the 
peace of Europe in the near future. Unfortunately, 
M. Izvolsky was not the man to make use of certain 
advantages which the aforesaid interview might have 
procured for him had he not been too confident of the 
impossibility of the Triple Alliance, which he had already 
good reason to believe to be only a dual one, being able 
to fight the Triple Understanding. 

M. Izvolsky was more clever and certainly more 
brilliant than Count Berchtold, but it is a question 
whether he appreciated at their proper worth the 
obstacles which the latter had to contend with, and 
whether he did not treat too lightly the dark clouds that 
at that time had already begun to loom over the political 
horizon. To tell the truth, no one feared Austria. No 
one ever gave a thought to the possibility that she might 
be used by Germany to set in motion the machinery of 
a European war. 

93 



Sovereigns and Statesmen of Europe 

When the Balkan crisis came to an apparent end, no 
one felt happier than Count Berchtold. It had given 
him more than one sleepless night, and he had often 
wondered whither its intricacies would lead his country. 
He was no lover of Germany or of German ways, and 
only tolerated them because it was impossible for Austria 
to escape from the bonds which she had willingly assumed . 
thanks to the clever diplomacy of Prince Bismarck. At 
the same time he had enough confidence in himself to 
believe that he would be able to cope with the Balkan 
complications, which he still imagined were remote, but 
out of which might arise a conflict with Russia. 

Events, however, brought him more than one surprise 
and more than one cause for considerable worry. The 
assassination of the King of Greece caused some appre- 
hension among the diplomatic world, as his son was felt 
to be in some respects an unknown, and in other direc- 
tions a dangerous, quantity. But somehow, in spite of 
these incidents, matters went on toward a tolerable, if 
not a satisfactory, adjustment of the pending difficulties, 
and Count Berchtold, who was a very rich man, and not 
at all in need of office, began to speculate as to whether 
it would not become possible for him to hand over his 
responsibilities, and to seek, in the forests and parks that 
surrounded his ancestral castle, a rest to which he felt 
he had a right. 

Providence, however, did not mean him to get it — at 
least, at that particular time. He had been asked by the 
heir to the throne, the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, to 

04 



Berchtold and William II. 

visit him at Konopischt, in Bohemia, during the short stay 
which the Emperor William II. had made there, and had 
had thus the opportunity to confer otherwise than in an 
official manner with the German Sovereign. The result 
of this conference had been highly satisfactory in the 
opinion of the Austrian Minister, who had returned 
home very much impressed by the conciliatory disposition 
exhibited by the German Emperor, whom he believed to 
be far too impulsive to be able to cloak his real intentions. 
Everything, therefore, seemed to him to be progressing 
favourably when, one June morning, whilst Count Berch- 
told was still enjoying the perfume of the roses for which 
his gardens were famous, the news was brought to him 
of the crime which had put an end to the existence of 
his host and hostess of a few days before, the Archduke 
Francis Ferdinand and the Duchess of Hohenberg. 

Count Berchtold hastened back to Vienna, which he 
reached a few hours before the Emperor himself returned 
from Ischl. Notwithstanding his optimism and the false 
light in which he had hitherto viewed European events, 
he fully realised the magnitude of the event that had just 
taken place. Apart from the natural feelings of horror 
with which it inspired him, he guessed that it might 
prove a prelude to a further catastrophe of unusual gravity 
and seriousness. It is related, though, of course, it is 
almost impossible to know with accuracy, that during 
these first days of consternation he avoided the foreign 
diplomats, not excepting the German Ambassador, who 
had hastened to the Ball Platz as soon as he had heard 

95 



Sovereigns and Statesmen of Europe 

V! st< ed He 

* . . ext< ill q the < 
* Mc dis 

ss - 
Fn as sep asu sne] 

success non eqi His 

sere H« .. this ne^ ■.-.■ sfortune with his usual 

d not exhibit any untoward emotion 
.t. 

Archduke wis not even allow. 
estions of etiquette intene. 

. est as - - fe had not been permitted to enter 
. bosom of the Imperial Family, her 
mortal with his, \iled from the 

vaults of ... ( apuchin Church I est all that is left 

of the Qabs gs, 1: was with the greatest trouble that 
Emperor was persuaded to allow a religious service 
for the victims of the Sarajevo tragedy to be celebrated 
in the Augustine Chapel adjacent to the Hofburg, and 

to permit the coffin of the Duchess of llohenber^ to 
remain next to her husband's whilst this service DTO 
led. Immediately after it was over the two bodies 
were removed at night, and almost in secrecy, to one of 
the estates belonging to the late Archduke, and buried 
without ceremony ; and. saddest thing of all. it was only 
there that the orphaned children of the unfortunate pair 
could at last bid a sad farewell to their parents. In 
Vienna this had been forbidden to them. The scandal 

q6 



Was Austria 9 ! Hand Forced ? 

t that it appealed even to 
of the 

olted openly against t Id Emperor 

: protested at the ind ieh the funeral 

r of the Austrian En 
conducted. 

Who would have thought that after this the Emr* 
Prancii Joseph would nevertheless have believed him 
obliged to avenge bis nephew 9 ! death upon people who 
had had no '-hare in it? Sueh was the case, be 
and the world taw the unprecedented pectacle of an old 
man, with one foot already in hi I on- 

questi and pondering as to how he could precipitate Lis 
country into a war which no one except himself and the 
German Emperor wanted. 

People have said that when the Austrian Government 
lent its ultimatum to it had been compelled to do 

so by the insistence of Germany. This was true in a 
certain sense, hut false in another. The Ball Plate had 
all along been looking for the pretext to invade Servian 
territory, and to annex it afterward,. The existence of 
this independent kingdom had presented a serious danger 
to the Austrian Monarehy ever since Bosnia and Herze- 
govina had been swallowed by their so-ealled protector.. 

The two provinces contained a considerable popula- 
tion of Servian origin who did not relish becoming 
Austrian., and who kept looking toward .Belgrade for 
rigni of help to regain their lost independence. This 
did not suit the politicians who ruled at Vienna, and 
H 07 



Sovereigns and Statesmen of Europe 

who were persuaded — which, perhaps, was not so untrue 
after all — that Russia intended to stand by the Kara- 
georgevitch dynasty and to support it in opposition to 
King Ferdinand of Bulgaria, who was supposed to be 
entirely under the influence of Austrian statesmen. The 
murder of the Archduke afforded a unique opportunity 
to air past grievances, together with new ones, and to 
make a bold attempt to reduce Servia to the condition 
of a dependant of the Ball Platz, unable to make a single 
step without first obtaining the permission of its masters. 

Perhaps Count Berchtold might not altogether have 
sanctioned this line of policy, but he was not gifted with 
sufficient independence of character to be able to resist 
the clamours of those who told him that it was his duty 
to see the murder of the Archduke properly avenged, 
and that if he did not show sufficient firmness in the 
attempt he might be suspected of not feeling too sorry 
it had taken place. 

The person who kept urging Count Berchtold to take 
steps in this direction was the German Ambassador, 
Baron von Tschirsky, a diplomat of considerable intellig- 
ence and wiliness, who knew much more than Count 
Berchtold ever did about the true state of European 
politics, and who had watched them with unflagging 
interest from all the different posts he had occupied in 
succession. He was a pleasant man, who possessed the 
great quality of knowing how to keep silent, and in his 
amusing conversations contrived always to obtain, and 

never to impart, information to those with whom he 

98 



Baron von Tschirsky 

indulged in small talk. He belonged to an old school 
of diplomacy ; and though he understood quite well that 
as things stood a war between Germany and France on 
one frontier, backed by Russia on another, was almost 
inevitable, he preferred it should break out through the 
fault of somebody else than his own countrymen. 

Whether Baron von Tschirsky acted of his own accord 
or followed secret instructions received from Berlin it 
is difficult to tell. The fact remains that it was principally 
at his instigation that the famous ultimatum which was 
the apparent cause of the whole trouble was framed and 
composed. Without him it can be doubted whether the 
Ball Platz would have found sufficient courage to send 
it. Even after it was dispatched Count Berchtold kept 
pondering in his mind whether it would not be possible 
after all to submit the matter to the decisions of a con- 
ference or congress of the Great Powers. Baron von 
Tschirsky noticed this indecision, and having occasion to 
be received by the Emperor Francis Joseph, to whom he 
brought an official letter of condolence from his Sovereign 
on the murder of the Archduke, he did his best to per- 
suade the aged Monarch that it was his duty to remain 
firm in presence of the undoubted encouragement which 
the Baron asserted this atrocious crime had received, not 
only among the general public in Servia, but also from 
the Servian Government, which, he further declared, had 
known all along it was being premeditated, but which had 
taken no steps to prevent it. The idea agreed too well 
with the personal feelings of the Emperor for him not to 

99 



Sovereigns and Statesmen of Europe 

accept it eagerly, and in the Long run it was he who gave 

positive orders to Count lVrehtold to follow the instrue- 
tions which he had given to him immediately upon his 
return to Schonbrunn after the assassination of his 
nephew. 

This personal intervention of the head of the I labs- 
burg dynasty in the matter of the ultimatum disposes of 
the theory put forward in some quarters that his state 
of senility prevented him from doing anything to stop his 
Ministers in their course of aetion. Far from this being 
the ease, it was Francis Joseph himself who all along had 
insisted on an aggressive attitude being adopted in regard 
to Servia, whose exist enee appeared to be a crime in his 
eyes far worse than the one which had deprived him o( 
his heir. The fact was that he had been si> entirely per- 
suaded by different artifices resorted to in Berlin, that 
it was his duty to insist on being left a free hand over 
the country which he believed harboured the murderers 
of the Archduke whom he had not deemed worthy oi' a 
decent funeral, that he had lost sight o( the true circum- 
stances of the case, and had rushed blindly upon a course 
of action before which anyone else would have recoiled 
with horror. 

The state of mind of the Emperor at that time tan 
be compared to a loaded rifle ; the least movement is 
sufficient to make it go off. A cartridge bound to explode 
had been introduced by Germany, and Germany was 
quietly waiting to see what would be the effects of that 
explosion. As things stood, the influence of Count 

ioo 



Baron de Macchio 

Berchtold had dwindled down to nothing; a certain mili- 
tary party in close relation with the German General 
Staff were the sole masters of the situation. 

When Russia tent her request to Austria to grant 
more time to Servia there were several people at the 
Ball Platz who, beginning to realise whither the obstinacy 
at their chiefs was leading the country, were of opinion 
that things bad gone rather too far, and that it would 
be better to display more leniency. Count Berchtold, 
who bad all along obeyed with considerable reluctance 
the peremptory instructions which he had received, was 
not. far from sharing their point of view. He would, 
perhaps, have replied in a conciliatory spirit to the 
demands of Russia had he not at this juncture been 
ordered to go to the country for a few days, evidently 
in order to elude a personal interview with the Russian 
charge* d'affaires and to allow the Austrian Minister at 
Belgrade to remain without any news from the Ball 
Platz at a time when it would have been more necessary 
than at any other for him to be in constant touch and 
communication with his immediate superiors. 

During Count Berchtold 9 ! absence his functions were 
exercised by Baron de Macchio, an excellent official, but 
devoir] of initiative, who was admirably well informed 
as to anything which concerned diplomatic traditions, 
but who, when left to his own inspiration, was incapable 
of anything but following the path he supposed was the 
one his predecessors would have embarked upon in similar 
circumstances. He was, moreover, very susceptible to 

ior 



Sovereigns and Statesmen of Europe 

flattery, and boasted of his patriotism and dear political 
outlook. It was easy to circumvent sueh a man, and 
Baron von Tschirsky grasped at once the advantages 

which arose out of the absence of Count Berchtold. 
When the latter returned from his enforced holiday he 
found that the demands formulated by Russia had been 
declined, and that the Austrian Minister at Belgrade had 
already asked for his passports and left Servian territory 
for the adjacent town of Semlin, where he remained 
awaiting further instructions, which Baron de Maechio 
had declared he was unable to give until he had 
conferred with his immediate chief. 

The die was cast, and there remained nothing more 
to do than to make the best of a very bad case. Still 
some people were left who refused to give up hope, and 
who kept looking for a ground of conciliation. At first 
Count Berchtold belonged to their number, but his view 
quickly changed, partly, it can be supposed, through fear 
of being suspected of not sticking to the guns which he 
had been falsely accused of having set in action. He? 
might have withdrawn from the struggle, thus separat- 
ing himself violently from the party to which he had 
been supposed to belong. But with it all he was a gentle- 
man, and he would have considered it quite unbecoming 
to abandon in a moment of crisis those who had put him 
into a position he had perhaps been wrong to accept, but 
which he did not like to forsake at a period of national 
danger. He had been weak all along, and he knew it ; 
and perhaps the consciousness that sueh was the case made 

102 



Count Berchtold's Dilemma 

him ferocious at times, and induced him to applaud openly 
what most likely he deplored in the secret of his soul. 

As matters stood, he resisted no longer the tide that 
rapidly bore him toward the vortex in which his reputa- 
tion as a statesman was definitely wrecked. He applied 
himself to the task of smoothing as far as possible the 
different antagonisms which in Vienna itself arose among 
the members of the Ministry at the head of which he 
stood, but his role was a passive one, and he submitted 
to the events that instead of being led by him, as they 
ought to have been, simply carried him along with them 
toward an unknown and a very dark future. 

Count Berchtold nevertheless rendered some services 

to the cause of peace during those trying days of July, 

1914. He sincerely desired to ward off the approaching 

catastrophe, and but for him it might have occurred a 

few days earlier. He was an honest man, imbued with 

the prejudices inherent to every great Austrian nobleman, 

but at least there was no falseness in his character. He 

was overwhelmed by a calamity for which nothing had 

prepared him, which he had hardly foreseen, and which 

he was neither clever enough nor brave enough to face 

otherwise than by blind submission to the will of people 

stronger than himself. Between the Emperor, backed 

by the German Ambassador on the one side, and by 

Count Tisza, the Hungarian Premier, on the other, he 

lost control of his independence of judgment, and fell 

because he lacked the courage to resist. 

It is a curious figure that of Count Tisza, whose influ- 

103 



Sovereigns and Statesmen of Europe 

cnce had more to do than the world supposes with the 
whole Servian incident. Ambitious, restless, desirous of 
seeing Hungary become the supreme power in Austria, 
he would have been an entirely superior man if his earlier 
education had prepared him for the part he was called 
upon to play. The Count did not like Francis Joseph, 
and hated the supremacy to which Austria pretended in 
Hungary. He had a very clear judgment, great presence 
of mind, and quick intuition as to the consequences of 
every grave political action. He bore against Russia the 
grudge which is shared by almost every man and woman 
in his country, but he cared little for Germany, feeling 
convinced, as he said more than once to his friends, that 
she meant in case of a victorious war, won in common 
with the troops of Francis Joseph, to annihilate entirely 
the last vestiges of independence left in Austria, and to 
oblige her to enter the German Confederation, thus 
becoming just like Bavaria, Wurtemberg and Saxony — 
a mere tributary of German greatness, and a slave to 
German politics. 

In view of this eventuality Count Tisza determined 
to take the lead in the conduct of the affairs, not only 
of the Hungarian kingdom but also of those of the Aus- 
trian Empire, so as to be able, when the opportunity 
came, to negative any arrangements that might injure the 
interests or threaten the independence of his own land. 

Since the constitution granted to Hungary in 18G7, 

this turbulent country, though she had acquiesced to the 

conditions offered to her by her oppressor of a few years 

104 



Count Tisza 

before, had never abdicated her right to be considered as 
a separate kingdom, ruled by a Habsburg, but not by 
the Austrian Sovereign. Therein lay the distinction, and 
it was a very essential one. Hungary could boast of a 
population that nothing had subdued into renouncing its 
privileges, and of an aristocracy haughtier than any other 
in Europe and which claimed to have a voice in all the 
decisions in which it was concerned. Hungary did not 
mind if Austria were swallowed by Germany, but she 
meant very decidedly not to share such a fate. 

Count Tisza — who knew as much about foreign 
politics as anyone in Europe, who had studied them with 
passion, and constantly remained informed as to their 
smallest details — realised perfectly well the immense con- 
sequences which a war was bound to bring along with 
it. He had made up his mind to get Hungary out of it 
unimpaired as to her position in the European constella- 
tion no matter what happened to Austria, upon whom 
he looked with contempt, did not trust, and only tolerated 
until the day when he could rid his country of her alto- 
gether. Out of the ashes of the general conflagration fired 
by the Ball Platz he hoped to see arise a new Hungary, 
free and great, able to exist alone, and to forget that a 
time had ever been when she had formed but a portion 
of an Empire that had foundered either in the throes of 
a defeat or in the triumph of a victory. 

Austria in 1914 could not have started on the mis- 
guided course of politics she rushed upon with such utter, 
unconcern as to what was going to be the result, had she 

105 



Sovereigns and Statesmen of Europe 

en able to lean upon Hungary, and had she not 
bees backed by Hungarian public opinion. This fad 
gave the President erf the Hungarian Cabinet quite 
exceptional position in Vienna, and Count r 
would not have boon the man he is had he not known 
h to exploit this circumstance tor his own benefit. He 
therefore applied himself to prove to Count Berchtold, 
and indirectly to the Emperor, that though he freely gave 
thom his adhesion and his support in the crisis they had 
provoked, he did not moan to do it tor nothing, but fully 
intended to be repaid for it with the pound of flesh he 
desired bo obtain. He insisted on being consulted upon 
every occasion when anything oft serious nature occurred, 
and gave the functionaries of the Ball Plati to under- 
stand that if it had boon ever their intention to ignore 
him, they had better give up the idea or he would not 

answer for the oonsoquonoos of such I rash act. 

What the Hungarian statesman desired was to see 
Count Berchtold replaced by i Hungarian whom he could 
entirely trust, and on whom he could depend to act ac 
cording to the interests and wants of their common 
Fatherland. He was far too cunning and too experienced 
not to understand that such a thing was impossible to 
obtain at onoo. and ho therefore sot himself to under- 
mine the position o( the Foreign Minister of Francis 
Joseph, and also to make life so intolerable for him that 
he would at last himself come to the conclusion he had 
better retire from the scene o( active politics where he 
had proved such a failure. 

1 06 



Baron Burian 

Jt. did not take hii long to icceed hi this ample 

plan. Count Berchtold discovered at ' 
the military party and the opposition which be encoun- 

'l in all that be attempted to do in Hungary, dm 
situation had become impossible. Then 
for him to remain in office, and indeed his large fortune 
and <:/ ' tates had suffered from lack of attention 

in his absence; his wife, too, did not care for v*ien 
He therefore wrote to the Emperor tending bis resigna- 
tion, which ccepted with alacrity. 

VViUi the departure of Count Berchtold the Ball Platz 
found itself once more placed under the control of a 
self made man. Baron Burian was a Hungarian, whom 
people said had Jewish Mood among his ancestry. lie 
was clever, had considerable experience of the world, very 
decided opinions, and a strong will, which in a certain 
'.ciw: wan '■'■ misfortune to him, because it prevented him 
from discussing with people who might have proved of 

to hirn the current questions of the day with which 
he WSJ not entirely familiar. He possessed an excellent 
belief in his own personal merits, and was a blind and 
submissive follower of Count Tisza. 

When he assumed office one of his first cares had 
been to u,<> to Berlin, where he hud long conferences with 

Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg, from which Baron Burian 

carried away with him the impression that Austria was 
not altogether in the good graces of her powerful ally, 
who reproached her for not having made the stand which 
had been expected before the common enemy. The fact 

107 



Sovereigns and Statesmen of Europe 

was that the pusillanimity shown at the beginning of the 
war by the Austrian troops had produced a contemptuous 
impression in Germany, and the General Staff in the 
latter country had decided to enforce a decision it had 
lately come to, to place the soldiers of Francis Joseph 
under the orders of Prussian generals and Prussian 
officers. 

This determination had, of course, been resented 
deeply in Vienna, though not in Budapest, where public 
opinion remained more than indifferent in regard to what 
was occurring elsewhere. The Hungarians knew that so 
far as they were concerned they had fought well, and 
that one of the results of the war would be to separate 
them entirely from Austria ; they therefore accepted with 
a complete philosophy the pretensions put forward by 
the German commanders, sure as they were that these 
would not influence in the least that one result of the 
war for which alone they cared — the recognition of their 
absolute independence from Vienna. 

Count Tisza was an excellent politician. He therefore 
experienced considerable satisfaction in hearing that his 
friend and associate Baron Burian had played his cards 
just as he had expected him to do, and in acquiescing to 
the German demands secured for himself and for his party 
the good graces of the Berlin Cabinet. Count Berchtold 
would have protested indignantly against this moral anni- 
hilation of Austria on the battle-field and this subordina- 
tion of her army to the pretensions of her ally. He 
would have tried to speak with Dr. von Bethmann- 

108 



The March of General Mackensen 

Hollweg as equal to equal — and would have done no 
good. 

Baron Burian was more submissive and far cleverer, 
inasmuch as he gave Germany a bone that he did not 
require himself, the chewing of which might prove 
infinitely useful to Hungary later on. He guessed, and 
Count Tisza had guessed too, long before him, that in 
exchange for the independence of Austria one of the most 
tangible results of the war would be the absolute freedom 
of Hungary, under a Sovereign who would not reside in 
Vienna and who would remain entirely outside that Ger- 
man confederation in which Austria would find herself 
engulfed, whether she liked it or not. 

Events justified this appreciation. The Austrian 
armies, which up to that period had suffered one defeat 
after the other, very soon turned over a new leaf after 
they had been placed under German command; and the 
united action of the Austrian staff, backed by the ener- 
getic march forward of General von Mackensen, ousted 
the Russians from Galicia and returned this province, 
together with its capital Lemberg, which for ten months 
had been occupied by Russia, and the fortress of Prze- 
mysl into the possession of the Habsburgs. The lost 
prestige of Francis Joseph's troops was restored, and the 
victories have paved the way for the absorption of 
Austria by her secular and traditional enemy Prussia, and 
for the constitution of Hungary as a separate kingdom, 
dependent on no one but itself for its existence in 
Europe. In 1870 German unity had been partly attained 

109 



Sovereigns and Statesmen of Europe 

thanks to the initial mistakes of France and of the Im- 
perial Government which ruled her ; in 1915 this unity has 
been virtually completed by the introduction of Austria 
into the sphere of its activity thanks to the astuteness 
of Count Tisza and of his friends and the errors of Count 
Berchtold and his policy — a galaxy of circumstances out 
of which a new State will be born and an ancient 
Monarchy will disappear. 



I IO 



IV 
BULGARIA AND SERVIA 

IT is but natural that after having spoken so fully 
about Austria my thoughts should turn toward 
the Balkans. It was in the Balkans that Austrian 
intrigues found a wide field of activity ; it was there 
also that Francis Joseph and his Ministers discovered 
the pretext to attack Russia, whose alliance with France 
and with Great Britain gave them such apprehension. 

In the days when King Milan reigned at Belgrade, 
and the Obrenovitch dynasty seemed destined to occupy 
for a long time to come the Servian throne, Servia had 
been entirely under Austrian influence. At this period 
there were in Vienna at the head of affairs men gifted 
with great intelligence and wide political experience, and 
it was recognised among the powers that ruled at the 
Ball Platz that the interest of the Dual Monarchy re- 
quired a sharp look out to be kept on all that was going 
on in Belgrade. King Milan's want of character afforded 
ample scope for presuming that he would not remain in- 
sensible to certain inducements. His finances were in a 
chronic condition of embarrassment, and his gratitude 
would be assured to any who would afford timely aid in 
this direction. 

i ii 



Sovereigns and Statesmen of Europe 

Milan was a clever man in his way, with perhaps more 
Bohemianism in his manners than was consistent with his 
dignity as a Monarch. Had he possessed sufficient money 
to gratify all his tastes, it is likely that he would have 
made a tolerable Sovereign. As matters were, however, 
he found himself compelled to seek the help sometimes of 
his friends, sometimes of his enemies, and more frequently 
of those who believed it advantageous to their interests to 
secure him as a friend. 

This peculiar position accounts for a great deal of 
Milan's follies and mistakes, even when it does not excuse 
them. He had married for love a beautiful but wilful and 
passionate woman, who on her side had been actuated 
only by ambition when she had consented to wed. Natalie 
de Keczko's best qualities were spoiled by her conviction 
of her own beauty, before which she remained in a state 
of perpetual admiration, that caused her to resort to 
extraordinary precautions in order to preserve it unim- 
paired. For instance, it is related that she used to sleep 
with veal cutlets on her face so as to improve her com- 
plexion, and that she spent many hours every day lying 
straight on her back on a very hard bed with the object 
of keeping her exquisite figure intact. This did not 
always suit Milan, who would have preferred having his 
wife more to himself, and it helped him considerably to 
get tired of her, and to show himself in time less indulgent 
to her caprices than had been the case in the early years 
of their marriage. 

Natalie was supposed to be entirely Russian in her 

112 



Milan and His Queen 

sympathies. People who knew her well, however, relate 
that in reality she had absolutely no political leanings 
of any kind, and that whenever she showed Russian or 
anti-Russian feelings, which also happened now and then, 
these outbursts coincided with some public manifestation 
on the part of the King, with whom she was always at 
variance, by principle if not by taste. As a fact, on those 
occasions when it would have been both necessary and 
profitable for her to express her opinions, she did not 
do so, and never even realised that this would have 
helped her considerably in avoiding her numerous and 
ever-recurring quarrels with her husband. 

Milan, in spite of the abominable way in which he 
had treated his Queen, never ceased to love her in a 
sensual, brutal kind of manner. I have been told by a 
gentleman who was in a position to know — M. Guen- 
tchitch, one of Servia's most prominent politicians, who 
had been one of the Ministers of King Milan — that the 
latter, long after his separation from the Queen, when 
speaking of her, used always to say that he had never 
seen a more beautiful or accomplished woman. It was a 
thousand pities that Natalie never understood her Con- 
sort's character. Had she done so it is probable that 
many sad things which later on took place at Belgrade 
could never have occurred. 

Milan's whole existence was one long intrigue, and 

unfortunately for him, and for his reputation in history, 

he allowed himself to be led in succession by people of 

whom one was less trustworthy than the other. And 

i 113 



Sovereigns and Statesmen of Europe 

when at last he met with a man who proved a real friend 
to him in more ways than one, it was already too late to 
repair his former errors and to derive any real benefit out 
of this disinterested affection which was offered to him 
with unbounded generosity. 

The friend to whom I am referring was Count Eugene 
Zichy, a Hungarian nobleman of remarkable intellig- 
ence and of considerable wealth. He was also a prominent 
politician in his country, and one who hated Russia with 
all the ferocity of a man whose relations had suffered at 
the hands of the armies of Nicholas I. during the mutiny 
of 1848. Count Zichy thought that it would be a fine 
thing to snatch Servia from the sphere of Russian influ- 
ence, and applied all his efforts to win over Milan to his 
point of view. The latter immediately yielded to the 
temptation, and in exchange for several large cheques 
proceeded to exile or imprison all the leaders of the so- 
called Russian party in his country. 

Unfortunately for him, and still more for the man 
who had believed he could make him a tool in the cause 
of Austrian politics, the King's position in Servia was 
already compromised. His quarrels with the Queen had 
discredited not only his person, but the prestige of his 
throne, and whilst many people still liked him, few could 
be found who respected him. He had himself destroyed 
his popularity. 

Nevertheless, he was still in possession of some 

authority ; at least in Belgrade, if not in the interior of 

the country, where one was less liable to be tempted by 

114 



Alexander as King 

the financial considerations which played no trifling part 
among certain circles of the capital. Milan contrived 
to keep at the head of affairs a ministry favourable to 
Austria, and disdaining the good advice proffered to him 
from all sides, he resolutely turned his back upon Russia 
and gave all his confidence to her enemies. The step was 
fatal. Very soon its effects came to be felt, and Milan 
went into exile after the pretence of an abdication which 
was nothing but a farce, as he fully intended to go on 
governing in the name of his son, whom he had put for- 
ward in the hope that the boy would never take the 
trouble to concern himself seriously about his father's 
doings as Regent. 

Alexander, however, turned out to be quite different 
from what his father had expected, and, partly on the 
advice of his mother — who had always contrived to keep 
up her relations with him, notwithstanding the barbarous 
and brutal way in which Milan had separated her from 
this only child she possessed — and partly at the instigation 
of a few friends of M. Pashitch — whom a strong sense of 
patriotism urged to try to do something to bring back 
to power this remarkable politician and great patriot — he 
overturned the Regency and took into his own hands the 
reins of the government of the country. 

For some time all went well, and then came Alex- 
ander's adventure with Madame Draga Maschin, and the 
dreadful crime to which they both fell victims. A new 
era was about to begin for Servia under another dynasty, 
the head of which, Prince Peter Karageorgevitch, was 

"5 



Sovereigns and Statesmen of Europe 

called to the throne he had secretly coveted for a long 
time. 

With the accession of King Peter Servia began to 
make progress. First of all, the Russian influence that 
had been so cleverly undermined by Austrian agents and 
Austrian money revived once more. The Russian Foreign 
Office had grasped at last the importance of keeping not 
only an attentive eye but also a strong hand on the leading 
politicians of Belgrade. This was not a hard matter, as 
in general Russia was very much liked, especially since 
the growing ambitions of Prince Ferdinand of Coburg had 
begun to cause some apprehension among Servian political 
circles, where it was feared that he would try to obtain 
some advantages for Bulgaria to the detriment of her 
neighbour Servia. In view of these developments it is 
not to be wondered that as soon as it was noticed that 
the old and cordial relations which had existed between 
the Petrograd and the Belgrade Cabinets seemed likely 
to be resumed, not only M. Pashitch, but all those who 
belonged to his party, should have rallied to the new 
dynasty, whose accession they believed had discouraged 
Austrian emissaries as well as inspired some sympathy in 
Russia. 

It soon became evident that the new King meant to 
remain faithful to that Muscovite alliance which he firmly 
believed constituted the only chance that Servia still 
possessed of remaining an independent kingdom. He 
used certain influence which he had in Petrograd as well 
as in Moscow to obtain the nomination at his Court as 

116 



M. Hartwig 

Russian Minister of a diplomat who had been in touch 
already with the East, and who could therefore form a 
dependable opinion as to the various Austrian intrigues, 
which at the time I am referring to had started with 
renewed vigour to undermine every manifestation of 
sympathy that was uttered in favour of the Tsar. He 
succeeded after some time in his design, and M. Nicholas 
Hartwig was appointed as Russian representative in 
Belgrade. 

M. Hartwig thoroughly understood the Eastern 
character and the intricacies of Eastern politics. For a 
considerable number of years he had been at the Embassy 
at Constantinople — at the time when it was administered 
by Count Ignatieff — and he had learned to appreciate at 
their proper value the protestations of friendship, or the 
declarations of enmity, which were liberally distributed 
all over the Balkan Peninsula to the people who happened, 
for one reason or another, to be prominent in that part 
of the world. He hated Austria, and he bitterly disliked 
Germany, whom he accused of fomenting all the troubles 
which were regularly taking place either at Sofia, Athens 
or some other Eastern capital. At the same time he did 
not hold to the opinion that Russia, as some politicians 
suggested in that country itself, should slacken her interest 
in the affairs of the Balkans, and leave a free field to her 
enemies in that direction. He therefore applied himself 
to win the favour of King Peter, already very well dis- 
posed toward him, and he began negotiating the marriage 
of the pretty and attractive Princess Helene of Servia, 

117 



Sovereigns and Statesmen of Europe 

the King's only daughter, with a member o( the Russian 

Imperial Family. Prince John Constantinoviteh. the 
eldest son of the Grand Duke Constantine. 

In this delicate affair M. Hartwig succeeded com- 
pletely, and this gave him at once quite an exceptional 
position at the little Court of Belgrade, where he became 
a persona grata, not only with the Royal Family, but also 
in Society. Among the embassies, too. officials became 
very quickly aware that they had to deal with a strong 
personality, who would not allow himself to be circum- 
vented either by Turkish or by Austrian intrigues. In 
fact, it was in regard to the latter that M. Hartwig 
occupied himself the most, trying to discover their im- 
portance and to find out their ultimate object and aim. 
He was fond of the Servians, whom he considered to 
have been very badly treated, and during the two Balkan 
wars M. Hartwig exerted himself in a most active manner 
in favour of Servia. It was thanks to his efforts that the 
disputes existing between her and the newly-erected 
kingdom of Bulgaria were at last settled to the satisfaction 
of both parties, and he laid with M. Pashitch the founda- 
tions of a vast scheme which was to secure to the poor 
little kingdom on the Austrian frontier the protection of 
Russia against any possible aggression. He had always 
felt frightened at what Turkey might feel tempted to do, 
and had never looked with favourable eyes upon all that 
was going on at Constantinople, where his unerring 
instinct made him scent danger when no one else even 
suspected its nearness. He kept urging M. Pashitch 

11S 



Death of M. Hartwig 

to declare himself more- openly in favour of Russian 
supremacy in the Balkan Peninsula, which he considered 
ought never to be shaken in the future. In a word, 
M. Hartwig wanted to bring back to life the glorious 

days when the power of Count Ignatieff at Stamboul was 
often pronounced to be superior to that of the Commander 
of the Faithful. 

M. Hartwig found the: ground very favourable to the 
active Russian propaganda he prosecuted from the very 
first day of his arrival in Belgrade. He was not only an 
exceedingly clever man, but also a sineere patriot. He 
was kept admirably well informed by his numerous agents 
as to the progress of Austrian intrigue, and it was said 
that he held in reserve several trump cards in the game 
which he was playing against his Austrian colleague. It 
is not, indeed, beyond possibility that, had M. Hartwig 
been alive at the time the ultimatum w r as presented, he 
might have induced the Austrian Ambassador to explain 
to his Government that if it pressed matters too much 
with Servia it might lead to unpleasant disclosures from 
which the Ball Platz might not emerge too creditably. 
Unfortunately, M. Hartwig died suddenly a short time 
after the crime of Sarajevo, and he carried with him to his 
grave many secrets that would have been of tremendous 
value to know to-day. He was exceedingly discreet, and 
handled his affairs alone. This fact gave him the oppor- 
tunity to learn far more than a diplomat could do through 
the usual channels, but it meant a great loss to his country 
when his secrets died with him. He had friends every - 

119 



Sovereigns and Statesmen of Europe 

where and found servants who fully trusted him, and he 
held in his hand the thread of almost all the undercurrents, 
of which there exist so many in the East. But he did 
not allow even his staff to learn who were his agents 
and what they reported to him. What goes some way 
to confirm the idea that the Russian Ambassador would 
have been able to persuade Austria to think twice before 
hustling Servia into war is the curious circumstance that, 
so long as M. Hartwig was alive, Austrian diplomacy did 
not show its cards ; yet the moment he was gone the con- 
ciliating spirit changed, and the attitude of the Austrian 
Minister, Baron Giesl von Gieslingen, became suddenly 
aggressive. 

In an article which I wrote concerning Austria and 
her despicable policy about a year ago, a few days after 
war had been declared, I quoted a remark attributed to 
the Servian Prime Minister in reply to the question put 
to him by a foreign diplomat accredited at the Court of 
Belgrade. This particular ambassador had felt indignant 
at the apparent submission with which Servia had seemed 
to agree to the Austrian demands. " You are making 
yourselves the servants of Austria," he had exclaimed; 
"and what will she give you for it?" " Her refusal to 
accept our humiliation," had replied astute M. Pashitch. 
And subsequent events proved that his appreciation of 
a most complicated situation had been right. It was 
essential at the critical juncture in which the whole of 
Europe found itself at that particular moment that the 
responsibilities of each party should be clearly estab- 

120 



M. Pashitch 

lished, and this could have been hardly possible had Servia 
appeared intransigeant or had refused, as she would have 
been entitled to do, to discuss the strange demands which 
Vienna had formulated. On the contrary, in seeming to 
yield, she proved, not only to the whole of Europe, but 
also established quite clearly for the future appreciation 
of history, that the war, which was then already admitted 
to be inevitable, had not been of the seeking either of 
Russia or still less of Servia. By his wise conduct M. 
Pashitch rendered an immense service to the cause of 
the Allies, and this ought to be remembered by them 
with gratitude when the time comes for balancing 
accounts. 

This old statesman is gifted with Eastern keenness of 
perception wedded to an Occidental culture, and during 
the long periods of imprisonment which he had to 
undergo for his political convictions has added to the 
large store of learning which he already possessed. From 
these vicissitudes he has emerged with ripened experience 
and with a profound knowledge of mankind and of its 
qualities and imperfections. 

M. Pashitch was always ambitious, with a noble 
ambition that had nothing personal about it, and he 
was a sincere patriot, devoid of any prejudices, and 
determined to do his duty toward Servia, no matter at 
what cost. He had perceived long before anyone else 
the danger which threatened his country, and during the 
deliberations which took place at Bucharest, previous to 
the conclusion of the treaty which put an end to the 

121 



Sovereigns and Statesmen of Europe 

second Balkan War. he had openly expressed to Kino- 
Carol of Roumania his apprehensions concerning the 

future. He dreaded duplicity on the part of Tsar 
Ferdinand of Bulgaria, and he was perfectly well aware 
that the hitter's dangerous dreams of the establishment 
of an Eastern Empire, of which he would be the head. 
were encouraged at Vienna, where it was believed that 
this would eventually put a check in the way of Russia 
and at the same time bring about the reunion of the 
National Bulgarian Church with the Roman Catholic one. 

Such a consummation had been one of the ardent 
wishes of the late Pope Leo XIII., who, in his desire to 
see it become an accomplished fact, had looked with far 
more indulgent eyes than could have been expected upon 
the conversion, in 1806, of Prince Ferdinand's young son 
to the Orthodox faith, a conversion the reason for which 
was so little understood in Petrograd, where no one had 
realised that in its way it was one of the greatest blows 
that could have been levelled at Russian influence in the 
Balkans. M. Pashiteh had known better than to rejoice 
at this apostasy by proxy made by the Bulgarian 
Sovereign : he appreciated it at its real worth, and his 
frank, honest nature recoiled from the hypocrisy which 
it embodied. 

M. Pashiteh had also had his dreams, and these 
included the establishment of a Balkan confederation, 
united in the same manner as the different German 
principalities, so that together they could withstand their 
common foe, Turkey, and live out their destiny inde- 

122 



Effacing the Shadow 

pendent of any European proteetion. He was a Slav, 
and as such he naturally sympathised with Russia, buto 
though he admitted that the latter ought to feel herself 
at home among her co-religionaries in the Near East, and 
that their policy ought to be guided by hers, yet he 
objected to her interference in matters where inner 
politics were in question. 

lie was far too clever not to realise that the Kara- 
georgeviteh dynasty had a good deal to do before it could 
hope to be admitted on a footing of equality with the 
other reigning houses of Europe. There was an un- 
pleasant suspicion in some quarters that it had not been 
entirely ignorant of the plot that had ended with the 
assassination of the luckless King Alexander and of his 
Queen Draga, and, though it was quite unmerited, it 
made people look askance at the dynasty. M. Pashitch 
felt this keenly, and, though he would never have admitted 
the fact openly, his sense of patriotism fretted under it, 
and he applied himself to efface this shadow which seemed 
to follow the house of Karageorgevitch wherever any of 
its members showed themselves beyond the frontiers of 
their own country. He knew that time alone could cure 
the trouble, and, clever and far-seeing as he was, he 
understood at once that it required much personal prestige 
on the part of its Monarch if it were to be banished 
definitely. 

One of his first cares when discussing the general 
situation with the new King was to draw Peter's atten- 
tion to the necessity of obliging his sons to perfect their 

123 



Sovereigns and Statesmen of Europe 

education, so that in time they could become distinguished 
men. He reckoned already on the possibility of an 
alliance between the future holder of the crown of Servia 
and a princess of Romanoff blood. The matter seemed 
outside the limits of expectancy then, but M. Pashitch 
knew better than anyone that opinions change as events 
develop themselves, and that there always arrives a moment 
when the person who has known how to wait gets, if 
not all he wants, at least something very akin to it. 

If this dream, which might change so much in Servia 
by the importance it would attain in Europe, were to 
be realised at all, it was indispensable that the young man 
who was to become the suitor should possess personal 
advantages of education, intellect and outward appear- 
ance which alone could allow him to pretend to such a 
future. M. Pashitch, therefore, told the King that, in 
spite of the seventeen and eighteen years of his two sons, 
it was necessary to submit them to a new course of train- 
ing which would better fit them for the exalted position 
that by a freak of destiny had become theirs. 

Peter I. was a wise man in his generation, and, 
besides, was guided at that time — though, I believe, that 
their relations have since become rather strained for 
reasons I need not enter into here — by his father-in-law, 
Prince Nicholas of Montenegro, an acute and far-seeing 
Sovereign. He immediately entered into the views of 
M. Pashitch, and put his sons under a severe discipline, 
which, however, did not bear the fruits that he had 
expected in regard to his heir, Prince George. When 

124 



King Peter and the Tsar 

the latter, however, had been persuaded to give up his 
rights to the crown to his younger brother, the King 
began to breathe freely once more, and as about that 
time his only daughter — thanks to the united diplomacy 
of M. Hart wig and M. Pashitch — had been given in 
marriage to a cousin of the Tsar, he could afford to look 
upon the future with more equanimity than had been the 
case ever since he had accepted the succession. He paid 
several visits to Petrograd, and every time met with a 
warm reception from the public, as well as from the 
Imperial Family, until at last even the Liberal Press — 
that had taken care always to remind its readers of the 
circumstances under which the Karageorgevitches had 
been able to ascend to the throne of Servia — began, on 
the contrary, to represent King Peter as a supporter of 
Russian influence in the Balkans. This change was 
certainly due greatly to the wise manner in which M. 
Pashitch, whether in or out of office, had applied himself 
to prove to the public that, whatever events had accom- 
panied the election of King Peter to the crown which 
his ancestors had borne in past times, these had nothing 
to do with his person. 

The Monarch himself was heartily glad to find that 
as time went on the prejudices which had existed against 
him at the Court of the Tsar were beginning to fade 
away. He was already an old man, very broken in health, 
and he felt that he would not be able for long to stand 
the strain which was inseparable from guiding an unruly 
nation. He had great confidence in his son Alexander, 

125 



Sovereigns and Statesmen of Europe 

and the young man justified it entirely. The present 
Crown Prince, though not gifted with a physique capable 
of appealing to the imagination of a young girl who had 
had no opportunity to discern his really excellent and 
brilliant qualities, has a strong personality, and has 
achieved for himself considerable popularity, not only 
among his immediate surroundings, but also in his 
country and in the army, where he is literally worshipped. 
Apart from his genuine military skill, he has contrived 
to impress his soldiers with the conviction that so long 
as he remains at their head nothing very evil can befall 
them. 

During the two Balkan Wars, and later on during 
the present campaign, Prince Alexander has shared all 
the privations and all the hardships of his men, sleeping 
in the open with them, going sometimes without food 
when they had none, partaking with them of the meagre 
comforts which they could obtain, bearing himself like 
any other officer woidd have done, and accessible to all 
those who had something to ask him or who wanted to 
exchange opinions concerning the dangers of the situation 
in which Servia has been drawn by a concourse of circum- 
stances it would not have been possible for any human 
comprehension to foresee. He distributed almost the 
whole of his income to his troops or to the needy popu- 
lation of Servia, declared that he did not want anything 
more but what they had for his personal wants, and 
refused to avail himself of any of the advantages of his 
position as heir to the throne. 

126 



Prince Alexander at Petrograd 

King Peter, acting on the advice of his doctors, who 
told him his health could not stand the strain of the 
leadership of public affairs at such an anxious time, had 
invested Prince Alexander with the functions of Regent, 
which he filled to the general satisfaction, and in which 
he displayed considerable tact. His telegram to the Tsar, 
sent when the Austrian ultimatum was presented to 
Servia, is still remembered with pride by Prince Alex- 
ander's future subjects, who consider it as a worthy way 
of meeting a blow delivered by an unscrupulous enemy. 
Its terms, which were entirely composed by the Crown 
Prince, are both respectful and dignified, and could not 
but have appealed to the generous feelings of Nicholas II. 

At the time of the previous visit of Prince Alexander 
to Russia the Tsar had been favourably impressed by the 
attitude of the heir to the Servian throne. The young 
man had pleased him by his simple, unostentatious 
manners and by the unaffected way in which he had 
replied to the various questions which had been put to 
him concerning his country and the prowess of his army 
during the recent war. His modesty when relating deeds 
to which everyone knew he had contributed, and the 
perfect indifference with which he rejected every praise 
that was offered to him, could not fail to appeal to the 
Russian Sovereign's heart; and when M. Pashitch timidly 
mentioned as a possibility a second alliance between the 
house of Romanoff and that of Karageorgevitch he was 
not discouraged, though at the same time he was told 
that the Tsar meant that his daughters should be left 

127 



Sovereigns and Statesmen of Europe 

entirely free to do what they liked in the matter of their 
marriage, and that the only thing which lie could say 
was that if the Crown Prince of Servia succeeded in 
winning the heart of one of the Grand Duchesses, he 
should not offer any objection on his side. The hint 
would have been more than enough had the young 
Grand Duchess Olga or her sister Tatiana looked upon 
"Rodrigue with the eyes of Chimene." to quote the 
famous verses of old Corneille. This was not the case. 
however, and Prince Alexander, who was not devoid of 
the keen sense of guessing the feelings of others in regard 
to himself — which was also a strong feature in M. 
Pashitch's character — wisely kept silent, and left Petro- 
grad without having betrayed the hopes which had been 
the prime motive of his visit. 

That old and experienced politician, the Servian 
Prime Minister, was not far wrong in his belief that 
things and opinions change. The present war has con- 
siderably increased the prestige of King Peter's heir, and 
it is quite possible that the young lady who would have 
preferred him to have a Greek nose and blue eyes instead 
of his dark complexion and sharp profile will come to 
think that, after all. physical appearance has little to do 
with the actual moral worth of a man. Chastened by 
the cruel experience of all the sad sights which have met 
her eyes in the hospitals to which she has been an angel 
of mercy in the days of her nation's sorrow, she will 
understand that a young fellow capable of renouncing all 
the pleasures of his age and all the privileges o( his 

128 



Servian Troubles 

position in order to share the hard life of the soldiers 
under his command, deserves more than a passing glance. 

Servia will require years of self-sacrifice before she will 
be able to overcome the disasters that have fallen upon 
her. Her soil is devastated, sickness has made terrible 
havoc among her population, her fields have remained 
uncultivated, her towns have been burned, the majority 
of her masculine population has perished on the battle- 
field, and there is not one home left in the whole of her 
territory that has not suffered in some shape or other 
from the horrors of this war, which was imposed upon 
her without any necessity, and after she had done all 
that lay within her power, compatible with her national 
dignity, to avoid. And, if I read aright, she will still 
have further Balkan troubles to face. 

The King and Queen who will have to rule Servia 
after peace is once more restored to her will not find it 
easy work. It will be a noble mission, and it is to be 
hoped that the Crown Prince Alexander will be lucky 
enough to find a wife worthy of him, whose help and 
sympathy will give him strength to fulfil the onerous 
duties that in the course of time will fall upon his 
shoulders. 

Poor little Servia deserves to be rewarded for the 
splendid examples of patriotism and self-sacrifice which 
she has given to the world. She is among the weakest 
of the nations engaged in the terrific struggle which is 
shaking Europe, and as such deserves the most sympathy. 
Her population has shown itself heroic, her King and his 
J 129 



Sovereigns and Statesmen of Europe 

heir, too, have shown themselves of heroic mould, and her 
statesmen, by their remarkable faculties and keen know- 
ledge of her requirements, have, at all events, proved 
themselves far superior to either Austrian or German 
diplomats. 

Every traveller in the Near East who visits that part of 
the world with the intention to acquaint himself with the 
character of its inhabitants is astonished to find the 
intensity of interest which exists in Servia, as well as in 
Roumania and in Bulgaria, concerning politics. In so 
many States local interests absorb public attention to the 
exclusion of outside affairs. In the Balkans it is the 
contrary. People feel there that their existence depends 
much more on what goes on in the rest of Europe than 
on what happens among themselves. They know very 
well that almost all the great wars of recent times have 
had their origin in the complications which have arisen 
over Balkan affairs, and that, rightly or wrongly, their 
movements have been followed with the keenest attention 
by all the chancelleries of Europe, who have tried to find 
in them pretexts for quarrels it would perhaps have been 
difficult otherwise to provoke. Bulgaria, for instance, ever 
since her erection into a principality, has caused much 
annoyance to the world. It required such a man of 
strength and decision as Prince Ferdinand of Coburg to 
bring back an approach to tranquillity in this land of 
unexpected political surprises. 

Prince Alexander of Battenbcrg, who had been chosen 
to rule Bulgaria after the Congress of Berlin had sanc- 

130 



Prince Alexander of Battenberg 

tioned her deliverance from under the Turkish yoke, had 
been elected will) the consent of the Great Powers, and 
had expected to maintain himself at Sofia without 
difficulty. Things had turned out differently, partly 
because he had attempted too soon to procure for his 
new principality an independence it was not yet ready to 
enjoy; and he found himself compelled to abandon not 
only the attempt, but also the ephemeral throne he had 
accepted without realising the problem it would prove to 
maintain himself upon it. His departure had left the 
field free to the intrigues of all the different parties 
which had formed themselves at Sofia as soon as the town 
had become a capital. For a long time these parties 
could not agree as to the choice of a successor to Prince 
Alexander, and at last, when they had found a candidate 
willing to run the chance of being overturned by a plot 
of some kind, it was Europe who objected and who 
refused to acknowledge Prince Ferdinand of Coburg as 
the ruler of Bulgaria. 

Prince Ferdinand, however, was not of the character 
to allow obstacles to stop him. He had in him far more 
cuteness than the world had ever given him credit for, 
and also far more natural cleverness, combined with an 
excellent education and considerable knowledge, which 
he had taken good care not to air before the world. 

He had the reputation of being very effeminate, and 
delighted in it, persuaded, as he felt, that it was far more 
advantageous to pass for a fool than to be credited with 
an amount of intelligence one did not in reality possess. 

1.1 1 



Sovereigns and Statesmen of Europe 

His mother. Princess Clementine of Bourbon-Orleans, 

whose favourite he was, was a remarkable woman, and 
one of the most intriguing princesses in Europe. A 
daughter of Louis Philippe, she had inherited the spirit 
of opportunism which had at all times distinguished the 
Orleans family. She was bigoted in a certain sense, but 
at the same time looked upon religion as a means more 
than as a conviction. She was upon very friendly terms 
with the Jesuits, though she took care never to take a 
Jesuit for her confessor. She considered her conscience 
as quite a personal property, and, different in that from 
most pious Catholics, she would never have dreamt of 
allowing a priest to guide her in matters of public import- 
ance. All her life she had been upon bad terms with 
Fate, who, instead of making her a queen with a wide 
sphere of activity, had condemned her to be the wife of a 
prince, very wealthy, it is true, but of no importance 
whatever in the world. She had tried hard to intrigue 
in favour of her cousin, the Comte de Paris, but had been 
promptly asked by him not to indulge in drawing-room 
conspiracies, which were entirely repugnant to his 
straightforward and timid nature. The old lady had 
retreated in high dudgeon, and declared that hence- 
forward she washed her hands of her nephew's welfare, 
and that the considerable portion of her ample fortune 
which she meant to leave him as the head of her father's 
house would be disposed of in a different way. 

The Comte de Paris shrugged his shoulders and did 
not reply to this threat. He did not want his aunt's 

13-2 



Princess Clementine of Bourbon-Orleans 

money, and was very much afraid of her political activity. 
The Princess Clementine, deceived in her hope of having 
some part in the ruling of her native country, returned 
to her vast Hungarian estates, and refused evermore to 
see any of her French relatives. Whether the breach 
would have healed in the natural course of things it is 
difficult to say. Subsequent events drove away her former 
animosity toward the pretender to her late father's throne, 
and she soon smiled upon him again, even going so far 
as to congratulate herself in the secret recesses of her soul 
on the want of common sense, as she considered it, of the 
Comte de Paris in refusing her money. Had he altered 
his mind her exchequer would have become considerably 
impoverished, a circumstance that would have materially 
interfered with the future career of her favourite child, 
Prince Ferdinand. 

The latter had taken good care to keep on the best 
of terms with his mother, which had not been the case 
with his two brothers, who, annoyed by the authoritative 
character of the old lady, had given her to understand 
they did not mean to be interfered with. They had plenty 
of money of their own, the eldest, Prince Philip, having 
inherited the entailed estates of the Kohary branch of the 
Coburg family in Hungary, whilst the second son, Prince 
Augustus, had married the daughter of the Emperor of 
Brazil, Dom Pedro, who had brought to him an immense 
dowry. 

Prince Ferdinand had no expectations whatever 
except his mother's good will, and he had made it his 

i33 



Sovereigns and Statesmen of Europe 

special duty to remain always at her beck and call, to 
seek her advice continually, and in genera] to conform 
himself to her will in everything. He was the most intel- 
ligent among her children, and this constituted a strong 
bond between them, stronger, perhaps, even than they 
realised themselves. When, therefore, the Prince was 
sounded by certain political men in Bulgaria as to whether 
he would consent to assume the reins of the Government 
in this little unruly, and as it still was at the time, un- 
civilised country, he at once went to his mother and asked 
her what she thought about it. 

Princess Clementine was delighted. Here at last was 
the opportunity for which she had been sighing all her 
life — the possibility, in her old age, to exercise the admir- 
able talent of organisation which she knew that she pos- 
sessed. She bluntly told her son that lie would be a fool 
if he refused this unique chance which kind Providence 
offered him to make his name in the world. 

This was also Prince Ferdinand's opinion, but he 
wanted her to say so, and thus to appear as if he were 
following the lead which she gave him, and not acting o\' 
his own accord. He was perfectly aware that his mother, 
once she had advised him to embark into what mam' 
people would have considered in the light of an adventure, 
would never allow him to give it up, but, on the contrary, 
would help him with all the influence at her disposal, and 
with all the money at her command, to maintain him- 
self in a position he fully intended to improve as time 
progressed . 

i34 



M. Stambouloff 

His expectations were not deceived. Bulgaria wel- 
comed him with effusion, an effusion with which the large 
sums distributed in alms and presents of all kinds by the 
Princess Clementine had probably had a good deal to do. 
He entered at once with considerable zeal into his new 
duties, and though no European Cabinet had consented 
to recognise the validity of his election, he did not trouble 
about it, but with an unequalled assurance proceeded to 
acquaint them of his assumption of the reins of the 
Government at Sofia, and did not mind in the very least 
that he received no reply to his friendly communications. 

When he arrived in Bulgaria he found himself con- 
fronted by M. Stambouloff, the most formidable person- 
age there, who had considerably helped his candidature 
in the hope of being allowed to reign in his name, ancf 
who deceived himself that Ferdinand was an insignificant 
princelet whom it would be easy to lead and easier still 
to frighten. M. Stambouloff, though most unpopular 
among some parties, was literally worshipped by others, 
and could boast of a considerable number of adherents 
ready to obey every injunction he saw fit to give them. 
He had hated Prince Alexander of Battenberg, in whom 
he had noticed an independence which did not in the least 
enter into his programme. He hated Russia still more, 
and he disliked Austria ; and whilst preaching constantly 
that Bulgaria ought to fight for her entire independence 
from European control, he meant her only to do so in his 
favour, and to deliver into his hands the governance of 
her destiny, which hitherto the Great Powers, signatories 

i35 



Sovereigns and Statesmen of Europe 

of the Treaty of Berlin, had exercised. It was not very 
long before M. Stambouloff found out that he had been 
entirely mistaken in his appreciation of the character of 
the Sovereign whom he had given to Bulgaria. Instead 
of finding himself in the presence of a weak young man, 
he discovered to his intense astonishment that he had to 
do with a personage gifted with unusual strength of mind, 
iron will, and inflexibility of purpose, backed, moreover, 
by the ferocious affection of a mother who passed for not 
being over scrupulous as to the means which she employed 
to attain her ends. 

At first M. Stambouloff could hardly believe in the 
truth of his discovery, then he applied himself to persuade 
Prince Ferdinand that his only safety lay in trusting him- 
self entirely to his care, and in relying on his experience 
of Bulgaria and of her population to help him to maintain 
himself on his throne, in spite of the violent opposition 
with which his election had been met in Europe. 

Prince Ferdinand smiled, but did not accept this 
generous offer, which he thought far too self-interested 
to be sincere. He set himself to win the affection of his 
new subjects ; learned their language, tried to adapt him- 
self to their customs, and, in fact, set his personality 
against that of M. Stambouloff, who somehow found 
himself thrust aside and in danger of losing his popularity. 

It is to be questioned whether Prince Ferdinand would 

have been able to win so quickly the battle he had made 

up his mind to fight had he not been backed by the 

thousands upon thousands which the Princess Clementine 

136 



Bulgarian Mannerisms 

distributed with such a lavish hand on his behalf. The 
clever and astute old lady understood to perfection the 
art of spending money usefully. Stingy in her private 
life, she surprised even her son by her immense generosity 
whenever arose the question of helping him in the diffi- 
culties of a position she had advised him to accept, and 
she associated herself with all his plans with an energy 
that was more than surprising at her advanced age. 

One of the first cares of the Princess was to gather 
round her son a household on whom he could absolutely 
rely, and then to engage for him the best chef she could 
discover in Paris. She made him give dinners at which she 
presided with a grace truly surprising when one considered 
her reputation of haughtiness and her proud disdain of 
everybody who was not royal. She smiled at the small 
incongruities committed during these meals by the un- 
couth Bulgarian notabilities of those days, and she con- 
trived somehow by her tact, and without ever wounding 
any one among them, to teach them that peas are not 
to be eaten with one's knife, and that it is not altogether 
the thing to drink from the finger-bowl, a performance 
in which some of these illustrious personages occasionally 
indulged. 

Princess Clementine also cultivated the Bulgarian 
clergy, and, when talking with its dignitaries, led them 
to hope that one day her son might enter into the bosom 
of the Orthodox Church, and that on the whole she 
thought the arrangement which had been made when 
Prince Charles of Hohenzollern had been called to the 

i37 



Sovereigns and Statesmen of Europe 

throne of Roumania, and which stipulated that any chil- 
dren he might have should be brought up in the religion 
of his new country, had been an admirable one which 
might with advantage be imitated in Bulgaria. 

The old Princess soon made herself most popular, not 
only in Sofia but all over Bulgaria, and before long 
Prince Ferdinand had no more need to be so careful not 
to wound M. Stambouloff' s susceptibilities. 

M. Stambouloff, meantime, had become furious. He, 
the experienced politician, had allowed himself to be taken 
in by a young man whom he had believed to be a 
nonentity. This was more than his vanity could bear, and 
he set himself thinking as to how he could get rid of him. 
The relations between the disappointed statesman and his 
Sovereign soon reached an acute state, and Stambouloff, 
as was reported in Sofia, began to make overtures to 
Russia with a view to securing the Tsar's permission to 
recommend the candidature of a Russian Grand Duke to 
the throne of Bulgaria. Alexander III., however, would 
not listen to any such proposal. The discovery of this 
plot did not interfere with the good temper of Prince 
Ferdinand, who was more amused at it than anything 
else. Prince Ferdinand knew perfectly well that the days 
of the Tsar were numbered, and he had his own ideas 
as to what his future movements would be. 

In the meantime, as M. Stambouloff was returning 
one evening from the club where he had dined, he was 
waylaid by assassins, who literally butchered him a few 
steps from his own door. 

138 



First Marriage of Ferdinand 

With the disappearance from the political scene of M. 
Stambouloff, the only serious obstacle to the further 
development of Prince Ferdinand's plans was removed. 
Henceforward his career was enabled to develop itself 
smoothly and evenly, notwithstanding a few small inci- 
dents which now and then arose to impede its onward 
progress. In the course of these events he had married 
the eldest daughter of the Duke of Parma, who had borne 
him two sons in the first two years of their marriage, and 
thus assured the future of his dynasty. He then resolved 
on the first really serious step he had made since his elec- 
tion — a step that was but the forerunner of others not 
inferior to it in importance — and determined to re-baptise 
his heir according to the rites of the Greek, or rather the 
Bulgarian, Orthodox Church. 

This difference was a very sensible one, but, as it 
happened, no one noticed it at the time. A numerous 
and influential party in Russia welcomed with delight 
what it imagined was a recognition bj^ Prince Ferdinand 
of the supremacy of Russia, mixed with the desire to 
place his family as well as his country under the protection 
of the Tsar. The latter, when asked to stand godfather 
to little Prince Boris, graciously consented to the request, 
and went so far as to send a special representative to attend 
the ceremony, which was performed with great pomp at 
Sofia, and the Slavophil Press hailed the return of Bul- 
garia into the arms of Russia. 

Prince Ferdinand came to Moscow at the time of the 
coronation of Nicholas II. to express his thanks for the 

i39 



Sovereigns and Statesmen of Europe 

restoration of his country and of his dynasty into the 
favour of the great White Tsar, but, notwithstanding, 
he was not received with any enthusiasm, a fact that 
troubled him but little, for he never allowed the numer- 
ous snubs he received to influence the equanimity with 
which Nature and a kind Providence had endowed him. 
Nevertheless, he contrived to gather a considerable 
amount of information during his stay in Russia, and he 
judged Russian statesmen as being infinitely inferior to 
himself in the matter of political perspicacity, as indeed 
they were. 

The next time Prince Ferdinand returned to Russia it 
was with the Princess, whose charm he trusted would win 
him a warmer welcome than he had received during his 
first visit, and thereafter vanished from the horizon so 
far as foreign visits were concerned. Instead, he applied 
himself to the development of the resources of his country, 
and occupied his leisure in building for himself on the 
shores of the Black Sea a fairy-like palace, to the em- 
bellishment of which he devoted considerable time and 
thought. At the same time he managed to keep himself 
very well acquainted with all that was going on in the 
Balkan Peninsula, and to foment dissatisfaction against 
Turkey in Roumelia. 

Ferdinand of Bulgaria soon acquired the reputation 
of being a conscientious Sovereign and a wise ruler who 
would not risk any adventure capable of disturbing the 
tranquillity and the peace of Europe. He maintained 
excellent relations with his neighbours, and altogether 

140 




Fermin \\n I. 

fsai of BktlfirM 




Ferdinand Becomes King 

played his curds so well that no one suspected he was 
aJ) the while working toward the destruction of Russian 
influence in his dominions, and thinking about the day 
when he would be able to have himself proclaimed, first, 
King of Bulgaria, and, later, Emperor of the Near East. 

When Roumelia revolted against the Sultan and asked 
to be incorporated with Bulgaria, Prince Ferdinand 
directed this revolution so cunningly that it was accepted 
as a matter of course by the whole of Europe, and, further- 
more, was congratulated on his success. Uq had by that 
time won for himself, if not the affection, at least 
the respect of his brother sovereigns, and later on, when 
he, by another piece of clever diplomacy, was hailed by 
his subjects as King of Bulgaria, he did not find a single 
dissentient voice among the European Powers. 

The Princess Clementine was dead by that time, 
having left Ferdinand all that she could dispose out of 
her immense fortune. The King had also lost his wife, 
that sweet Princess Louise whose existence, rumour 
would have it, he had considerably embittered. In time 
he .sought another consort. Here again he was guided 
by that unfailing tact which helped him to surmount so 
many difficulties and to come out of so many unpleasant 
situations to his honour. The Princess Eleonore of 
Reuss, who consented to share with him the responsi- 
bilities of a position which was not yet entirely secured, 
was a woman of great intelligence and nobility of 
character. Without her it would have been difficult for 
him to pass through the trials that at last beset him 

141 



Sovereigns and Statesmen of Europe 

when he committed the first mistake in his political life 
and after the success of the first Balkan War — which he 
had fought against Turkey side by side with Servia and 
Greece — turned against his allies of the day before and 
led his army toward the fiasco in which the independence 
of Bulgaria, which had been acquired with such efforts, 
nearly foundered and perished. 

It is difficult to understand how a politician of the 
experience of King Ferdinand could be led into such an 
error. The fact is that for once he had not followed his 
own instincts, and in his desire to rule in Constantinople 
he had allowed himself to listen to the advice of Austria, 
who, desirous as she had always been to bring about com- 
plications in the path of Russia and to put barriers in 
the way of the latter's legitimate ambition to obtain 
free access to the Dardanelles, had plotted to set a rival 
to her in the person of King Ferdinand, to whom she 
promised help which she refused to him when he wanted 
it the most, compelling him thus to accept the disastrous 
conditions imposed upon him by the treaty concluded in 
Bucharest. 

Out of this cruel experience the Bulgarian Sovereign 
emerged a sadder, and let us hope a wiser, man. He has 
not, however, given up his old grudge against Russia, 
and, if what rumour whispers is true, he may yet risk for 
the second time the future of his dynasty. Were he to 
make such an attempt — and it seems highly probable — 
it is freely believed that he would have the backing of 
certain other European Powers, and that the lure which 

142 



Ferdinand's High Ambition 

is so attractive to his eyes, the crown of Islam, is being 
dangled before his ambitious vision. 

But, with all his defects, it cannot be denied that 
King Ferdinand is a statesman ; not too rigid in his 
conscience, perhaps ; mistaken in his appreciations some- 
times ; but a statesman all the same, and, so far as we 
have seen, the only one Bulgaria possesses at the present 
moment. 



'43 



BELGIUM AND GREECE 

IT seems to me that the country who fought so long 
for her liberty and the one who is fighting for it at 
the present moment can well be mentioned together, 
notwithstanding the distance which separates them on 
the map. One of them has been celebrated by Byron in 
some of his most enthusiastic and pathetic poems ; the 
other will find writers in the future to tell her nobly 
tragic story. Greece had Canaris to fight for her, and 
Belgium gave birth to thousands of unknown heroes 
who have suffered and endured a real martyrdom in 
order to guard her rights against an unscrupulous and 
arrogant invader. 

King Leopold I. of Belgium was an exceedingly 
astute and capable Monarch whose influence in the matter 
of politics stretched far outside his own little kingdom. 
The correspondence of Queen Victoria has revealed to 
us the real character of that beloved uncle of hers whom 
she trusted and respected so much. He was a kind of 
Nestor among Monarchs, whose advice was always sound, 
because he never gave it in a hurry, and because he had 
acquired more experience than most men of his time. 
Had he lived it is to be questioned whether the expan- 

144 



Baron Nothomb 

sion of Prussia at the expense of all other nations would 
have been tolerated. 

Leopold I. founded a school of politicians the achieve- 
ments of which, if ever published, would furnish many 
interesting and unknown details concerning the politics 
of the last half of the nineteenth century. It is sufficient 
to mention such men as Baron Nothomb, who, after 
having played a most important part in the recognition 
of Belgian independence, represented his country with 
such distinction in Berlin for something like forty years, 
and was the only statesman whom Prince Bismarck not 
only feared, but condescended to consult upon more than 
one occasion. 

Baron Nothomb, in the numerous detailed reports 
that he used to address to his Government, clearly 
described his understanding of the policy pursued by 
Prr /. The Belgian Ambassador was not an admirer 
o f ' tt policy, the shallowness and cruel selfishness of 
which he appreciated at its proper value. Long before 
anyone else suspected it in Europe, he saw the danger 
that the hegemony of Prussia would represent one day 
to the whole of the world, and more than once Baron 
Nothomb expressed himself with foreboding and emphasis 
on the subject. Unfortunately, he was powerless to do 
aught else but signify the apprehensions with which his 
mind was rilled ; but if ever his letters see the light of 
day more than one passage would sound prophetic of 
the evil he was the only one to see coming from afar 
and which he would have done much to be able to avert. 
K i45 



Sovereigns and Statesmen of Europe 

In a private communication to a persona] friend of 
his, written in 1875, he expressed himself in the follow- 
ing terms concerning the preponderance of Germany : 

'"It is very much to be regretted that there was not one 
nation in the whole of Europe who, after Sedan, was 
courageous enough to oblige Prussia to conclude peace 
with France. This one thing alone would have prevented 
the grouping of Germany into one vast Empire, or, at 
least, would have delayed this disastrous event. I call it 
disastrous because the whole course of history has proved 
to us that a great and united Germany would be the 
source of the most terrible danger that has ever assailed 
the world. One must not forget that the German, in 
spite of all his cleverness, his industry, and the persever- 
ance of his character — which qualities no one can deny 
to him — is not a civilised being in the sense of being able 
to carry civilisation anywhere else. He assimilates to 
himself and eventually improves on the discoveries and 
progresses started by other people ; he has never been 
able to initiate. There is about him a good deal left of 
that savagery which distinguished the Teuton hordes who 
assailed the Roman Empire, and it will require many 
more years than I would care to count to rid him of it. 
'* The great work performed by Prince Bismarck is 
far from being complete, and, unfortunately, there will 
be no one after him to perfect it. He will only find 
many imitators, who, in their desire to copy him, will 
destroy all that he has done, because he has done nothing 

really good, though he may have done much that was 

146 



M. Frere Orban 

great." I give here the original French, which expresses 
better than any translation can the real meaning of the 
writer : " II n'a rien fait de vraiment bien, quoiqu'il ait 
fait beaucoup de choses qui sont grandes." 

Baron Nothomb was not the only Belgian diplomat 
who felt distrustful of Prussia. M. Frere Orban, too, 
the great Minister of Leopold II., before whom even 
that enterprising Monarch felt cowed, and with whom he 
did not care to have any differences of opinion, was heard 
more than once to express his fears concerning a possible 
aggression of Germany on Belgium in case of a war with 
France. It was well known that such an aggression had 
been contemplated in 1870, and had been finally given 
up owing to the prudence of Prince Bismarck, who over- 
ruled the influence of the military party, and also on 
account of the strong opposition of the Crown Prince 
Frederick, who put forward as a reason to abstain 
from such a treacherous intention that England and 
Queen Victoria would most certainly oppose such a step 
— if necessary, by the strength of arms. Germany at 
that time was not intoxicated with her past successes, and 
even the venturesome and enterprising mind of Prince 
Bismarck recoiled before such a flagrant violation of 
solemn treaties. Belgium was not invaded, and France 
having been beaten all the same, German public opinion 
did not regret that its reputation for honesty had not 
been impaired by such a circumstance. 

But the idea that, in case of another war, the 

neutrality of this brave little country was bound to perish 

147 



Sovereigns and Statesmen of Europe 

had got hold of the German mind. As years went on 
an increasing number of people in Berlin, as well as in 
Dresden, Munich and other large German towns, dis- 
cussed the idea in an academical sort of manner, and 
occasionally articles appeared in one or other of the news- 
papers. Abroad, too, it was openly spoken about, and 
in Russia especially a fixed idea was implanted that the 
plan of the German Staff, in ease of a second Franco- 
German war, was to invade Belgium, and fight a way 
through to Paris. Why such a thing was believed it is 
impossible to say, but the fact remains that this idea 
floated through the air long before the likelihood of such 
a war was even admitted. 

In Belgium itself the possibility of such a catastrophe 
was recognised, and had caused more than one sleepless 
night to those responsible for the destinies of that 
country. The only person who had refused to admit its 
likelihood was Leopold II., who trusted to his personal 
ability to avert such an event. But when this clever, 
though perhaps not over saintly, Sovereign passed away, 
the question of a possible violation of Belgian neutrality 
had to be discussed between his successor and the hitter's 
Ministers. It was but natural that they should weigh 
all the pros and cons of such an eventuality. It was also 
more than natural for them to see whether, in case it 
really came to pass, they could rely on someone to help 
them keep secure their political independence. The 
famous documents which the German Foreign Office 

published with such alacrity, and from which it tried to 

148 



King Albert and His Queen 

make out that an aggression against Prussia had been 
contemplated by Belgium, together with England and 
France, prove absolutely nothing else than this desire 
for safety. No man gifted with the slightest amount of 
common sense can ever say that these documents prove 
in any way that Belgium nourished evil designs against 
Germany. 

Belgium met her fate bravely and faced it without 
fear. Every citizen of that heroic little country did his 
duty, and the conduct of the Royal Family will ever 
remain an example of nobility. When King Albert 
succeeded to his uncle people believed him to be a very 
ordinary young man, content with his position, honest 
and true, but commonplace, and somewhat phlegmatic 
like all his ancestors. To tell the truth, no one troubled 
much about him, or about his Queen, the little Bavarian 
Princess whom he had married out of love, and with 
whom he was happy after the manner of the kings in 
fairy tales. Adversity was to reveal him in all the manly 
beauty of his character and to make his people realise the 
qualities of this quiet, unobtrusive man who had made 
duty his ideal. 

King Albert's distinguished parents had imbued him 

with a strong sense of honour. The Count of Flanders 

used to tell him that before ever saying " Yes " or " No " 

to anything he ought to think carefully, and then, once 

he had made up his mind, to hold to his decision without 

wavering. " And," used to add that fond father, "you 

must, above everything else, always take the responsibility 

149 



Sovereigns and Statesmen of Europe 

for your personal actions, and never try to shift it on 
to other people's shoulders." 

The Countess of Flanders, also, had been a remark- 
able woman, who had unbounded influence over the minds 
of all her children. She had made a great position at the 
Belgian Court, and, indeed, among all European royal- 
ties. The old German Emperor William I., whom her 
great beauty had attracted in the days of her youth, had 
later on been charmed by the dignity of her mind, and 
liked to invite her to his presence whenever he found 
an excuse for doing so. Even her brother-in-law, hard 
Leopold II., who was so tyrannical in regard to the 
members of his family, treated his sister-in-law with a 
respect he never showed to anyone else. 

The Countess of Flanders, who was by birth a German 
and a Princess of the House of Hohenzollern, being a 
cousin of the Emperor William, had so thoroughly 
identified herself with her husband's country that she 
hardly ever spoke German, and her household was wholly 
conducted on Belgian or French lines. She was very 
talented ; used to draw clever sketches, which more than 
once won prizes at various exhibitions, and was a musician 
of no mean order. All her children were brought up 
under her own supervision, and the smallest details of 
their education were entered into and followed by her 
with a keen interest that never flagged so long as they 
remained under her roof. She tried, as she used to say 
herself, to make them good Christians and good Belgians, 
leaving to Providence the care of their further fate in life. 

150 



M. Emile Vandervelde 

Her son had been very much attached to her, and her 
death was one of the great sorrows of his life. 

The world knows the perfect calm with which King 
Albert chose the path of honour. He led his troops 
against the enemy with a determination no one who did 
not know him well had ever expected from him. He did 
more. He shared their dangers, their privations, all their 
cruel sufferings, and valiantly fought at their side, always 
the first there where danger threatened, sinking his royal 
rank, glad whenever he was treated as any other officer 
by the soldiers under his command. He led the same 
rude, hard existence as his men — sleeping together with 
them in damp trenches, remaining out of doors in the 
cold and in the rain, encouraging his army by his example 
and by his words ; always keeping high up before them 
the flag of their country, and telling them never to 
despair, though everything seemed lost as far as human 
eyes could see. His conduct has been sublime in its 
simplicity, and only equalled by that of his noble con- 
sort, the courageous Queen Elisabeth, who during those 
trying days of agony remained at his side, sharing all his 
anguish and suffering, and participating in all his labours. 

When the King called to be one of his Ministers the 
Socialist, M. Emile Vandervelde, Belgium recognised the 
democratic tendencies of her Monarch. M. Vandervelde, 
the politician whose name for such a long time was 
synonymous of Republicanism, and some say Anarchism, 
is, perhaps, one of the few men in Europe who have 
grasped in its extent this problem at which several 

151 



Sovereigns and Statesmen of Europe 

generations of men have already worked without result — 
the problem of conciliating all the different parties in a 
country into one great feeling of love for it and for its 
dynasty. He is the great rehabilitator of Socialism, and 
he has proved that, if applied according to his personal 
ideas, it can become one of the most powerful supports 
of a Monarchy. M. Vandervelde visited Russia two or 
three years ago, and whilst there came into contact with 
some of the principal Socialist members of the Duma and 
of the leaders of the working classes. He was reported 
not to have been too edified by what he had seen of them. 
M. Vandervelde, at whose word all the Socialists of 
Belgium would rise at once, should he call upon them 
to do so, is far from having any sympathy for revolution. 
He is a reformer ; not a destroyer of the old and venerable 
things thanks to which a nation has performed great 
deeds in the past. He wants progress and civilisation 
to take the place, not of traditions, but of incompetence. 
He is essentially a man of his time, who has understood 
the value of steam, electricity, and all the wonderful dis- 
coveries that have transformed the face of the world and 
opened new and wonderful horizons to its intelligence ; 
and he wants those horizons to widen still further, to 
unfold to him secrets of conciliating all the various 
interests which at present are struggling so violently for 
existence in Europe. M. Vandervelde is a great man in 
his way, not only a great Belgian. He will leave his 
impress on the organisation of the Socialist party in his 
country, and should ever that country win back her inde- 

15-2 



M. Carton de Wiart 

pendence, it is certain that by his efforts she will prosper 
under the rule of a King who will have ceased fearing any 
attempts of Socialism to overthrow his throne. Nothing 
draws people together more than suffering and danger 
borne in common, and after the trials that have befallen 
them the Belgian people and their King will be united 
more intimately than ever. Little Belgium has already 
given to Europe several examples worth following, and 
she is likely to give it one more : that of a Monarch 
popular amidst subjects who are mostly Socialists. 

Beside these two great men are other figures just as 
interesting. One is M. Carton de Wiart, whose wife has 
been one of the victims of German brutality, and who 
in his desire to be useful to his Sovereign and to his 
country followed the King and Queen in their exile on 
the French coast. There are authors like Maeterlinck, 
and poets like Emile Verhaeren, who have proclaimed 
their horror of Germany's dark deeds. There are men 
and women who have sacrificed everything that they held 
dear to the cause of their native land, and often have I 
wished I could write the story of all those obscure heroes 
who, sometimes unknown to themselves, have contributed 
such beautiful stones to the monument of their beloved 
country's glory. Others more worthy than I am will 
perform this task, and tell the English reader of all the 
wonders that have been performed on the soil of old 
Flanders, and of ancient Brabant, in these sad years. 

Albert I. is still a young man ; indeed, this is the age 
of young personalities. King Constantine of Greece is 

153 



Sovereigns and Statesmen of Europe 

not yet middle-aged, though already his sons and 
daughters are grown up. Physically Constantine is a 
fine type of man, hearing a strong resemblance to his 
mother's family, and with more than one trait of the 
Romanoffs in his character, as well as in his personal 
appearance and manners. 

He showed from his earliest childhood considerable 
determination and a strong will that brought him more 
than once into collision with his father, who on his side' 
was not a man to tolerate the least infringement of his 
authority. When the then Crown Prince had attained 
his eighteenth year, on the advice of the old King of 
Denmark, his grandfather, he was sent to Berlin to 
study the art of warfare in the ranks of the German 
Guards. It was hoped that the strict discipline to which 
he would be subjected would unbend some of the natural 
stiffness and temper of his obstinacy. The result did not 
answer to expectations. The young man conformed him- 
self with the utmost exactitude to all that was required 
of him, and soon became a favourite with his 
superiors; none of his defects, however, was modified 
by the severe course of instruction which he underwent, 
while, on the other hand, his sympathies, which up to 
that time had rather favoured France, became suddenly 
German, and he carried away with him from Potsdam a 
strong admiration for everything that was Prussian, as 
well as an ardent love for the Prussian Princess whom 
later on he was to win for his wife. This was not quite 
what his father and mother had expected ; especially the 

i54 



King George of Greece 

latter, who had always retained her Russian inclinations, 
and to whom the idea of having for her daughter-in-law 
a German and a Protestant did not appeal in the very 
least. The King, too, though he had no serious objec- 
tion to raise to the marriage desired by his heir, would 
have preferred his choice to have fallen elsewhere. In 
spite of the efforts of King George and his Queen to 
hide their real feelings from the new Crown Princess, 
they did not succeed well enough, and as a consequence 
the relations of the Duke of Sparta — such was the title 
of Prince Constantine — with his parents became strained. 

At first the coldness was slight, but later on it became 
more acute, especially after the war with Turkey, in 
which the Crown Prince's popularity suffered so much 
that he considered it well to leave the country for a few 
years. The heir to the throne of the Hellenes was drawn 
toward the Triple Alliance. It is not surprising, there- 
fore, that he did not care for the French officers who 
had been called by King George to take over the instruc- 
tion of the Greek army. He would have preferred the 
Grecian forces to be trained according to Prussian 
methods. 

After some time the Crown Princess abjured Protes- 
tantism and embraced the Orthodox faith, much to the 
anger of William II., who for some years thereafter would 
not speak to his sister, and much to the relief of the 
Greek nation, who did not care for the thought that its 
future Queen was a heretic. The Crown Princess proved 
herself a woman of considerable intelligence, far cleverer 

i55 



Sovereigns and Statesmen of Europe 

than her mother-in-law, that beloved Queen Olga whose 
beauty had won for her, together with her unbounded 
charity, so much popularity in Greece. She had been 
severely critical of the war with Turkey, which she con- 
sidered to have been a most foolish enterprise, and she 
never made a secret of her point of view, which was in 
direct opposition to that of the King, who never forgave 
her for her outspoken disapproval. George I. was essen- 
tially French and English in his sympathies. 

France always attracted King George. He used to 
spend two months at Aix Les Bains every autumn, where 
his arrival was always awaited with great impatience, 
as the brilliance of the season mostly depended upon 
it. King George was also fond of Paris, where he led 
the life of a tourist, and, beyond one solemn visit to 
the Ely see, never appeared anywhere in his official 
capacity. One could meet him accompanied only by an 
aide-de-camp strolling on the boulevards or in the Rue 
de la Paix looking at the shops as any ordinary traveller 
would do, or dining at some fashionable restaurant, some- 
times with a lady friend and sometimes alone. He would 
finish his evening at a small theatre, where no one beyond 
the detective appointed to watch over his movements was 
aware of his real identity. King George enjoyed that 
kind of life, and always left gay Paris with regret. 

This penchant for light amusement on the part of 
the King always jarred on the serious nature of Prince 
Constantine. He thought it undignified, not to use a 
more sweeping expression : and he allowed his father to 

156 



Prince Gonstantine Exiled 

see that such was the case. No man cares to be looked at 
askance by his own children, and it is no wonder, there- 
fore, that George I. and his heir did not get on so well 
together. 

When the Crown Prince had to go into exile he 
repaired again to Germany and took up his abode in the 
Castle of Cronberg, which his mother-in-law, the late 
Empress Frederick, had left to her three youngest 
daughters, and there applied himself to different studies, 
military and historical, in order the better to prepare 
himself for his future duties. He was no longer a boy, 
but a man with considerable experience of life, and he 
began to judge objectively certain facts which formerly 
had appealed to his heart or to his fancies but not to 
his judgment. Curious as it may seem, this second 
sojourn in Germany did not widen his sympathies for 
the Teuton ; the brutal side of the German character, 
that had escaped him before, suddenly became revealed 
to him. This gave him considerably to think, and he 
began to observe the country where he had found his 
accomplished wife with eyes which were not so completely 
obscured as of old. Constantine has inherited from hi? 
Danish ancestry that strong common sense which always 
distinguished the House. He had very soon taken mental 
assessment of the moral standard of the Hohenzollerns, 
and the result of his observations strengthened him in his 
determination never to go to war with Germany, as it 
would mean certain defeat. 

Acting on this conviction, Prince Constantine showed 

i57 



Sovereigns and Statesmen of Europe 

himself extremely prudent in his conduct when at last 
he was allowed to return to Athens. When the first 
Balkan War broke out, the Crown Prince did not indulge 
in unnecessary enthusiasm, and took particular care to 
let Berlin know that though he sympathised with the 
reasons that had drawn Greece into the struggle against 
Turkey, it was not from anti-German feelings, and that, 
on the contrary, he reckoned on Germany's help to 
smooth matters when peace would come to be discussed. 
Still, Constantine showed himself more than cool in 
his relations with King Ferdinand of Bulgaria, and con- 
siderably reserved in regard to Roumania. During the 
London conference he maintained, an active correspond- 
ence — through the medium of his wife — with several 
leading people in Berlin, and managed to convey to the 
German Government the impression that he would never 
pursue an aggressive policy in regard to anyone. And 
at the same time he won for himself a standing popularity 
in his own country, where the brilliant successes obtained 
by the army, which he had commanded during the cam- 
paign, were attributed to the care which he had given to 
its instruction. 

What would have happened had Greece settled to a 
quiet and normal existence during the lifetime of the 
late King it is, of course, difficult to say, and it is likely 
that the dissension between him and the Crown Prince 
would not have abated. But King George was struck 
by the bullet of an assassin in the streets of Salonika, and 
Constantine became Sovereign of the Hellenes. 

158 



Constantine Ascends the Throne 

The first feeling of King Constantine was one of 
passionate regret for the father who had fallen so un- 
expectedly a victim to political fanaticism. Whatever 
may be his defects, King Constantine has a warm heart, 
and his feelings are not lacking in intensity. He mourned 
sincerely the parent who had been taken away from him 
in such a tragic manner, and his grief was as genuine 
as it was deep. Then as time passed he had to map out 
for himself a political programme and begin seriously to 
take up the task of governing his country under the 
difficult circumstances which, in common with the other 
Balkan states, Greece found herself involved. 

The peace of Bucharest, though it met with opposition 
in some quarters, was on the whole not badly received 
throughout Greece. It gave her the much-coveted harbour 
of Kavala, which was a decided victory over Bulgarian 
ambitions and pretensions, and it secured for her other 
advantages of no mean importance. The nation had no 
reason to grumble or to feel dissatisfied, and could afford 
to wait in patience for developments which were bound 
to come. It was shortly after this peace had been signed 
that Greece's principal statesman, M. Venizelos, started 
on a journey which took him to all the principal European 
capitals, and which was expected to yield great results 
not only in his country but also in the whole of Europe. 

M. Venizelos is perhaps one of the cleverest Hellenes 
of his generation. He aspired to follow in the foot- 
steps of Cavour or Bismarck, forgetting that circum- 
stances were different, and that in such a land of surprise 

i59 



Sovereigns and Statesmen of Europe 

as the Near East, the news of a Bulgarian-Greek treaty 
would not strike the public mind as a truly great 
achievement. In the East everything is possible, which 
perhaps accounts for the fact that everything that occurs 
is discounted already in some form or other. Surprise 
is the last thing one must look for; and yet M. Venizelos 
wanted to surprise his compatriots as well as Europe. 
But Europe, though considerably interested in M. Veni- 
zelos, treated him simply as the Minister of the small 
Power which he represented. 

In France alone did M. Venizelos receive more atten- 
tion, and consequently it was toward France that his 
sympathies leaned. It must not be lost sight of when 
judging M. Venizelos that his temperament is strongly 
Oriental, and he is not at ease among people who have 
been in contact with Western civilisation all their lives. 

It is to be feared that two authoritative natures like 
those of King Constantine and M. Venizelos would never 
be able to work together for any length of time. M. 
Venizelos has unquestionable talents, but is too obstinate, 
perhaps conceited, in his opinions ever to admit himself 
in the wrong, even where his judgments are manifestly 
founded on superficial observation. 

Statesmen cannot be improvised. The greatest politi- 
cal triumphs of Prince von Bismarck were obtained by 
him after a long career, during the course of which he 
had had many disappointments. M. Venizelos forgets 
this circumstance and believes himself to be a statesman, 
whereas he is nothing more than a very clever politician. 

160 



M. Venizelos 

The King understood the difference, and though he 
rendered full justice to the unmistakable talents of M. 
Venizelos, he could not sanction a policy that seemed 
to him to savour of the adventurous, and he did not 
care to risk his Crown for the sake of what appeared 
to promise but illusory triumphs. He knew that the 
existence of the Triple Understanding furnished Ger- 
many with a pretext for war, and under the circumstances 
he could not commit his country to a policy that promised, 
sooner or later, to plunge Greece into a new struggle at 
a moment when the nation had not yet recovered from 
the effects of the last, and when an aggression against 
Turkey would have resulted in the invasion of Greek 
territory by Bulgarian forces. 

M. Venizelos did not believe in this danger. He only 
saw a territorial aggrandisement for Greece resulting in 
her co-operation in the attack on the Dardanelles by the 
Allies, and he criticised the Sovereign for not then fol- 
lowing him on this road. Out of this situation arose the 
vague gossip that the King allowed himself to be influ- 
enced by the Queen and by the heads of the Staff, who, 
having learned militarism in Berlin, were imbued with 
Prussian ideas. 

These attacks that touched upon his private life in- 
censed the King. He knew, if M. Venizelos did not, 
that the Greek army was not in a condition to engage in 
war. M. Venizelos thereafter resigned office as Prime 
Minister, and King Constantine appealed to an old 
statesman of considerable experience, M. Gounaris, to 
l 161 



Sovereigns and Statesmen of Europe 

take over the Government of the country. Difficult as 
the task appeared, M. Gounaris did not hesitate to 
accept it. The Chamber was dissolved immediately 
afterwards, and new elections fixed for the end of June. 
When they took place the King was at death's door, 
and the whole interest of the nation remained concen- 
trated around his sick bed. Politics were put aside and 
lost their interest, and the popularity of Constantine, 
which wise folk said had been shaken by reason of 
his conflict with M. Venizelos, once more became con- 
siderable. Crowds filled the streets of Athens and 
gathered around the palace during the days when his 
life trembled in the balance, and the violence of parties 
subsided whilst the danger lasted. 

Under these circumstances the elections took place 
far more quietly than could have been hoped or ex- 
pected ; and though M. Venizelos ? s party obtained a 
small majority, he did not have the great triumph his 
partisans had expected. In the meanwhile events proved 
it would not have been such a wise thing for Greece 
to have joined in the terrible European conflict. What 
will be the end of the present conflict between Constan- 
tine and one of the most popular Greek statesmen of 
modern times it is difficult to say, or even to guess. It 
is to be hoped in the interests of humanity that Greece 
will refrain from joining in a struggle which has already 
made so many victims, and in which she can hope to 
gain nothing that she would not obtain by an attitude 
of strict neutrality. Yet who can tell? As I have said, 

162 



What King Constantine Knows 

" everything can happen in the East," and any moment 
may see a drastic change in the whole situation. 

King Constantine has been charged with being a 
pro-German. I have failed to see where this pro-Ger- 
manism has been exhibited. He knows very well the 
resources and limits of his country, and understands 
better even than politicians, who may not be able to form 
a judgment on military matters, whether it would be 
possible for Greece to draw the sword at the present 
moment or whether her honour requires her to do it. 
If this latter factor came into question, the King is the 
last man who would hesitate before an attempt to 
vindicate the honour of his country, even at the cost of 
heavy sacrifices. 



163 



VI 
. ITALY 

NO country in Europe has occupied public opinion 
since the beginning of the great war more than 
Italy. It was generally believed that a good deal 
depended upon the attitude she would assume in the 
struggle, and that if she repudiated the Triple Alliance 
Austria and Germany would certainly find themselves 
seriously handicapped. In Berlin, as well as in Vienna, 
considerable uneasiness was felt with regard to this 
matter, whilst in France great hopes were entertained 
as to the possibility that Italy might be drawn by her 
kindred ties with her Latin sister to denounce the treaty 
which she had accepted at a time when political conditions 
were so entirely different. The Irredentist party had 
always been powerful in the Italian Peninsula, and 
the desire to annex Trieste was growing stronger and 
stronger as the kingdom developed itself. 

The old hatred, too, for Austria had not abated 
one iota, notwithstanding the fact that an alliance bound 
the two countries. The genius of such a statesman as 
Prince Bismarck alone brought about the alliance, which 
was entirely artificial and reposed on nothing firm or 

stable. When Austria sent her famous ultimatum to 

164 



Italy Resents Being Ignored 

Servia, Italy protested and declared that she ought to 
have been consulted on a step of such unusual gravity. 
Austria resented these complaints, and recriminations 
followed. 

At this juncture Germany tried to interfere. She 
considered herself entitled to exercise a serious influence 
over Italy. Ties of friendship had long bound together 
the two reigning dynasties, and both the late Emperor 
Frederick and William II. had always said that they 
considered themselves at home in Rome. It could not 
be gainsaid that Germany had proved herself a very 
useful friend to Italy on more than one occasion. It was 
only lately that clouds had begun to darken the former 
intimacy, and the German Foreign Office blamed French 
intrigues for the change. 

So long as Prince Billow had occupied the post of 
Ambassador at the Quirinal everything had gone 
smoothly, but when he removed to the Wilhelmstrasse 
somehow his tone as German Chancellor was not alto- 
gether the same that it had been when he was simply a 
German Ambassador. To tell the truth, the great affec- 
tion which Prince Bulow professed to feel for Italy, the 
land where he had found such a charming and accom- 
plished wife, consisted of little else than words. When he 
found himself at the head of German foreign affairs he 
never missed an opportunity of being unpleasant to Italy 
in a quiet, unobtrusive manner which was intensely dis- 
agreeable, but at the same time so courteous and so polite 
that it was impossible to resent it outwardly. The fact 

165 



Sovereigns and Statesmen of Europe 

of the matter was that Prince Billow, who was most 
servant during his tenure of the Embassy at Rome. 
had realised that the Triple Alliance was not popular in 
Italy. This had angered him; and lie delighted therefore 
in checkmating Italian diplomacy. 

oce Bulow, however, tell from his high position 
long before the solidarity of the Triple Alliance was 

stioned, and after he had gone the relations between 
Berlin and Rome became appreciably more pleasant. 
Several interviews took place between the Emperor 
William and King Victor Emmanuel, which might h 
led to a renewal of the past intimacy had the German 
Sovereign not shown himself so overbearing in his de- 
meanour and so exacting as to the manner in which he 
insisted upon being treated whenever he graced Italian 
shores with his presence. The Emperor William II. 
evidently had made up his mind that Italy was somewhat 
of a vassal to Germany, and that he had the right to 
enforce his will upon her in insignificant as well as in 
serious matters. King Victor Emmanuel resented this 
with all the haughtiness of the old House of Savoy. He 
waxed indignant at certain slights which were put upon 
him by the Prussian Monarch — slights still more offensive 
because, perhaps, they were not intentional. 

As interview succeeded upon interview the personal 
relations between the two rulers became more and 
more strained, and meanwhile the French Republic kept 
extending her hand to Italy across the Alps, and the 
visits which were paid by the President of the French 



itx? 



M. Barrere 

Republic in Rome, and by the King and Queen of Italy 
in Paris, helped to make each country popular with the 
other. The French Ambassador in Rome, too, M. 
Barrere, was a clever man who admirably understood 
how to use every opportunity that presented itself to 
bring about a renewal of the old ties that had existed 
between France and Italy. By his tact he rallied around 
him at the La Palazzo Farnese all the different elements, 
not of Society, because the great and fashionable world 
and himself had but few points in common, but of the 
various political parties then existing and fighting for 
supremacy in Italy. 

In days gone by M. Barrere had been an active 
member of the Paris Commune, and after the latter had 
collapsed under the reprisals ordered by M. Thiers, he 
had left Paris for London, where he spent some years 
in complete obscurity and relative poverty. At last M. 
Barrere was allowed to return to France, where, of course, 
he took up journalism, and very soon made himself a 
name. He became intimate with Gambetta, and this 
decided his future career, as by the influence of Gambetta 
M. Barrere entered diplomacy. He found free scope for 
his abilities in Rome, and very soon laid the seeds of a 
future understanding between France and Italy. When 
the 1914 war broke out he very cleverly made use of 
these tentative sentiments to bring the Government of 
King Victor Emmanuel toward active participation in the 
conflict. The Press listened to M. Barrere and followed 
his lead very willingly. Here I may be forgiven, perhaps, 

167 



Sovereigns and Statesmen of Europe 

if I mention that the French Government had given 
M. Barrere a free hand in all that he considered useful 
or necessary to do, and that very large sums were put 
at his disposal. 

The news that such was the case reached the Palazzo 
Caffarelli, where the German Embassy was located, and 
the Ambassador, who at that time was not Prince von 
Biilow, asked the Wilhelmstrasse to open a substantial 
credit in his name at a Roman bank. His demand was 
refused, and he was bitterly censured for having dared 
to make it. This is a curious fact, and proves how entirely 
mistaken the German Foreign Office was in regard to the 
real disposition of Italy in respect to the Triple Alliance, 
and how badly it had been informed as to the change 
that was gradually taking place in the public opinion of 
that country. 

When the war between Russia and her northern 
neighbours broke out it found Italy very uncertain as 
to what was going to be her share in it. The King per- 
sonally felt drawn toward the cause of the Allies, and it 
is no secret that he regretted the ties which bound him 
to the Austro-German cause. The Queen did not hide 
her sympathies for Russia, where she had been brought 
up, and, moreover, was incensed at the unjustifiable 
aggression against Servia, where her own brother-in-law 
reigned. It is known that she did her best to persuade 
her husband to throw in his lot with the Allies, a course 
which the Italian nation favoured. Victor Emmanuel 

felt perplexed ; he was essentially a prudent man, and 

1 68 



King Victor Emmanuel 

being a passionate lover of his country lie did not care 
to engage in any adventure where she might lose all. King 
Victor Emmanuel has all the characteristics of the valiant 
Savoy raee to whieh lie belongs; an historian who had 
carefully studied the annals of that House remarked at 
the beginning of the present war that the King reminded 
him of that Victor Amedee of Savoy who for such a long 
time fought against Louis XIV. 

The present King is a true descendant of those princes 
who rose slowly from the humble position of counts of 
Savoy to the proud one of kings of a united Italy, but 
he possesses honesty of purpose and sincerity of convic- 
tion in a far greater measure than his ancestors. This, 
added to the spirit of self-sacrifice which has never been 
absent from his race, led him to assume responsibilities 
with great firmness whenever he had come to the conclu- 
sion that the welfare and the interest of Italy required 
it. 

It has been said that Victor Emmanuel allowed him- 
self to be carried away by an artificial enthusiasm which 
made him break sacred engagements he ought never to 
have forgotten. The reproach is unjust — and untrue into 
the bargain. The present ruler of Italy is the last man 
to be led away or influenced by the desires of a mob. 
His austere, calculating character will always weigh care- 
fully the pros and cons of every question ; and if in the 
present case he joined his people in the wave of patriot- 
ism that swept over the land, it was not because he was 

too weak to resist it, but because he had come to the 

169 



Sovereigns and Statesmen of Europe 

conclusion that his duty toward Italy required him to 
seize the opportunity that had presented itself to accom- 
plish the final unity of the nation under the dynasty of 
Savoy, and to bring back Trieste and the Trentino to 
the Mother Country from which they had been separated 
for such a long time. It was not the eloquence of Signor 
Gabriele d'Annunzio that influenced the Sovereign ; 
neither did the cries that day and night resounded under 
the windows and the balconies of the Quirinal decide the 
King to draw forth his sword. It was simply the con- 
viction that the old Latin proverb contained more truth 
than it is generally credited with, and for once the vox 
populi of Italy was also the vox Dei. 

The whole conduct of the Italian Foreign Office at 
this critical juncture was but an echo of the wishes and 
desires of the King. He it was who led the first negotia- 
tions with Austria from which it was hoped that the 
calamity of a war might be averted. From the very first 
day of the crisis he had clearly expressed his intentions 
and formulated the demands which, according to his 
personal opinion, Italy could justly make by moral right. 
He did not seek a quarrel with his neighbours, and he 
neither played the double game he has been accused of 
by certain organs of the German and Austrian Press, 
nor followed the dictates of the extreme Irredentist party, 
which in reality he despises with all the haughty disdain 
inherent to his race and to his personal character. 

The King is not a monarch likely to obey blindly any 
mandate the nation might make ; he is possessed not only 

170 




Victor Emmanuel 

Ring of Italy 




The Misunderstandings of William II 

of persistence in his personal opinions, but also of a will 
firm enough to enforce these opinions even when they 
clash with those of his people. He had done his best 
to avoid the war, but finding all his efforts had broken 
against the arrogance of Austria, he had no hesitation in 
taking up the sword to fight for the future destiny of 
Italy. 

The German Foreign Office had not realised all these 
facts ; did not know them indeed. It had taken its cue 
from the estimate of Victor Emmanuel's character which 
had been made by the Emperor William II., who con- 
sidered him as a young man of no importance. The 
German Emperor had never understood the undercur- 
rents of strength and of determination that lay hidden 
under the apparent coldness and timidity of the Italian 
Sovereign. His own exuberance of manner and of 
language was so different from the reserve of Emmanuel 
that it was next to impossible for him to guess that a 
man might, though he said nothing, still think a good 
deal, and that the Italian proverb which says Chi va 
piano va sano might be applied with a certain amount 
of truth to the son of Humbert I. and of Margherita 
of Savoy. 

There was, however, one man who prided himself 
upon being a keen student of human nature, and who, 
in the matter of this Italian crisis, had seen farther than 
the German Emperor and the Berlin Foreign Office. I 
am thinking of Prince von Bulow. After he had been 

compelled to abandon his political career, the Prince had 

171 



Sovereigns and Statesmen of Europe 

settled in the Eternal City. He bought one of its love- 
liest residences, the famous Villa Malta, where amidst 
the roses, palms and orange trees o( his wonderful old 
gardens he still kept a sharp look out on everything that 
was going oo in the domain of polities, and never relin- 
quished the hope of being called again to till an important 
position in his country. 

Prince von Bulow pretended to have given up every 

idea of returning to political life, and assured his friends 
that he had felt much lumpier since the day he had 
abandoned statecraft. Nevertheless, he awaited with a 
certain impatience some opportunity to make his name 
heard once more in the world ; he assured himself that 
one day he would be given some fine piece of diplomatic 
work where his unquestionable intellectual faculties could 
shine with brilliance. 

There arc few men in Europe who are such masters 
in the art oi' obscuring their real thoughts as Prince von 
Bulow. With him one cannot even try to guess what 
lie is thinking about, and 1 verily believe that there are 
moments when he tries to cheat even himself as to his 
views in regard to his own future. 

The Prince always appears to share the opinion of any 
with whom he is speaking, even though this may be 
contrary to what he thinks. For instance, just after the 
war with Russia broke out he used to frequent the house 
of a lady who occupied one of the foremost positions in 
the Society of the Prussian capital. She was a French- 
woman by birth, and it was but natural that, though 



Herr von Flotow 

fate had married her to a German, she should have re- 
tained some affection for the land of her birth. Prince 
von Bulow believed that he could obtain certain informa- 
tion which he required in view of the private political 
campaign he meant to start as soon as he returned to 
Kome. He therefore called upon her almost every day, 
and always criticised most bitterly not only the general 
policy of Germany, but also the Emperor and the conduct 
of the war from the military point of view. He said 
quite openly that lie did not believe in the many victories 
upon which the General Staff prided itself, and that he 
felt sure the campaign just entered upon would end by 
the defeat of Germany. Whether the people to whom 
Biilow told all this believed him or not is another matter, 
but it is probable, nevertheless, that his apparently care- 
less remarks — which in reality were very carefully planned 
— brought him as reward many things he would never 
have been able to learn otherwise. 

At the time to which I am referring the German 
Ambassador in Rome was Herr von Flotow, a diplomat 
of considerable experience, common sense, and culture. 
He had spent a certain number of years in Paris as 
Councillor to the German Embassy, and had learned to 
know French political men and the French temperament 
rather well. He had been Minister in Brussels for some- 
thing like two years, if not more, being transferred to 
Rome in the spring of the year 1913. He soon made 
friends, thanks to his pleasant manners and to the great 
amiability of his wife. 

i73 



Sovereigns and Statesmen of Europe 

Frau von Flotow, a Russian by birth, before she 
married von Flotow was the widow of one of the heroes 
of the Manehurian War, Count Keller, who had fallen 
bravely during the battle of Liao-yang. Frau von 
Flotow, who was a very rieh woman, opened widely the 
doors of the Palazzo Caffarelli to Roman Society, and 
soon created a coterie of clever politicians, artists, writers 
and musicians, who were all delighted to enjoy her 
hospitality. The German Embassy became a centre of 
reunion for Roman Society such as had rarely been the 
case with a foreign mansion. Ministers and a great 
many Deputies got into the habit of dropping in for an 
hour's pleasant chat with the clever wife of the repre- 
sentative of the Emperor William. The German 
Embassy, indeed, became so popular that the world 
forgot to take as often as formerly the road leading to 
the Villa Malta, where Prince and Princess von Biilow 
used to give solemn receptions, during which the guests 
felt thankful for the exquisite taste displayed in this 
superb mansion and that its beautiful works of art helped 
them to endure the dullness of these entertainments. 
Prince Biilow did not like this at all ; he would have 
liked to have been the only king in Rome, as he was 
until the Flotows occupied the Embassy, and he would, 
doubtless, have felt comforted had events caused their 
removal to another sphere of activity. 

Now, Herr von Flotow had never belonged to the 
number of people who believed that the Triple Alliance 
had still many years of life. He had seen through the 

174 



Manufacturing Opinion 

fallacy of a union between Austrian despotism and Italian 
love of liberty, and, moreover, had noticed the slow move- 
ment which was inspiring Italy with the desire to snatch 
back Trieste and the province of Trentino. He suspected 
this movement to be viewed with singularly indulgent eyes 
by public opinion in France, and was rather alarmed by 
the aggressive tone which had been adopted by the Press 
in regard to Germany from the very first days of the war. 
He would have liked to influence that Press, either by 
invitations to dinner and lunch, cleverly and tactfully 
distributed, or by more tangible means. As I think I 
have already related, he even went so far as to ask his 
Government to place at his disposal the means to make 
a useful present to this or to that person whose influence 
it would have been profitable to see exercised in favour 
of the Triple Alliance. His demand was received with a 
scream of horror, and he was told that he ought to feel 
ashamed of himself for having even dared to suggest it. 
Herr von Flotow sighed, and, of course, had to submit, 
but more than once he must have regretted the want of 
foresight that had made his superiors so utterly indifferent 
to the possibility of any danger coming from the direc- 
tion of the Consulta. This blindness was the more extra- 
ordinary in that, as a general rule, the Wilhelmstrasse is 
not so adverse to the use of such concrete arguments in 
the matter of influencing opinion. 

All this took place before the war. When it broke 
out von Flotow, who had been away on leave, hastened 
back to Rome with the feeling that he would not be 

i75 



Sovereigns and Statesmen of Europe 

able to do anything to prevent Italy from abrogating 
the Triple Alliance, but at the same time with the 
determination to keep a serious watch over everything 
at the Consulta, as well as at the Farnese Palace, where 
resided his turbulent colleague and diplomatic opponent, 
M. Barrere. 

Prince von Bulow, who would on no account have 
given up his custom of spending his winters at his Roman 
villa, followed upon the Ambassador's footsteps, but not 
immediately. lie did not care to expose himself to the 
intolerable heat which in summer renders the Eternal 
City so intensely disagreeable ; besides, while in Berlin, 
he wanted to learn how far it would be possible for him 
to expect being restored to the favour of the Emperor 
William, who had always refused to speak to him since, 
more rudely than kindly, he had obliged Bulow to resign 
office as Chancellor of the Empire. 

Prince von Biilow had found Berlin divided between 
agitation and calm conviction about the war. The country 
had been very carefully prepared for its probability, and, 
firm in the belief that it had been treacherously attacked 
by Russia, Germany was quite determined to see the 
struggle through to the bitter end. As yet Italy was not 
publicly discussed, but it needed little acumen to guess 
that very soon the people would ask what this so-called 
ally was doing. 

Prince von Biilow noted all these symptoms, but said 
nothing. He spent something like two months in Berlin. 
Whilst there he succeeded in his long-standing wish, and 

176 



Prince Billow's Secret Mission 

contrived at last to meet the Emperor at the house of 
one of the latter 's friends. 

The interview between the two men passed off better 
than could have been expected. Prince von Biilow 
assumed his most dutiful attitude, whilst the Sovereign, 
though stiff in his greeting, was persuaded to enter into 
a conversation in the course of which his former Chancel- 
lor touched upon the subject of Italian friendship. He 
expressed his regret that, as things had turned out, the 
Italian Press, with the exception perhaps of the Mattino 
of Naples, appeared to be completely inimical to the 
German alliance. He hinted also at what Herr von 
Flotow had mentioned as to the advisability of leaving 
certain funds at the disposal of the occupant of the 
Palazzo CafTarelli for him to use at his discretion. The 
Emperor, however, would not at first enter into that line 
of thought ; then suddenly exclaimed that, though it was 
beneath the dignity of his Ambassador to occupy himself 
with such things, someone else might do it, and point 
blank asked Prince von Biilow whether he would not 
accept the mission to watch privately German interests 
in Italy. 

Nothing could have delighted the Prince more, but he 
showed nothing of the satisfaction he was experiencing. 
On the contrary, he expressed himself as being very 
reluctant to do so. He allowed himself, nevertheless, to 
be persuaded to try what he could do to conform himself 
with the views of the Emperor, and agreed, as soon as 
he had arrived in Rome, to send William II. a report 

M 177 



Sovereigns and Statesmen of Europe 

telling him what he thought of the situation in regard 
to the policy the Government of King Victor Emmanuel 
would be likely to adopt as events developed. 

This report was sent, and was soon followed by others, 
until an undercurrent of mysterious correspondence was 
established between William II. and his former Chancel- 
lor. The situation reminded one of the famous inter- 
communication conducted by Louis XV. with subordinate 
agents he disavowed later on, behind the back of his 
responsible Ministers. Prince von Biilow did not see 
how lowering to his dignity was the kind of private 
espionage which he conducted for his master's benefit. 
The Prince, indeed, holds the opinion that in politics the 
end justifies the means, and he applied himself with great 
zeal to the task of proving to his Sovereign that were he 
only once more to be entrusted with the direction of 
German affairs in Rome he might dissuade the Italian 
Government from throwing in its lot with that of the 
Allies. 

The statesmen who ruled at the Consulta, however, 
proved themselves too clever for Prince von Biilow. So 
long as they considered him as a private individual who 
had found Rome a pleasant place to live in, they had not 
objected to exchange opinions with an apparent frank- 
ness which savoured more of politeness than of anything 
else ; but they became far more reserved as soon as they 
guessed he might still have some official connection with 
Berlin. The fact was that, clever as he undoubtedly was, 
Prince Biilow, during the years that he had lived in 

178 



Ambassadorial Amenities 

retirement, had lost touch with politics, else he would 
never have deluded himself that he would be able to 
succeed where others had failed to convert Italy to a 
complete allegiance to Germany. 

Whether the reports of Prince Biilow contained much 
or little about poor Herr von Flotow is unknown, but it 
is certain that from the day of Prince Billow's arrival in 
Rome (in the autumn of 1914) the position of von Flotow 
became insecure. He was reproached by Berlin for care- 
lessness in his discernment of a situation which was daily 
growing more and more complicated, and he was blamed 
for having failed to counteract the activity displayed by 
M. Barrere. Very soon the unfortunate Ambassador was 
advised to ask for a few months' leave to repair his 
shattered health, which in reality was indifferent, and 
Prince von Biilow was appointed Ambassador Extra- 
ordinary at the Italian Court pending the recovery of 
Herr von Flotow. 

The world wondered ; Rome was not overpleased. It 
was felt that the position of the new envoy of the Ger- 
man Government might not be an easy one. Relations 
between the Consulta and Vienna were daily becoming 
more strained, and somehow political men in Italy did 
not nurse an implicit faith in the ability of Prince von 
Biilow to dissipate the clouds which were gathering from 
all directions over the blue sky of Italian diplomacy. 
King Victor Emmanuel, too, though he received the 
Prince with his usual politeness, was not at ease with 
him. The general impression was that Italy did not 

179 



Sovereigns and Statesmen of Europe 

require in her midst at this particular juncture a man 
who was too clever to be reliable and honest — in the 
political sense, of course. 

The Prince himself had not the slightest doubt 
of his ability to turn the tide of events in favour of 
Germany, and it never dawned on him that the demon- 
strations which began to take place in Italy against 
Austria shortly after his appointment were dangerous. 
Prince von Biilow was imbued with the conviction that 
it would be relatively easy to buy Italy off with a few 
concessions which Austria might be persuaded to make 
in order to secure Italian neutrality. lie did not believe, 
either, that the man in the street might interfere, and 
that a movement, reminding one of the enthusiasm in the 
days of Garibaldi . was already taking place. He despised 
the Press and disdained the ardent speeches of men 
who, like d'Annunzio, were placing the power of their 
eloquence at the service of the Irredentists, who were 
clamouring for the possession of Trieste and the other 
Italian provinces still held by Austria. 

It is difficult to explain such a mistake on the part 
of a man of the undoubted ability of Prince von Biilow, 
and the fact that it could occur proves how easy it is 
even for a very clever person to be mistaken. 

The head of the Italian Ministry at that time was 
Signoi Salandra. a politician of the old school — prudent, 
wise, but prejudiced, as are so many of his compatriots. 
He was. however, very much influenced by his colleague. 
Baron Sonnino. who held the portfolio of Foreign Affairs, 

i So 



Baron Sonnino 

and who was the moving spirit in the Cabinet. Baron 
Sonnino was entirely French in his sympathies, and for 
years had preached the necessity of denouncing the Triple 
Alliance, which, he asserted, constituted a danger to 
Italy. It was Baron Sonnino — and this is a circumstance 
which, I believe, is known to but very few people — who 
hit upon the idea of engaging d'Annunzio to come to 
Italy to preach a new crusade, which was to hurl 
the Peninsula against the Teuton race, in order to help 
the great Latin sister who had done so much to further 
the cause of Italian unity in the past. 

The idea was a brilliant one ; d'Annunzio was invited 
to return to Italy, where he was greeted with the wildest 
enthusiasm all over the country. The Italians are the 
most impressionable people in existence, and soon the 
echo of d'Annunzio's words aroused in the nation one 
immense desire to rush against Austria, no matter at 
what cost. Manifestations took place not only in Rome, 
but in other large towns of the kingdom, and the King 
and the Government found themselves in the presence 
of an expression of the national will that they could not 
afford to disregard. At this juncture the Cabinet, pre- 
sided over by Signor Salandra, resigned its functions, and 
the latter advised the King to appeal to the Chambers 
to decide who was to lead the affairs of the country. He 
added that in doing so the Ministers thought that their 
decision would untie the hands of the Sovereign, leaving 
him thus the entire responsibility of the future course 
of events. 

181 



Sovereigns and Statesmen of Europe 

Victor Emmanuel, though prepared in a certain sense 
for the incident, found himself, nevertheless, considerably 
embarrassed by it. Personally, he had not yet made up 
his mind as to the course of action he ought to adopt, 
and whether it was advisable for himself, in the interests 
of Italy, to depart from the attitude of strict neutrality 
he wished to maintain. He was not a partisan of war at 
any price, and, at all events, would have preferred his 
Ministers not to abandon him at this particular moment. 
They had his confidence, and were aware of all that he 
had already done, and wanted still further to do, to obtain 
by peaceful means a settlement of the outstanding diffi- 
culties with Austria, lie also would have liked to see 
Trieste returned to the Mother Country, but he was 
cautiously prudent, and he believed that his Ministers 
were in entire agreement with him on this question, as 
well as upon others of like interest and importance. It 
grieved him personally, therefore, to lose their support 
just when he relied on them more than he had ever done 
before. 

Signor Salandra, in handing over to Victor Emmanuel 

the resignation of himself and his colleagues, had advised 

him to call the President of the Chamber of Deputies, 

Signor Marcora, a politician of vast and varied experience, 

who understood public opinion better than anyone else 

in the whole of Italy, and could, therefore, guide him as 

to its state. The Sovereign acted on this advice, and 

Signor Marcora was summoned to the Quirinal, where 

he had several long conferences with the King, the result 

182 



Italy's Polite Indifference 

of which was that Baron Sonnino was asked to form a 
new Ministry — or, rather, he and Signor Salandra were 
invited to resume their functions. Italy had approved of 
their policy, and Italy expected them to carry it out to 
the best of their abilities. Whilst all this was going on 
Prince von Biilow had not remained inactive. He distri- 
buted promises all round. The misfortune was that no 
one believed in these promises, and the only reply that 
he got was that, if Germany was so sincere in wishing 
Italy to preserve her neutrality, she ought to cause her 
faithful ally Austria to consent to the stipulations of the 
Italian Government. 

The representative of William II. at the Court of the 
Quirinal found himself, however, for once in his life in 
the presence of a people who would not discuss with him 
and who offered a polite indifference to all that he said 
or attempted to say. It seemed that Italy did not want 
to have anything more to do with him, and wished him 
to realise this painful but obvious truth. Nevertheless, 
von Biilow did his best to right down the ostracism which 
he found steadily rising against his person as well as 
against his Government. But, as I have already hinted, 
he had lost touch with politics. The lightness of his 
hand had suffered in consequence of his forced inaction, 
the clearness of his perception had become dimmed, and, 
besides, he wished far too passionately to succeed to be 
able to view with unprejudiced eyes all that was going 
on around him, which others far less clever than he was 
saw but too clearly. 

183 



Sovereigns and Statesmen of Europe 

Prince von Biilow was received by the King at a 
time when the crisis had reached its most acute stage, 
and only then by the desire of the Emperor William, 
who had telegraphed to Victor Emmanuel asking him as 
a personal favour to discuss the situation with Prince 
von Biilow. The interview was a long one, and when 
he left the Quirinal the Ambassador believed that he had 
convinced the Sovereign that it was his duty to resist the 
clamours of his people and to disregard the advice of his 
Ministers. Prince von Biilow wrote in that sense to 
Berlin. In reality the King, who had been most 
courteous to the German diplomat, and had listened to 
his arguments with the attention that he always brings 
into everything that he does, had come to the conclu- 
sion during this memorable conversation that Germany 
would never try to influence Austria into making the 
only concessions capable of satisfying the Italian nation, 
and that, under such circumstances, the sooner Italy 
linked her fate with that of the Allies the better it would 
be for her in the long run. A powerful Austria would 
mean the undoubted loss of Italian independence, and — 
who knows? — perhaps the loss of Venice and Milan, 
which the Habsburgs had coveted ever since they had 
been compelled to give them up to the House of Savoy, 
thanks to French intervention and to the determination 
of the Emperor Napoleon III. 

It is here that the supreme ability of Baron Sonnino 
came in. He did not attempt to interfere between the 
King and Prince von Biilow ; he never objected to the 

184 



d'Annunzio and the War 

former having a conversation with the latter; he relied 
absolutely — and this proves what a profound student of 
human nature he was — on the common sense of Victor 
Emmanuel, and on his patriotism, feeling quite convinced 
that it would enable him to discern all the fallacies hidden 
under the smiles and promises of one of the ablest states- 
men of whom Germany can boast. 

Baron Sonnino has one great quality : he knows 
what he wants. From the very day that Germany 
declared war upon Russia he made up his mind that, 
whatever might be its result, it would not pass by with- 
out bringing some kind of advantage to Italy. In his 
secret heart the Baron had no special predilection for 
either of the belligerents about to engage in a fight for 
the supremacy of their country in Europe. He was just 
as ready to shake hands with one as the other. All that 
he wished, all that he was determined to work for, was 
the achievement of the great work begun by his famous 
predecessor, Count Cavour, and completed by Garibaldi 
just as much as by Victor Emmanuel II., the famous 
4i Re Galantuomo." 

He was thinking of that work when he authorised 
d'Annunzio to make the speech that was to set ablaze the 
fire that had been smouldering for many months already 
throughout Italy. The Baron knew that it would not 
have been politic to say the decisive words himself; it 
would have been hardly possible, indeed, for him to 
throw the glove in the face of Austria so frankly as the 
famous novelist did. He had to look to the future. 

1S5 



Sovereigns and Statesmen of Europe 

Here I must pause to mention another thing that 
may surprise my readers. Baron Sonnino did not care 
for a quarrel with Germany, though his soul thirsted 
after a war with Austria. The thought that he might 
eventually be glad to have the support of Berlin when 
it came to the squaring of accounts with the Habsburgs 
had passed more than once through his subtle Italian 
mind. He therefore always showed himself most 
courteous with Prince von Biilow, and even encouraged 
the latter in the hope that the Consulta would not care 
to come to an open rupture with the Wilhelmstrasse. 
His attitude, which was most arrogant with regard to 
the Austrian Ambassador, appeared more deferential 
than anything else whenever he had occasion to discuss 
the situation with the latter's German colleague. Prince 
von Biilow could find no subject of complaint on this 
point, and had reason, when all is said and done, to 
believe that his adjurations not to bring matters to a 
climax had had some effect on the thoughts of the Italian 
Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

This explains to the uninitiated why, even when 
Italy declared war upon Austria, she carefully abstained 
from dragging Germany into her quarrel with the Court 
of Vienna, and though her Ambassador, Signor Bollati, 
left Berlin almost simultaneously with the departure 
of Prince von Biilow from Rome, the two statesmen 
started on their journey home without any demonstra- 
tions of hostility against them on the part of the mob ; 
and though the diplomatic relations between the two 

1 86 



Germany Wins a Move 

countries were, in appearance at least, broken off, yet 
they remained officially at peace with each other. 

This curious situation was in a certain sense a triumph 
for the policy of Prince von Billow. He had not been 
able, it is true, to avoid a war between Italy and Austria, 
but he had succeeded in preventing the former from in- 
dulging in any brutally hostile act in regard to Germany. 
This was certainly an advantage of no small importance, 
if one takes into account that it enabled the Emperor 
William to use all the forces of his army against France 
and Russia, and not to send a single regiment against 
the troops of Victor Emmanuel. 

Baron Sonnino did more than that. He expressed to 
Prince von Biilow his deep regret at the untoward turn 
which circumstances had taken, and also the hope that, 
when one would be so far advanced as to begin the dis- 
cussion of an honourable peace, he might rely on his 
co-operation to obtain it. To this the former German 
Chancellor replied by repeated assurances that of course 
he would be delighted to follow the example of Prince 
von Bismarck, and in his turn to act as the honest broker 
in a quarrel which he deplored more than anyone else, 
because it interfered with the placidity of his own exist- 
ence, and obliged him to leave for a time his beautiful 
Roman home and all the delights of the Villa Malta 
which he loved so much. The two diplomats cordially 
shook hands with one another before parting, and it 
remains still a question as to which of the two felt the 
more satisfied with himself. 

187 



Sovereigns and Statesmen of Europe 

I think that this side of the Italian affair has never 
been sufficiently noticed before. People think that in 
joining the Allies Italy has done so against Germany as 
well as against iYustria, but in reality nothing of the kind 
has taken place. Italy is not at war with Germany ; she 
has never declared war upon Germany ; and though Ger- 
many has recalled Prince von Billow, she has not done so 
in regard to Herr von Flotow, who is still quoted in the 
diplomatic staff as the Ambassador accredited to Italy, 
and only considered on leave for reasons of health. One 
must not forget that Prince von Billow was only ap- 
pointed Ambassador Extraordinary pending the recovery 
of Herr von Flotow, and that, consequently, his recall 
could not have the same importance as would have had 
that of the regular German representative at the Italian 
Court. In the joy that seized Europe at the news that 
Italy had renounced the Triple Alliance this small but 
important circumstance was entirely lost sight of, and 
the Press of the whole world assumed it as a fact that the 
Emperor William had found himself with one enemy 
more to fight against. 

In the meanwhile nothing of the sort had really 
occurred. In recalling Prince von Biilow, Germany 
made a platonic demonstration in favour of the Austrian 
Government, but did not move one single step farther. 
When one compares Germany's conduct on this occasion 
with the alacrity with which she endorsed Austria's 
quarrel with Russia, and the haste with which she almost 

substituted herself for her ally in the matter of her differ- 

iSS 



Signor Salandra 

ences with the Petrograd Cabinet, going so far as to 
take in the light of a personal offence the decision of the 
Tsar to mobilise a part of his troops, one can but wonder 
at this apparent indifference in a question of infinitely 
more gravity. 

It is not to be doubted for an instant that in the 
future congress Baron Sonnino will be appointed the 
principal representative of Italy, and it is just as sure 
that he will succeed in obtaining for her all the advan- 
tages it will be possible for him to snatch from the 
weakness or the good will of Europe. He is clever 
enough to hold his own, and he will have the immense 
advantage of never losing either his temper or his head. 
Moreover, he is a gentleman of exceedingly refined 
manners, and with the extreme charm which is so 
eminently characteristic of the Italian. He may not 
always be sincere, but he is always amiable, and, after 
all, it is mostly by the surface that the world judges 
of men. 

I do not feel quite so sure as to whether Signor 
Salandra will care to represent his country at the con- 
gress. For one thing, he is rather shy and not quite so 
much at his ease as Baron Sonnino, whom nothing and 
nobody can abash ; for another, he would hardly care to 
leave Rome whilst peace is being discussed. He knows 
admirably the Italian character, and understands that 
with its extreme impressionability it is essential always to 
keep before the eyes of the nation the things one wants 
it to accept or to refuse. He is hardly a leader of men, 

189 



Sovereigns and Statesmen of Europe 

but he is essentially a leader of opinions, and opinion will 
have a considerable amount of influence upon the future 
congress. 

It is likely that Italy, even if she beats Austria, 
will never get all that she wants at the present moment, 
and neither Baron Sonnino nor Signor Salandra expect 
that such can be the case. It will, therefore, become 
necessary to reconcile the people to a disappointment of 
some kind and to explain to the country that what she 
will obtain will be infinitely better than what she had 
wished to have. No one in the whole of Italy will be 
better able to do so than Signor Salandra, and for this 
reason it is probable that he will remain in Rome during 
the whole period that peace negotiations are in progress, 
and as this will require a considerable time, we need not 
expect an early change of Government in the Italian 
Peninsula. 

Baron Sonnino, however, will not be able to face 
alone the heavy task of watching over the interests of his 
country when the question of settling the various difficul- 
ties raised by the war will arise. He will require the 
help of someone else, and it is difficult to guess whom 
that someone else will be. There are plenty of politicians 
in Italy, but a politician alone is not sufficient. There 
are former Ministers like Signor Luzzatti, for instance, 
or even present prominent people such as General the 
Count Cadorna, who by virtue of his military position 
will most likely be called upon to take part in the labours 
of the congress ; but none of them could have quite the 

190 



Duke of Sermoneta 

requisite authority to hold as high as would be necessary 
the flag of Italy. It is within the limits of probability, 
therefore, that the King will ask some prominent Italian 
or Roman nobleman to sit by the side of Baron Sonnino 
and to lend him the support of an ancient name and of a 
spotless reputation. 

I have in mind two personages whose presence amidst 
the diplomats and statesmen would alone ensure for Italy 
that respect without which no nation in the world can 
hope to be listened to. One of them is the head of 
the illustrious family of Gaetani, the present Duke of 
Sermoneta, one of the most remarkable men of his 
generation. He has held with distinction the portfolio 
of Foreign Affairs, and his unimpeachable honour, great 
intelligence, immense fortune and high position, together 
with his blameless character, would at once raise the 
prestige of Italy at a time when her future destinies 
would come to be questioned. The Duke, moreover, is 
married to an Englishwoman, is related to the highest 
aristocracy in Europe, has some Russo-Polish blood in 
his veins (through his mother), and, having travelled all 
over the world, has acquired an experience such as few 
Italians can boast. Besides this, the authority which gives 
him the great place that his race has held in the annals 
of his fatherland ever since it gave Popes to the Church, 
and in those of modern Italy, will carry great weight. 

His father, the learned Duke Michael Angelo, whose 

commentaries on the works of Dante will have a lasting 

place in Italian literature, was one of the first to rally 

191 



Sovereigns and Statesmen of Europe 

to the flag of United Italy, having been chosen to 

carry to Victor Emmanuel in Florence the first welcome 

of emancipated Rome. This place, so unique thanks to 

the personality of the man who tills it, would alone be 

sufficient to make people think well before they would 

attempt to oppose just claims put forward by the Italian 

Government. In a congress where the personal and 

moral value of the men who will take part in it will have 

as much to do as the military triumphs of the countries 

they will represent, the Duke of Sermoneta would 

certainly be one of the most imposing figures. 

The other nobleman who might also be called with 

advantage to the help of Baron Sonnino would be Prince 

Prospero Colonna, the Syndic, or Mayor, of Rome, an 

ambitious, enterprising personality, who since his earliest 

youth has taken a prominent part in Italian politics, and 

whose devotion to the House of Savoy has never wavered 

or been questioned. Though relatively a young man, he 

has gained considerable experience of political life, and 

has always stood foremost among those who have worked 

toward economical reforms in his country and who have 

taken the liveliest interest in the development of social 

matters, not only in Rome, where his administration as 

Mayor has brought about many improvements from the 

municipal point of view, but also all over Italy. He. 

too. would have the advantage of bearing one of Italy's 

historical names, one of those which are almost a part 

of the past glories of that country. He. too. can boast 

of an irreproachable character and of a high position, 

192 



The Man Who Understands 

besides being a personal friend of the King. Taking 
everything into consideration, it is most likely that Signor 
Salandra, who understands so well what Italy requires 
and what the Italian people want, will appeal to one, if 
not both, of the men I have just mentioned to represent 
their Sovereign during the future congress out of which 
he hopes that the unity of Italy will emerge stronger 
and at last complete. 



i93 



VII 
TURKEY 

DURING the last war iu the Balkans I heard more 
than one person express his conviction that it 
would be impossible ever to obtain a permanent peace in 
Europe so long as Turkey was allowed to drag on her 
existence. I have never been able to agree with this 
pious assertion or to desire the annihilation of a nation 
which, in spite of its abominable government, has many 
excellent and even attractive characteristics. For one 
thing, all the picturesqueness of Constantinople would 
be gone were a European Power to gain possession of 
the city ; then, and this is more important, the quarrels 
and discussions to which Turkey has given rise among 
the diplomatic circles of Europe would only be intensified 
were the rule of Islam to come to an end. At present 
Turkey is the cause of many complications by the mere 
fact of her existence, but, should she ever be destroyed 
as an independent Power, the division of her spoils would 
become the pretext for further strife, which would most 
probably drag on for years. 

The neutrality of the Straits or of Constantinople is 
nothing but a Utopian dream which facts would disperse 
very soon — too soon for the peace of the world, because 

194 



Constantinople in the Balance 

every single nation that had helped to establish the 
neutrality would immediately begin to undermine it. 
Even St. Sophia could not be given back to the Christian 
faith without causing bitter and prolonged discussions. 
The quarrels between Greeks and Latins, that have 
always had such an influence upon the welfare of the 
Near East, would begin anew, fiercer than ever, should 
the old Mosque of Justinian be snatched away from its 
present owners. The Catholics would claim it, the 
Orthodox Greeks would put forward their pretensions, 
and the church would remain a bone of contention for 
years to come. The hope that the expulsion of the Turk 
would prove beneficial to the peace of Europe is one of 
the most forlorn that was ever indulged in. Let us trust, 
therefore, that the future congress will not lend itself 
to the overthrow of the Sultan's throne. 

The long and cruel reign of Abdul Hamid certainly 
hastened the dissolution of his Empire, and had he 
remained longer on the throne it is a question whether 
Russia would not have at last seized Constantinople, with 
or without the consent of the other Great Powers, under 
the pretext that her presence there was required to pro- 
tect her subjects and her co-religionaries, whose existence 
was threatened by the tyranny and the avarice of the 
Sultan. When, however, that remarkable man had at 
last been removed from the scene of his former cruelties, 
Turkey began to breathe again. 

Sultan Mehmed Rechad, Abdul Hamid's successor, 
was totally different from him. For the best part of his 

i95 



Sovereigns and Statesmen of Europe 

years ho had boon kept in semi-captivity by his ferocious 
brother, and this had robbed him of all energy and 
initiative. Unfortunately for himself and for Turkey, he 

became the tool of those who had deposed his brother 
and put him in his plaee. and who were about as unscru- 
pulous as Orientals can be. which means a good deal. 
They followed and obliged him to follow an execrable 
political system, but at the same time it must be con- 
ceded that they aroused in Turkey some of her old-time 
energy, reorganised her armies, and by the alliance with 
Germany put her upon a footing she had never known 
before. 

I do not mean by that to suggest that this alliance 
into which they rushed, partly through the intrigues of 
Enver Pasha, whose stay in Berlin as military attache 
in the time of Abdul Hamid had imbued with strong 
German sympathies, was wise. It certainly added to 
European complications. Judging matters from their 
own point of view, however, it must be admitted that 
it gave them a new lease of life and instilled in them an 
energy which they had lacked for main years. 

Turks have always been excellent diplomats ; diplo- 
macy, indeed, is just the kind of exercise that appeals to 
the subtle Eastern mind. Had they lacked this quality 
they would never have been able to hold their own during 
the last hundred years or so, when so often it has seemed 
as if they were going to collapse. After the war of 1877 
with Russia they played a brilliant game against the 

diplomacy of the whole world, and though they had lost 

196 



Turkey's Double Game 

Bulgaria, Ears and Batoum by the decisions of the Con- 
gress of Berlin, they contrived to retain far more territory 
than they could have hoped, Ry their diplomacy they 
achieved the Further triumph of making friends of their 
erstwhik enemies, for Russia, when she found she could 
not swallow the Turkish Empire, took it under her pro- 
tection and showed an unexpected, though an interested, 
tenderness to her enemy of the day before. 

Turkey knew how to make use of this situation in 
the years that followed, and by playing off one European 
Power against another managed to rub along pretty com- 
fortably on the whole, continuing to exist simply because 
no one could agree as to the best way of destroying her. 

The Ambassadors representing the Sublime Porte at 
the various foreign Courts during the last ten years or 
so have mostly been men of considerable intellectual 
value, experience, and discernment. For instance, 
Turkhan Pasha, who was until lately Ambassador in 
Petrograd, was a man of unusual ability, who understood 
to a nicety the intricacies of diplomatic life and who had 
a close acquaintance with the foibles of the leading poli- 
ticians of Europe. lie was exceedingly popular in Russia 
the whole time he remained there, and had managed to 
preserve such amicable relations that, even during the 
grave crisis provoked by the first Balkan war, he kept 
the sympathies and friendships which he had acquired, 
and smoothed the susceptibilities of the Russian Foreign 
Office. He explained to its leader, M. Sazonov, that 
Turkey did not mean to profit by the complications that 

197 



Sovereigns and Statesmen of Europe 

had arisen, and that she would be content to recover 
Adrianople. This being granted, Turkey would be willing 
to conclude with Bulgaria and her allies a treaty which 
gave them considerable advantages. 

Simultaneously, Turkhan Pasha accentuated as much 
as he could the disunion that immediately after, and even 
during, the war had sprung up amongst the adversaries 
of his country. Well-informed people maintain that the 
influence of the Pasha had a good deal to do with the 
breaking out of the second Balkan war, during the course 
of which Turkey recovered all, or nearly all, the territory 
that had been taken from her. Turkhan Pasha knew 
King Ferdinand of Bulgaria personally, and unknown 
and unsuspected by the majority of the public, finally 
persuaded him to set his ambitions against those of Servia. 
with the result, as we know, of bringing Bulgaria within 
two fingers of her definite ruin. 

I have been told that the humiliating defeats inflicted 
by Servia and Greece on her former ally were a source of 
unmitigated pleasure to Turkhan Pasha. King Ferdi- 
nand realised how stupid he had been when he refused to 
listen to the good advice of those who had told him it 
would be better to give way to his neighbours and make 
the concessions upon which they insisted rather than drive 
them to turn upon him. 

In Albania Turkhan Pasha also held his own. After 
leaving Russia he became the principal Minister in 
Albania, and amidst the difficulties which he encountered 
managed to come out unscathed. He lost none of his 

198 



Turkhan Pasha 

popularity either in Constantinople or amongst the Euro- 
pean chancelleries. Even after he had failed to restore 
order out of chaos nobody blamed him for his want 
of success. The exceeding difficulty of the Albanian 
problem was unanimously recognised. Though the 
Prince of Wied was made the subject of bitter criticism, 
Turkhan Pasha did not share the blame that was freely 
lavished upon his so-called Sovereign, and returned to 
Turkey without having suffered in the least from his 
perilous adventure. 

Turkhan Pasha's personality is one that imposes itself 
upon the crowds, and I should feel considerably surprised 
if he were not appointed one of the Turkish plenipoten- 
tiaries at the future congress. I do not see anyone better 
fitted than he to uphold his country, respected and 
esteemed as he is in Turkey and in Europe. Though a 
Christian, the Pasha has a goodly share of Oriental fatal- 
ism, and is firmly of the conviction that the end of the 
Ottoman rule at Constantinople is still far distant. He 
is not a military man, yet he has managed to secure a 
very clear knowledge of the military resources of Turkey. 

These resources are considerably larger than the Press 
has represented. In the summer of 1915, without the 
slightest effort, Turkey could put in the field something 
like thirteen army corps without calling up her reserves. 
These represent 400 battalions of infantry, forty regi- 
ments of cavalry, and twenty-four regiments of irregular 
cavalry. The artillery numbers thirty-eight regiments, 
totalling seventy-seven batteries ; thirty groups of light 

199 



Sovereigns and Statesmen of Europe 

mountain artilleiy, and five groups of horse artillery. 
Each battery has six guns, and the mounted ones four. 
There are also thirteen regiments of siege artillery, 
possessing excellent guns (furnished mostly by Krupps), 
and handled by German officers. It must be added that 
the guns are absolutely modern, the majority having 
been acquired since the Balkan War. 

The prime mover of the reorganisation of the Turkish 
army, of course, has been Enver Pasha, who is a curious 
mixture of European culture, Oriental laziness, and 
Turkish ferocity and savagery. Had it not been for 
Enver it is unlikely that the Turkish Government would 
have occupied themselves with this important question. 
Enver Pasha saw farther than his colleagues, and either 
on his own initiative or else in obedience to inspiration 
received from Berlin, applied all his energies and deter- 
mination to the work of organising the army. 

Whether Enver Pasha was actuated solely by patriotic 
motives or whether personal ambition had more to do 
with his efforts it is not for me to say. With all his 
defects, whenever I think of him and of the extraordinary 
influence he has managed to acquire — not only over the 
Sultan, but also over all those with whom he has worked 
— I cannot help remembering the famous reply of 
Leonora, who, when she was asked during her trial by 
what means she had captivated the heart of Marie, Queen 
of the Medici, and caused her to do her bidding, replied 
simply : " By means of the influence that every strong 
nature can acquire over a weaker one." Enver Pasha is a 



200 



Enver Pasha 

strong nature, stronger even than credited, and possesses 
over his colleagues the immense advantage of being culti- 
vated. Even when he returned to Turkey he contrived 
to keep himself wonderfully well informed upon the 
advances of science and knowledge. 

Enver Pasha is a born organiser, and has established 
an intelligence system in the Turkish army. It is not 
generally known that the principal source of information 
of the German Government in regard to Russian affairs 
is Turkey ; and that most of the espionage in Russia on 
account of the German General Staff has been the work 
of men employed under Enver Pasha and instructed by 
him. The immense industrial movement around the 
harbour of Odessa, and the constant relations that were 
entertained between the South of Russia, the Crimea and 
Bessarabia with Turkey were very useful to the cause 
of the Austro-Prussian-Turkish alliance. Sellers of 
sponges, coral, and Turkish delicacies, and the many 
pedlars who tramped over the southern provinces of the 
Empire of the Tsar, were mostly spies in the employ of 
Enver Pasha, and thanks to the carelessness with which 
people talk in Russia, they obtained far more information 
than could have been suspected. 

In this way particulars of the defences of the Black 
Sea are known as well, if not better in Constantinople 
than they are at Petrograd. These particulars have been 
gathered and great care taken to ensure that the details 
are accurate, for they lie at the base of a deeply laid 
scheme for the future march of the troops of William II. 

201 



Sovereigns and Statesmen of Europe 

from the Polish frontier through Brest-Litovsk to Kiev, 
and thence to Odessa, which, if seized, would be a base 
whence it would be relatively easy to send reinforcements 
to Turkey in order to secure for her and her allies the 
complete mastery of the Black Sea. 

In the region of the Caucasus, too, Enver Pasha con- 
trived to make many friends among the Mussulman 
population, who had ever been restive under Russian 
rule. He had emissaries who were always moving about, 
and who, therefore, could give him fairly accurate in- 
formation regarding the feelings of the inhabitants of 
those provinces, as well as of the military dispositions for 
the defence of that region of Russia. The thoroughness 
of this espionage enabled Enver Pasha to hold his own 
with a relatively small number of troops from the begin- 
ning of the war, and to keep the soldiers of the Tsar 
sufficiently busy to prevent the Caucasian regiments 
being used elsewhere. 

No one doubts that Enver Pasha will be one of those 
who will represent Turkey at the peace conference. He 
would never trust anyone else there, for Enver Pasha 
never relies on anything or anybody except on himself. 
He certainly means Turkey to reap some solid advantage 
when, at last, peace is signed, and he is far too cautious 
to permit these matters to be discussed without his being 
present to see it is properly done. 

It is likely that another of those who will undertake 

this task with him will be his personal friend Hakki Bey, 

who has recently been appointed Ambassador in Berlin. 

202 



Hakki Bey 

If Turkhan Pasha is inclined to be too modest in his 
demands, these two certainly will not make any mistakes 
in that direction. 

Hakki Bey is the type of the cautious Oriental who 
does not say much, but who can wait if he cannot get all 
he wants at once. He is imbued with the conviction 
that Islam ought never to yield an inch to the Infidel. 
In that respect he is absolutely Eastern in his character, 
in spite of frequent journeys in Europe. In this he is 
a marked contrast to Enver Pasha. On the other hand, 
Hakki Bey can be very persuasive in all that he says, 
and he argues with great talent, even with eloquence, 
when the occasion requires it. His intransigeance might 
be extremely useful, combined with the diplomatic suavity 
of Turkhan and the dashing energy of Enver, and in 
view of this circumstance it is probable that the three 
men will have to fight together against diplomats whose 
aim must be to reduce Turkey to an utterly dependent 
position. 

It is said that in spite of the chronic financial straits 
of Turkey, money for the needs of the army is still 
forthcoming, thanks to Enver Pasha, by whom loans 
lately contracted by the Sublime Porte with banks or 
private individuals have been retained at the War Office, 
where they remain at the sole disposal of Enver Pasha. 
Troops have been paid, guns have been bought with 
ready money, and rifles have been acquired and paid for 
with solid cash — incidents which had not occurred for 
something like half a century or so. This fact alone 

203 



Sovereigns and Statesmen of Europe 

would have made Enver Pasha popular even if his energy 
had not appealed to the imagination of the army, which 
he treated somewhat after the manner the former Sultans 
used toward their janissaries — with a mixture of affection 
and of apparent fear that appealed to military vanity and 
gave the army a sense of importance to which it had long 
been a stranger. 

Enver Pasha is most certainly popular, not only among 
soldiers but also in the country. His countrymen feel 
grateful to him for having made them realise that they 
could have a voice in affairs of government and the 
welfare of the Turkish Empire. He has succeeded in the 
most difficult task of persuading an enslaved nation that 
it is perfectly free ; many people cleverer than Enver 
Pasha have failed in the attempt. 

As I have said earlier in this chapter, I do not believe 
in the destruction of Turkey as a European Power after 
the present war. The possibility of taking Constantinople 
away from her in order to neutralise the Dardanelles may 
be discussed in the congress ; but it will be very quickly 
recognised that were such a thing done the result would be 
disastrous. In spite of the present community of interests 
that have drawn together England, France and Russia, 
the two former coimtries will rapidly arrive at the con- 
clusion that it would not do to give Russia either an 
absolutely free hand in the Near East or supreme control 
over the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles. The best thing 
for the future peace of Europe will be to leave things as 
they have been for so many centuries. 

204 



The Sheikh-ul-Islam 

This might not, after all, be such a risky proceeding 
as it would have been in the days of Abdul Hamid. 
Enver Pasha has done one good thing for Turkey : he 
has almost succeeded in stamping out the wholesale 
plundering of the Public Exchequer. A new and more 
honest set of officials now reign who, in the main, are 
above baksheesh, or, at any rate, fewer are susceptible 
to bribery. 

Among the high functionaries is the present Sheikh- 
ul-Islam, Hairi Bey, perhaps the most popular personage 
in Constantinople to-day, and his influence is exceedingly 
widespread. Were he ever to use it against Enver Pasha, 
it might prove a source of great trouble to the War Lord 
of Turkey. 

Hairi Bey is not a diplomat, 5 r et he is thoroughly 
conversant with the different phases through which diplo- 
macy has passed during the last quarter of a century. He 
is, indeed, one of the shrewdest minds in Constantinople ; 
his whole character a mystery ; his secretive powers almost 
abnormal in their intensity. 

When Abdul Hamid was dethroned Hairi Bey 

affected a surprise that was so well acted that no one 

could have supposed every detail of the conspiracy was 

known to him and that he had helped it by every means 

at his disposal. His outward manners are as humble as 

his heart is proud ; his outward charity as large as his 

greed for power is intense. Enver Pasha respects the 

Sheikh and relies on him to support many of his actions 

which, perhaps, he would not dare to attempt were he 

205 



Sovereigns and Statesmen of Europe 

not covered in his responsibility by the authority of 
Ha'iri Bey. In any ease, Enver Pasha would not care to 
incur the opposition of this redoubtable individual, who 
incarnates in his person all the fanaticism of Islam and 
who understands to perfection the art of leading men 
wherever he wishes. 

I have sometimes heard people ask whether Turkey 
possesses any real statesmen. It has always seemed to 
me that with the sole exception of Turkhan Pasha — who 
is not a Turk, but an Albanian — and even his states- 
manship is erratic, she has no men who could have any 
pretension to be considered as such. Either through the 
influence of the Turkish climate or through the fatalism 
which is inherent to the Mohammedan faith, all her 
prominent people have been able diplomats or great 
warriors, but none of them have exhibited what we 
understand in Europe to be statesmanlike qualities. The 
Turk can conquer, he can display tact and not less 
ability, but he cannot govern. The Turk is quite con- 
tent to "carry on"; he sees progress, but can never 
apply it to his personal wants or requirements. His 
fatalism has produced a chronic inertia. Is it, therefore, 
to be wondered that among such a nation the first man 
endowed with the qualities that it lacks should rise to 
prominence and dominance? In a land where statesmen 
do not exist an adventurous, intriguing, clever and keen 
mind such as possessed by Enver Pasha was bound to 
come forward, but whether it will be for good or for evil 
the future alone will show. 

206 



An Imprisoned Statesman 

Hakki Pasha is capable of great and grave resolutions, 
but quite without initiative. He could defend a fortress ; 
he would never be able to build one. The Sultan is a 
figurehead whom some respect, some despise, and on 
whom no one relies. In all the vast Ottoman Empire 
I can find but one individual who truthfully could be 
designated as a statesman. He is in a prison, and his 
name is Abdul Hamid. 



207 



VIII 
GERMANY 

EVER since the days of Frederick the Great 
Germany has almost constantly occupied the 
attention of the world, but though she has had a 
number of more than remarkable military men and at 
least one great statesman, she has never been served by 
diplomats of supreme ability. In the dark days of the 
Napoleonic wars Prussia found no one to oppose the 
French Ministers who acted under the directions of the 
Prince de Benavente. At the Congress of Vienna not 
one Prussian managed to get his voice heard, and though, 
chiefly in deference to the wishes of the Emperor Alex- 
ander I. of Russia, Prussia was taken into the councils 
of the Congress, it is very much to be doubted whether 
Talleyrand or Lord Castlereagh ever heeded the opinions 
of their Prussian colleagues. As for the King, Frederick 
William III., no one took him seriously. 

Later on, in the middle of the last century, Prussian 
diplomacy suffered terrible humiliations at the famous 
Olmutz Conference, in 1850, when Prince Schwarzenberg 
forced the Prussian Minister, Baron von Manteuffel, to 
sign a treaty which reduced his country to the condition 

of a vassal of the Austrian Empire. 

208 



Discovery of Bismarck 

Until the accession of William I. Prussia was treated 
by Europe as a negligible quantity, but with the latter's 
advent on the political scene in the quality of an inde- 
pendent Sovereign things changed very quickly. The 
new King was an excellent observer of human nature, 
and understood to perfection the art of appreciating 
people at their real value. He was also ambitious to a 
degree that no one who had known him previous to his 
coming to the throne had ever suspected. His first care 
when he had succeeded to his brother was to look out 
for someone willing to act under his directions and to 
undertake, with him, the task of elevating Prussia to the 
position which he believed she deserved to occupy in 
the European concert. 

The King of Prussia discovered the Great Chancellor, 
then plain Herr von Bismarck Schonhausen, and the 
magnitude of their mutual achievements need not be 
retraced here. The facts speak for themselves, and, 
thanks to the efforts of perhaps the greatest political 
genius of modern times, Prussia was merged into a 
united Germany, and so became the leading Power of 
the Continent. 

Prince Bismarck could not bear to have anyone 
inferior to himself meddling with his actions; he would 
never suffer another to offer him advice or make sug- 
gestions. Even at the beginning of his ministerial career, 
when he had just assumed the direction of public affairs, 
he had felt impatient with the people with whom he 
found himself compelled to associate. When events made 
o 209 



Sovereigns and Statesmen of Europe 

him a great man whom no one dared to contradict, he 
became extremely jealous and apprehensive of rivals in 
the particular sphere of activity which he considered was 
absolutely his own. He forgot that he was not immortal, 
and that when he died others would have to take up the 
work he had conducted so brilliantly up to a point when 
it seemed that the greatness of Germany could not be 
further increased. He carefully eliminated from the 
Foreign Office every man of independent spirit, and with 
the sole exception of his alter ego, Herr von Holstein — 
the only man to whom he ever opened his mind without 
reserve — Prince von Bismarck refused to avail himself of 
the experience of anyone. He treated the Ambassadors 
that Germany held accredited at foreign Courts with a 
mixture of disdain and of rudeness that soon obliged 
them to resign, when they were immediately replaced 
by nonentities who never looked beyond humbly perform- 
ing all the orders which they received from the Wilhelm- 
strasse, and who were so constantly told that they dared 
not take any personal initiative in anything that they 
lost it altogether. 

Even Prince Henry VII. of Reuss, who was accepted 
as their equal in birth by all the sovereigns in Europe, 
and whose wife was a niece of the old Emperor William 
and a Princess of the Grand Ducal House of Saxe- 
Weimar, had finally to abandon the Vienna Embassy 
and to retire into private life. The only man who 
contrived to maintain himself in his high place, and 
who always received sincere deference from the formid- 

210 



Prince von Stolberg-Wernigerode 

able Chancellor, was Prince von Stolberg-Wernigerode, 
who, by his tact and the independence that his immense 
fortune and his quasi royal position gave him in regard 
to everybody, had rendered great services to Prussia in 
the past, and was to render still greater service in the 
future, in many important questions concerning home 
politics. 

One of the principles which actuated the conduct of 
Prince von Bismarck in regard to his subordinates was 
never to employ any really brilliant man. Only medioc- 
rities were tolerated by the Great Chancellor, with the 
inevitable result that he created no school, had no 
imitators, and, when he was turned out of office by a 
young and energetic Sovereign, there was no one to 
continue the political system he had inaugurated with 
such success and carried through with such extraordinary 
tenacity and luck. 

This simple fact contains the key to the present 

trouble. Had Prince Bismarck still been at the head of 

affairs it is certain that the war which is waging would 

never have taken place. He was always against the idea 

of warfare with Russia; as he explained one day in the 

Reichstag, to do so would be nothing short of madness. 

The interest of Germany required her to keep upon 

good terms with her Russian neighbour; and during 

the whole time that he remained in office the first 

Chancellor of the new German Empire had done his 

very best to cultivate friendly relations with Russia. 

His one great fear was a Franco-Russian alliance, which 

211 



Sovereigns and Statesmen of Europe 

would constitute, in his opinion, a direct source of danger 
for the future of Germany ; and he had steadily done his 
best to counteract all attempts that had been made to 
bring it about, especially at the beginning of the reign 
of William II. 

The whole aim of the policy of the Great Chancellor 
had been to put obstacles in the way of a closer union 
between the Cabinets of Petrograd and of Paris. He 
would have liked to see the heir to the Russian throne 
married to a Prussian princess, and he had been deeply 
disappointed to find that such an alliance could not be 
arranged. 

Bismarck's attitude toward England was derived 
principally from his antipathy for the Crown Princess 
Victoria, who later became the Empress Frederick. He 
accused her of keeping the English Government, through 
Queen Victoria, her mother, informed as to everything 
that was being planned or done in Berlin. The reproach 
was unjust, but the Chancellor, nevertheless, remained 
convinced that such was the case, and during the years 
when his relations with the present Kaiser were still 
intimate he preached to him continually the necessity of 
keeping England at arm's length, a principle which 
William II. appropriated and enlarged upon when the 
object of his particular dislike, King Edward VII., 
ascended the throne. 

At this period Bismarck had already been dead for 
some years, and the German Foreign Office had already 
entered into that period of its existence in which its 

212 




William II. 

German Emperor 



Mistakes of German Diplomacy 

incapacity was to come out in brilliant colours and to 
end by producing confusion and misfortune. It had 
had its marvellous epoch of glory ; it was having its day 
of tinsel. The successors of Bismarck were for the greater 
part imbued with that German arrogance which believes 
that it can do everything and can dictate its laws to the 
whole of the world because it had once conquered a part 
of it. With few exceptions they were men who, when 
brought into contact with the really great world, were 
incapable of holding their own amongst it. 

In the course of the last six or eight years German 
diplomacy has accumulated so many mistakes that I do 
not think it a libel to call it one of the most incapable 
in the whole of Europe. It has shown neither political 
instinct nor political perspicacity ; has attached importance 
to things that have none at all, and overlooked the really 
significant events of a nature capable of influencing the 
future course of German history. It has substituted 
brutality for tact, and in its desire to assert German 
supremacy all over the world it has simply rendered 
Germany so unbearable that, even before the idea of a 
war with her became familiar to the public, many people 
wished in the secret of their souls that something would 
happen to put an end to her arrogance. 

As time went on the feeling increased in intensity, 
and unfortunately for Germany the diplomats and states- 
men, instead of trying to work against this current of 
dissatisfaction, distrust and general dislike which was 
arising against her everywhere, did their very best to 

213 



Sovereigns and Statesmen of Europe 

intensify it by the insolent and overbearing manner with 
which they simply swept before them everything and 
everybody who ventured not to admire indiscriminately 
all that she did, said, thought or imagined. 

The German Foreign Office saw many changes in its 
chief until the advent of Herr von Jagow, while above 
him the Chancellor Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg exercised 
supreme control over Germany's policy abroad. The 
doctor was no more a diplomat than Herr von Jagow, 
or Count von Pourtales in Petrograd, or Baron von 
Schoen in Paris. All these men, with a touching 
unanimity, failed to see the seriousness of the situation 
after the Austrian ultimatum, and, either on purpose or 
through simple incapacity, aggravated it by the light- 
hearted manner with which they seemed to treat the 
whole affair. 

The German Chancellor himself proved to be a very 
novice in the science so dear to the hearts of Talleyrand 
and of Metternich, and allowed himself to be completely 
misled by the reports of subordinates who were less clear- 
sighted even than himself. Prince Bismarck, had he been 
alive, would have felt himself more than avenged for his 
arrogant dismissal in watching the many blunders and 
errors committed by the man occupying the place which 
he had filled so brilliantly for more than a quarter of a 
century. 

Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg, however, had one great 
advantage : he was a truthful man, who never hesitated 
to call a spade a spade, and who sacrificed his reputation 

214 



Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg 

to his love for sincerity. His famous declaration, repeated 
by Herr von Jagow, that Germany knew she had com- 
mitted a crime in not respecting the neutrality of Bel- 
gium, was a diplomatic blunder for which both he and 
Germany will have to pay a heavy price later on. It 
was so characteristic of German brutality that it proved 
to those who had not yet noticed the circumstance, that 
in spite of his charming manners, politeness and know- 
ledge of the world, Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg lacked 
delicacy, tact and consideration. He blurted out the 
truth simply because he w T as proud of the consciousness 
of the brute force it emphasised. This same feeling has 
caused the present war to be so brutal — it became so 
largely because of the clumsiness of the German Foreign 
Office, which rushed headlong down the course its leaders 
had made up their minds to follow, without taking the 
slightest trouble to hide their intentions or to attenuate 
the crimes committed in the course of the conflict. 

In a similar situation to Bethmann-Hollweg, and with 
the same intention in mind, Bismarck would certainly 
have manipulated things so that Europe would declare 
war upon Germany, and have, therefore, proclaimed 
Europe as the aggressor. Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg 
contented himself by repeating the lie which had been 
set afloat by the Press and the Government : that 
Russia had attacked Germany ; an assertion which no 
one believed, and which only added insult to the many 
injuries that had been inflicted by Prussia on her 
neighbours. 

215 



Sovereigns and Statesmen of Europe 

Personally, the German Chancellor is a quiet, serious- 
looking man who would have made an excellent professor 
of philosophy or of history at a University, where his 
conservative views would have kept him in a stage of 
honest, painstaking mediocrity. He could have taught 
with success where his pupils were not too inquisitive as 
to the why and wherefore of things, and would have 
imbued them with that middle-class spirit which per- 
vades all his actions and which has made him such an 
excellent official and such a poor statesman. His vision 
seldom goes beyond the horizon, and he lacks originality 
to an extent which is sometimes pitiful and mostly amus- 
ing. His attitude during the coming congress, if he 
has not fallen from the favour of the Emperor before 
then, will be a purely passive one. 

Herr von Jagow is quite a different kind of man from 
his chief. He is a bustling sort of creature, very intrigu- 
ing, very active, very busy with what does not concern 
him, and very much convinced as to his personal import- 
ance. He is not so frank as Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg, 
and he tries to be very sharp and very observant, 
giving himself the airs of a Bismarck in miniature, whose 
different sayings he is very fond of repeating and quot- 
ing, sometimes quite unnecessarily and sometimes quite 
wrongly. 

At the beginning of the European crisis he tried to 
imitate the Great Chancellor in equivocating and delay- 
ing matters in the hope that the conflict might break out 
before he gave his reply to propositions that might have 

216 



The Austrian Ultimatum 

helped to avert war. Thus, for instance, when Sir 
Edward Goschen, on the 27th of July, 1914, communi- 
cated to the German Secretary of State the proposal 
formulated by Sir Edward Grey of a conference of the 
four great Powers, to which would be submitted the 
various incidents that had arisen between Austria and 
Servia, Herr von Jagow hesitated, seemed embarrassed 
to give an answer to this offer, declared that he had to 
consult the Chancellor, and at last managed to delay this 
answer until the beginning of the war rendered it useless. 
In doing so he imagined he was very clever. In 
reality his conduct only emphasised the very fact which 
he had always denied : that of Germany's intention to 
go to war, coute que cotite. It was a piteous, a stupid, 
and an underhand procedure which nothing justified, and 
which in some details was so naive that one could only 
smile had the whole matter not been so terribly serious. 
How can one, for instance, qualify the remark of this 
would-be Richelieu to the French Ambassador, M. 
Cambon, when on the 27th of July, answering the 
latter's observation that the Servian reply to the Austrian 
ultimatum was an entirely satisfactory one, he merely 
said that he had not had time yet to acquaint himself 
with the contents of this reply, that had been, it must 
not be forgotten, handed to the Austrian Minister in 
Belgrr.de on the 25th of July — two days earlier? One 
can only wonder whether in making it Herr von Jagow 
wanted to amuse himself at M. Cambon's expense or 
whether he was taking him for a fool. 

217 



Sovereigns and Statesmen of Europe 

Such conduct proves to what extent German diplo- 
macy had degenerated since the days of Bismarck. One 
can imagine what a singular part Germany will play at 
a congress if her only representatives are of such poor 
calibre. Dismissing, then, Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg 
and Herr von Jagow, one can only remember Prince 
Lichnowsky and Baron von Tschirsky as diplomats who 
could defend her interests with any chance of success. 

The Prince is far too grand to consent for a second 
time to run the chance of being duped by the Wilhelm- 
strasse as to its real intentions, as he most undoubtedly 
was last year in London. Baron von Tschirsky, though 
extremely clever, is not popular either in Court circles 
in Berlin, or among his colleagues, or with his imme- 
diate superiors. As an Ambassador he has shown more 
discrimination than most of his colleagues, and though 
his conduct in Vienna since the murder of the Archduke 
Francis Ferdinand could be criticised in most severe 
terms, yet it must be acknowledged that he admirably 
fulfilled the task that he had been set to accomplish : that 
of driving Austria to be the apparent cause of the war. 
Sir Maurice de Bunsen was perfectly right in concluding 
from the conduct of Baron von Tschirsky, and especially 
from his repeated and persistent refusal to join his efforts 
to those of the other Foreign Ambassadors at Vienna in 
seeking a peaceful solution, that from the very outset 
of the crisis his attention had been entirely directed to 
securing an open rupture between Austria and Russia, 
and in this way afford Germany the opportunity she had 

218 



Count Berchtold is Afraid 

been seeking to start hostilities. That he did not even 
think it necessary to consult Austria about her own affairs 
is seen by the following incident. When M. Sazonov 
asked the Austrian Government simply to eliminate 
from its ultimatum all the points that touched upon the 
sovereign rights of Servia as an independent kingdom, in 
return for which Russia declared herself ready to stop 
her military preparations, Herr von Jagow refused even 
to transmit this offer to Vienna, and dismissed it curtly 
with the remark that it was entirely unacceptable and 
beneath the dignity of the Austro-Hungarian Govern- 
ment to consider. 

I have heard from a source that I have reason to think 
well informed, that even Count Berchtold was over- 
whelmed by the responsibility which Austria, backed 
by Germany, was taking upon her shoulders. Only 
at last he allowed himself to be half convinced by the 
representations which were made to him from London, 
Paris, and Rome, that it would be well to make an effort 
to meet Russia half-way, and had consequently authorised 
the Austrian Ambassador in Petrograd, Count Szapary, 
to open once more the negotiations that had been aban- 
doned between him and M. Sazonov. 

When the fact was communicated to Baron von 
Tschirsky, he protested with unstinted vehemence against 
such " criminal weakness," as he termed it, and hastened 
to inform Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg of the " pusil- 
lanimity " of the Ball Platz. It seems that it was after 

the reception of his dispatch upon the subject that Baron 

219 



Sovereigns and Statesmen of Europe 

von Schoen in Paris, and Count von Pourtales in Petro- 
grad, were instructed to present the two ultimatums by 
the means of which Germany at last unmasked her 
batteries in the clumsy way which has seemed inseparable 
to every step taken by her diplomats. 

It is much to be regretted that when the complica- 
tions that brought about the war broke out, Prince 
Radolin was no longer at the Paris Embassy, having 
already retired from public life. Prince Radolin was a 
diplomat of the old school, who had studied under Prince 
von Bismarck, and indeed had been among the few 
favourites of the late Chancellor. He was a man with 
considerable experience, an excellent knowledge of 
foreign politics, and owing to his Polish extraction 
devoid of Prussian arrogance. Prince Radolin might — 
I do not say he would — have found a means of concilia- 
tion which, if it had not prevented the war, would at 
least have circumscribed it within certain limits. He 
was liked in Paris, where he had many relatives on his 
wife's side, the Princess Radolin's mother having been 
the daughter of Alexandre de Talleyrand-Perigord, Duke 
of Dino. 

Prince Radolin would most certainly have softened 

the tone of the demands formulated by Berlin, and met 

half-way any overtures that might have been made to 

him by the French Government in the cause of peace. 

He was trusted by the statesmen of Europe, and that in 

itself was a great thing. 

Baron von Schoen, on the other hand, was not a 

220 



Baron von Schoen 

persona grata in French political circles nor in French 
Society, and, moreover, had acquired during his short 
tenure of the Foreign Office in Berlin the reputation of 
understanding far more of the rules of tennis than of the 
intricacies of politics. The Baron's strong German ac- 
cent, too, predisposed people against him. 

During the period the preludes of the great drama 
that was to shake the world were being played the 
conduct of Baron von Schoen was singular. It seemed 
as though he had received instructions to do all that 
he could to get himself insulted by the Parisian mob 
in order that the contretemps could be construed as 
a casus belli, and so excuse an immediate attack upon 
France at a time when she was unprepared for un- 
expected aggression. It is to the honour of Paris that 
throughout this painful time it preserved an attitude 
of perfect dignity and remarkable self-control. Baron 
von Schoen would have dearly liked to become a hero, 
but found himself reduced to the sorry satisfaction of 
delivering, with a brutality he did not even attempt to 
palliate by politeness, first the Note addressed by the 
German Government to the Republic demanding to 
know within eighteen hours whether, in the case of a 
Russo-German war, France would remain neutral, and, 
later on, on the 3rd of August, 1914, the declaration of 
war based on the absurd pretext that French aviators 
had committed hostile acts in Germany and had violated 
the neutrality of Belgium. Surely an ambassador pos- 
sessed of experience in international relations would have 

221 



Sovereigns and Statesmen of Europe 

tried to persuade his Government to find a more plausible 
subject upon which to quarrel with France. 

So much for Baron von Schoen. He showed himself 
an excellent servant but a tactless diplomat. There can 
be no question of ever entrusting him with the interests 
of his country during the future congress, but it is not 
beyond the limits of probability that Count von Pourtales 
will be asked to attend. 

Count von Pourtales speaks excellent French, has 
delightful manners, and can write in another language 
than his own without a single error, which is more than 
most German diplomats can boast. 

It is my opinion that Count von Pourtales completely 
misunderstood the Russian character in spite of the ten 
years or so which he spent in Petrograd. He never 
realised what was going on around him, nor the great 
importance of the mission with which M. Delcasse was 
entrusted when he was persuaded to accept the post of 
representative of the Republic at the Court of the Tsar. 
He had preconceived ideas as to the efforts made by 
France, and especially by the French Press, to persuade 
Russia that she ought to prepare herself for the eventu- 
ality of a war, but he attributed to them a success to 
which, unfortunately in a certain sense, they did not 
attain, because events have proved that the military 
preparation of Russia was not so forward when the war 
broke out as most people thought. But, with it all, Count 
von Pourtales was firm in his conviction that Russia would 
never dare to declare war — in which, perhaps, he was not 

222 



Baron von Wangenheim 

so very wrong, because it is incontestable that the Russian 
Government almost humiliated itself in its efforts to avoid 
it. What he failed utterly to see was that Germany was 
urging it on and intriguing to the utmost to bring it about. 
No one was more surprised at the conduct of the German 
Government during those eventful days than the German 
Ambassador in Petrograd, who, up to the moment 
when he had found himself compelled to hand over to 
M. Sazonov the ultimatum formulated by Dr. von 
Bethmann-Hollweg, had firmly believed that no one in 
his own country wanted to see the end of the good 
relations which had existed with Russia for more than 
one hundred years, and which were based on so many 
common interests, as well as on family ties between the 
two reigning houses of Hohenzollern and of Romanoff. 

When the war broke out Baron von Wangenheim, at 
Constantinople, whose conduct there gave proofs of great 
shrewdness and considerable ability, and Prince Lichnow- 
sky, in London, were, perhaps, the two ablest diplomats 
the German Empire possessed. During the whole time 
of his stay in London Prince Lichnowsky tried by all 
means to efface the bad impression that somehow had 
prevailed in Great Britain for upwards of ten years in 
regard to the policy of William II., and especially con- 
cerning the constant aggrandisement of the German navy. 
Prince Lichnowsky was a nobleman with an almost 
regal position, which he did not owe to his official career; 
indeed, he relinquished office after his father's death to 
take upon himself the cares inseparable from the adminis- 

223 



Sovereigns and Statesmen of Europe 

tration of large properties such as be possessed. The 
Prince had always been considered as one of the Emperor 
William's personal friends, and had shown considerable 
tact in all his dealings, as well as a certain gentleness 
and finesse not often met with among his compatriots. 
He was, moreover, married to a very charming woman, 
who considerably helped him to make the German 
Embassy in London a pleasant meeting-place for Society. 
Being so rich, he could afford the luxury of holding 
opinions of his own, as well as of expressing them when- 
ever he chose. His conduct at the time of the crisis was, 
and always remained, most correct. But — he knew 
nothing of the real intentions of his Government; it 
purposely kept him in the dark, and he failed to appre- 
ciate the spirit of England and of the English nation 
when it found itself confronted by the violation of a 
sacred treaty to which it had given its sanction and 
signature. Prince Liclmowsky was just as much per- 
suaded as Herr von Jagow himself that England would 
never go to war for the sake of a " scrap of paper," even 
though, as Sir Edward Goschen remarked so well, " the 
signature of England was affixed to it." 

The fact was that the Wilhelmstrasse was still under 
the delusion that England would always maintain the 
attitude of splendid isolation favoured by Lord Salisbury, 
and that she would never, under any pretext whatever, 
allow herself to be entangled in the complications and 
adventures of a European war. Germany firmly believed 
that England was far too selfish to lend any other aid 

--4 



A British Precedent 

than fine promises and fine words to any allies that she 
might have, and that she would never draw the sword 
o? . behalf of anyone for fear of compromising either her 
prestige or her personal welfare and comfort. Therein 
existed the initial mistake in the whole ghastly business, 
and surely if Germany had possessed diplomats or states- 
men worthy of the name she should have avoided it. 
Their blindness is the more remarkable because they had 
the precedent of 1870. In that year the German Staff 
wanted to obtain a free passage for the Prussian Army 
through Belgian territory, but Prince von Bismarck was 
the first to oppose such a plan, and in the British Par- 
liament Lord Granville, in the House of Lords, and Mr. 
Gladstone, in the Commons, declared that under no 
pretext whatever would England allow the neutrality of 
Belgium to be violated. Mr. Gladstone, in almost the 
same words as Mr. Asquith in 1914, said that any attack 
committed against Belgium would be "the direst crime 
that ever stained the pages of history." 

If the German Foreign Office had taken the trouble 
to act on the advice of the great Catherine of Russia, 
and studied " the future in the history of the past," it 
would have recognised this fact, and not undervalued the 
influence that its conduct was bound to have on English 
public opinion, nor believed for one single instant that 
the English people would look unmoved upon the 
spectacle of the flagrant violation of treaties. 

Throughout the crisis German statecraft showed itself 
the weakest and the worst informed in the whole of 
p 225 



Sovereigns and Statesmen of Europe 

Europe. Not only has it branded itself with a reputation 
for utter incapacity, but it has led the German people 
into its own errors of judgment, its own false appreciation 
of facts that have never existed. When the German 
nation realises the abyss into which its leaders have 
allowed it to fall an awful day of reckoning will come. 
It will ask of its leaders, as of old was asked of Varus : 
6 ' What have you done with my legions ? ' ' 

I have mentioned Baron von Wangenheim. He is the 
only Prussian diplomat who has no decisive mistake to 
his credit. At Constantinople he was able to counteract 
all the efforts of M. Bompard, the French Ambassador, 
and an exceedingly able diplomat, to persuade Turkey 
to remain neutral in the great struggle. At one time it 
had seemed as if M. Bompard might succeed, especially 
as Sir Louis Mallet, the English Ambassador, added the 
weight of his personal arguments to those expressed by 
the Frenchman. It is no secret that large advantages 
were promised to Turkey if she would but listen to the 
Triple Understanding and recognise in which direction 
lay her best interests. Unfortunately — and there again we 
see the struggle between honesty and its reverse — neither 
of these two gentlemen would resort to the means which 
in Turkey more than anywhere else plays such a con- 
siderable part in public life, whereas Germany showed 
herself prodigal in guns and ammunition, in rifles and 
officers, and in pouring out money whenever Turkey 
wanted a loan. An unlimited credit also was opened at 
Krupp's, of which Enver Pasha hastened to make use. 

226 



German Undercurrents 

It was chiefly amongst such people as the enterprising 
Pasha that Baron von Wangenheim had made friends. 
The Baron is a man of unusual ability, who under a 
quiet manner and an apparent apathy hides great deter- 
mination and an iron will. He followed with the most 
intense interest all the incidents connected with the 
Austro-Servian crisis. It was rumoured at the time, 
indeed, that it was through him that the Cabinet of 
Vienna obtained what it considered were proofs of 
the complicity of certain influential, though not perhaps 
official, personages of Belgrade Society in the conspiracy 
against the Archduke Francis Ferdinand. It was upon 
this information that Count Berchtold formulated the 
extraordinary and insolent demands of Austria upon 
Servia. 

It was afterwards remarked that during the few weeks 
that followed immediately upon the assassination of the 
heir to the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy there were con- 
stant communications exchanged between the German 
Embassy in Constantinople and the Prussian Legation 
at Belgrade, and that immediately after Baron von 
Griesinger received a letter from Baron von Wangenheim 
he repaired to the Austrian Minister, Baron Giesl. The 
two diplomats held long conversations, the secrets of 
which remained a mystery to the whole of the world, 
save, perhaps, to M. Hartwig, the Russian Minister, who 
contrived generally to keep himself well informed upon 
everything that was going on at Belgrade. Incidentally, 
it is certain that his premature and sudden death removed 

227 



Sovereigns and Statesmen of Europe 

a formidable enemy from the path of Austro-German 
diplomacy. 

The Servian Government could do nothing, of course, 
to interfere with this exchange of views between two 
colleagues, but several people who ought to be well able 
to know the truth continue to assert that had it not been 
for the efforts of Baron von Wangenheim at Constanti- 
nople it is doubtful whether Count Berchtold could have 
been induced to launch the bomb that was to destroy 
part of Europe and completely change the features of 
the rest. 

Upon reviewing the actions of the different repre- 
sentatives of the German Court at the time the war 
broke out, I feel inclined to think that those of Baron 
von Wangenheim, though they may not perhaps bear 
a close scrutiny, will nevertheless appear as the least 
reprehensible from the intellectual point of view. He 
at least understood the character of the people with whom 
he had to deal. He worked for a certain aim, and he did 
it thoroughly, but there was no attempt to deceive the 
public in his actions, and he never pretended that right 
was wrong and vice versa. He was not duped either by 
circumstances, by unforeseen events, or by his own 
Government. He knew very well what was expected of 
him, and tried to perform it to the best of his ability ; 
and, on the whole, among the mistakes and the incapacity 
or credulity of his colleagues, the figure that he cut was 
not such a sorry one after all. 

If Baron von Wangenheim erred, it was on the side 

228 



Prince von Biilow 

of caution, and if he succeeded so well, relatively speak- 
ing, because the ultimate end of his efforts remains to 
be seen, it is certainly due to his personal merits, not to 
any directions he may have received from Berlin, where 
it was desired when the war broke out that Turkey should 
come in at once. That Baron von Wangenheim did not 
obey implicitly the orders given to him by Dr. von 
Bethmann-Hollweg, but preferred to wait for the natural 
development of a situation that his chief would have liked 
to see brutally handled, will always remain to his credit, 
and proves, at least, that he is capable of personal initia- 
tive, a quality of which most German diplomats are sadly 
in want. 

Prince von Biilow also could boast of initiative ; he, 
indeed, took too much upon himself on occasion. I 
have already related how he allowed himself to be hood- 
winked in Rome by Baron Sonnino, and refused until 
the last minute to admit that Italy would throw in her 
lot with that of the Triple Understanding. Notwith- 
standing his occasional attacks of blindness — which, how- 
ever, only occurred when it was against his interests or 
personal inclinations to notice anything that was going 
on before his eyes — he is certainly a clever diplomat, and 
gifted with more delicacy of touch than the generality 
of his colleagues. 

Prince von Biilow was cradted in diplomacy, having 
been at the school of Prince von Bismarck, and begun 
his apprentissage in the Wilhelmstrasse at a time when 
every word uttered there inspired respect and gave rise 

229 



Sovereigns and Statesmen of Europe 

to speculations as to what it really meant. His father, 
too, who had occupied for a considerable length of time 
the position of Foreign Secretary, had been a diplomat 
of considerable talent, whose lessons and experience had 
not been lost on his son. Young Biilow had grown up 
at a time when Prussia was slowly emerging from her 
second-rate position and was preparing herself for her 
future great destinies. This had been an education in 
itself, and its teachings had imprinted themselves deeply 
upon the mind of the young man in a manner calculated 
to influence the whole current of his life. 

If von Biilow had had genius instead of talent lie might 
have succeeded in taking the place of Prince Bismarck 
instead of merely occupying it. Unfortunately, his intel- 
lect, though very shrewd and capable of entering into 
the various intricacies of political life, lacked that flash of 
something, unknown to the majority of men, that con- 
stitutes the difference between real greatness and the 
desire to accomplish great things. The first Chancellor 
of the German Empire possessed the first, whilst Prince 
von Biilow has only occasionally felt the fluttcrings of a 
nebulous wish to make a stir. 

In general, Prince von Biilow is too active, too eager, 
too fond of criticising the things that he does not do, and 
of blaming those for which he docs not care. Imperious 
in his temper when he wants something, he never has 
enough patience to wait until it comes within his reach, 
but snatches it away from those who possess it with a 
lack of consideration truly Prussian. lie believes strongly 

210 



Biilow and Italy 

in his own cleverness, is habitually entirely elusive in 
what he says and does, and is reputed to have no hesita- 
tion in trampling his own expressed convictions under his 
feet if by so doing he can achieve something which 
otherwise he would not. 

At one time Prince von Biilow had hoped to govern 
with the sole help of his personal intelligence the whole 
of that vast structure called the German Empire, and 
he never forgave the Emperor William II. for having 
deprived him of that supreme triumph for which he had 
worked and toiled for many years. When he had to 
retire into private life, unlike Prince Bismarck, he kept 
to himself the indignation that he undoubtedly felt at the 
offhand manner with which he had been asked to resign. 
This reticence did not prevent him, however, from sug- 
gesting, either by his sighs or by his ironical smiles, that 
he considered that the master who had shown himself so 
ungrateful for his past services was hurrying Germany 
along a very bad road indeed. In the seclusion of his 
private life he believed firmly that one day he would rule 
again, and was habitually looking ahead far more often 
than he was given credit for. Even when he had to 
leave Rome after Italy had declared war on Austria, he 
managed to conclude with Baron Sonnino a tacit kind of 
understanding which resulted in the strange incident of 
Italy being at war with Francis Joseph but not with the 
Emperor William. 

Taking all these various things into consideration, I 

should feel inclined, if I were asked on whom will fall 

231 



Sovereigns and Statesmen of Europe 

the choice of Germany to represent her in the future 
negotiations, to nominate Prince von Biilow, Dr. von 
Bethmann-Hollweg, perhaps Herr von Jagow, if he is 
still in office — a thing that a considerable number of 
people doubt — Prince Radolin, whose vast experience 
and thorough knowledge of Polish affairs would prove 
most useful in an assembly where the fate of Poland 
must come under discussion ; Baron von Wangenheim, 
most undoubtedly ; Prince Lichnowsky, probably ; and 
one or two of the more prominent military personalities. 
Apart from these men I only see Count von Pourtales, 
or Count Bernstorff, or Baron von Tschirsky, whose 
presence would, however, be more useful in Vienna, as 
somebody will be wanted to infuse into the mind of the 
Emperor Francis Joseph a proper conviction of the line 
of conduct that he ought to follow when called upon to 
give an opinion or a reply concerning matters which the 
congress will submit to him. 



232 



IX 
ENGLAND 

WHEN the full story of the Great War comes 
to be written in its rude nakedness, and history 
is asked to pronounce its verdict, the responsibilities 
of each of the different nations who took part in it will 
be fixed with dispassionate justice, as they ought to be, 
but could not be at a time when the struggle was raging 
in its abominable and merciless fury. On that day it 
will be seen that all the countries involved, with the 
exception of England, had interested motives, either of 
aggression or of defence, that made them rush into 
the fray. England alone went to war for the honour 
of her signature. England gave to a sceptic and selfish 
world a noble example of disinterestedness and of chivalry 
which will be written in the pages of her national existence 
in letters of gold and will remain engraved in her memory 
with tears of blood. 

I am laying particular stress upon the unselfishness 
'that characterised the whole conduct of England all 
through the trying days when the destinies of Europe 
hung in the balance, because to those who did not know 
the true heart of Great Britain it came in the light of a 
surprise. Being of foreign birth, and having spent most 

233 



Sovereigns and Statesmen of Europe 

of my life on the Continent, I can say with authority that 
English policy had always been considered abroad as being 
directed by motives of personal interest, and few believed 
she could be capable of rising to the heights of heroism 
upon which she stood for such a long time without flinch- 
ing and without one single moment of weakness from the 
day she declared war. Such an example of glorious 
abnegation will be appreciated by history as it deserves, 
even if the present generation fails to see the real and 
splendid beauty of such conduct. England has well 
deserved of humanity during this crisis, not only from the 
moral point of view, but also by the ability and shrewd- 
ness of her statesmen, the enthusiasm of the nation, and, 
lastly, the spirit of self-sacrifice that has inspired all her 
actions, her coolness, presence of mind, and impartial 
common sense. 

With an inflexibility of purpose worthy of his great 
character, Sir Edward Grey, whenever Herr von Jagow 
or Count Berchtold tried to avoid giving a definite reply 
to straightforward questions, brought matters back to the 
point, and refused to allow idle sophisms to divert atten- 
tion from the main issue. 

This is not mere friendly flattery, but exact truth, as 
can be traced in the various Blue, Orange or Yellow 
books published by the different chancelleries of Europe. 
One, indeed, cannot restrain an expression of admiration 
for the clear-sightedness of the English diplomats and the 
patience with which Downing Street sought to dissipate 
any errors that might have arisen to prevent people from 

234 



King George V 

grasping the real issues at stake. Unfortunately, Great 
Britain, too, had to deal with an enemy who had made 
up his mind beforehand not to be convinced, and who, 
moreover, never believed that Britain would go to war 
for the sake of keeping intact her promise to maintain 
Belgian neutrality. 

England had also the advantage of a Sovereign it could 
respect. In a century when, every day, Royalty loses 
something of its prestige, when the barriers that formerly 
separated monarchs from their subjects are falling one by 
one, the Royal House of England has a secure and grow- 
ing place in the affections of the English nation. 

In his difficult position as a constitutional Sovereign, 
obliged more or less to accept the decisions of his Parlia- 
ment, King George V. has nevertheless contrived to set 
the seal of his personality on the whole attitude of the 
British people, and of persuading them that not only was 
he heart and soul with them in their noble resolve, but 
also that he would never lend himself to anything that 
might be construed as a surrender of right to might. 

The King is a rare character. Rather secretive and 
very discreet, he does not say much, but he thinks a good 
deal, and has an especially strong sense of his responsi- 
bilities as the Sovereign of the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Ireland and ruler of the vast British Empire. 

King George V. knows more of life and its difficulties 
than monarchs do generally, owing to the fact that he was 
not expected to become one, and that he was brought up 
much more freely than would have been the case had he 

235 



Sovereigns and Statesmen of Europe 

been the eldest son of his parents. He began his public 
career as any other naval officer would have done, and in 
the various journeys which he undertook all over the 
world he contrived to observe a great deal and to learn 
even more. When he found himself unexpectedly faced 
with the great change in his position brought about by 
his elder brother's death, he was neither surprised nor 
dazed by it, but began at once, without ostentation, to 
prepare himself for the new duties which were bound in 
the course of time to be his own. He was assisted in the 
task by the experience of his father, who, it is no secret, 
initiated him into the art of government with truly 
parental kindness and tried to make him participate in it 
as far as lay within his power. The late King, who was 
in so many ways the most remarkable man of his genera- 
tion, never felt that jealousy of his heir which has so often 
impaired the good relations of monarchs with their eldest 
sons. He knew very well that the authority he wielded 
could not be wrested from him, and that ultimately it 
would be for the benefit of his kingdom if he showed 
its future King how he ought to rule. 

During the last years of the life of Edward VII. the 
then Prince of Wales used to come every day to see his 
father at Buckingham Palace, when the Court was in 
London, and to work together with him, reading dis- 
patches to him, and hearing his wise remarks upon their 
contents. When the King died his son was so well 
instructed that he could at once enter fully into the 
duties of his new position and pursue the same wise 

236 



King George and his Subjects 

policy that had brought Great Britain into closer con- 
tact with other European nations than had ever been 
the case before. In a word, he could appreciate the 
great advantage of the Triple Understanding, and go on 
strengthening it by all means in his power. 

King George V. quickly became yet more popular as 
Monarch than he had been as Prince, and he and his 
gracious Queen soon attained to a lasting place in the 
affections of the people. He showed great interest in 
the welfare of the working classes, and the journeys 
which he undertook, together with the Queen, to the 
industrial centres of England made him acquainted with 
the needs of his subjects and also initiated him into the 
details of daily life in their several differing conditions. 
He could, therefore, speak with authority when local 
disputes among workmen and their employers arose, and 
more than once it was owing to the King's advice and 
soundness of judgment in the discussions concerning these 
differences that they were settled in a relatively short 
time. 

King George liked to go about and to show himself 
in his overseas dominions, and thus heightened the 
prestige of Royalty in the Colonies, bringing each into 
closer touch with the Motherland. When he went to 
India to be proclaimed Emperor, his presence evoked an 
outburst of loyalty the beneficent consequences of which 
can be appreciated to-day when India has responded so 
nobly to the appeal of the Mother Country. 

King George V. possesses in a marked degree the 

237 



Sovereigns and Statesmen of Europe 

useful quality of tact. He understood perfectly in what- 
ever he did where he ought to stop and when he could 
proceed; moreover, he never preached what he did not 
practise. The simple family life which the King liked 
to lead with his consort and their children did more than 
could have been supposed at first to put an end to the 
spirit of restlessness that pervaded the existence of the 
upper classes in England, where it seemed as if no one 
could stay three days in one place. It still continued 
fashionable to spend one's winters on the Riviera or at 
Cairo, but home life also came into favour, and many 
of the noble English mansions that had remained closed 
for years reopened their doors, and their owners grew to 
love home life with an affection akin to the home-loving 
spirit their forefathers had felt in long past days. The 
influence of the Queen, too, made itself felt among 
Englishwomen, whom she encouraged in domestic virtues 
and the delights of family duties and pleasures. Each 
of the Sovereigns thereby unconsciously raised the moral 
standard of the whole English nation by the purity and 
earnestness of their lives, and when the hour of peril 
struck it found the nation ready to meet it with dignity, 
without fear, and without hesitation or remorse. 

In the matters of government King George always 
listens to his Ministers with attention, and though he 
does not go beyond his rights, or, on the other hand, 
abrogates any of them, he still puts in his word wherever 
he considers it useful, and does not subscribe blindly to 
measures presented for his approval or signature. He 

238 



Standing by his Guns 

reads the newspapers assiduously, so as to keep himself 
well informed as to the opinion of the country, and never 
hesitates to discuss this or that point with his advisers 
when he does not find himself in entire accord with them. 
He has shown himself a faithful servant of his country, 
watching over her interests, and trying to lead her on the 
path of prosperity and of greatness. 

The personal part played by George V., when the 
complications arose which were to lead to the war, has 
not yet been fully revealed to the public. He applied 
himself with a rare conscientiousness to smooth down the 
differences that had arisen between his cousin of Berlin 
and his cousin of Petrograd, and many more telegrams 
than have been published were exchanged between 
Buckingham Palace, Potsdam, and Tsarskoye Selo. 
None deplored more than he his failure to avert the dire 
catastrophe. But this did not prevent King George 
from standing by his guns, and when at last he found 
himself compelled to draw the sword he did it without 
hesitation. Not only did the whole British nation stand 
by King George in this resolve, but he found in his 
Ministers the wise and intelligent help of men of supreme 
ability and clear understanding, who fully realised that 
the stake was an enormous one, and that it required 
unwavering strength and decision of mind to play the 
game upon which the future peace and tranquillity of 
mankind depended. 

It has seemed to me, on looking back over the history 
of Europe during the many years that have passed since 

239 



Sovereigns and Statesmen of Europe 

I was young, that England is the only nation who, in 
this age of militarism, has succeeded in preserving unim- 
paired the best traditions of her diplomacy. One has 
only to read the dispatches to realise the shrewdness of 
such men as Sir Edward Goschen, or Sir Maurice de 
Bunsen, or Sir Louis Mallet. 

I must now ask my readers to forgive me for turning 
briefly to a subject that has already been treated in various 
books by people far more competent than myself to 
discuss it. I am trying to make short sketches of the 
diplomatic work of different statesmen in different 
countries, together with an appreciation of their person- 
alities, and I think and firmly believe that, in the 
circumstances which preceded and brought about the 
war, England acted most loyally and intelligently ; that, 
moreover, all her efforts have been directed toward the 
maintenance of a peace of which she did not despair even 
at the last moment, when everybody else considered that 
war had become unavoidable. I consider it necessary, 
therefore, to refer to some of the efforts of Sir Edward 
Grey and his colleagues to prevent the explosion. 

We must first analyse the conduct of Sir Edward 
from the moment when the Austrian ultimatum made 
action imperative if peace were to be preserved. Dr. 
von Bethmann-Hollweg, as the mouthpiece of Germany, 
has accused the English Foreign Secretary of having 
excited public opinion against Germany, in Paris as well 
as in Petrograd, and of not having exercised his influence 
in favour of peace. This strange accusation is easily con- 

240 



Sir Edward Grey 

tradicted, but it may not be without interest to mention 
a few simple facts which will go far to prove the astonish- 
ing way in which the German Chancellor reads and 
understands history. 

If we examine the details of the procedure of Sir 
Edward Grey, we find, first of all, that as soon as the 
news of the Austrian ultimatum reached him he at once 
had the Servian Government advised that, in his opinion, 
it should accept it without unnecessary irritation, and 
exercise moderation in its reply. The hint was taken, 
as we all know, and the reply of M. Pashitch to the 
arrogant demands formulated by the Ball Platz surprised 
by its meekness even the best friends of Servia. 

Apart from this, the English Foreign Secretary 
upheld the demand of Russia to lengthen the limit of 
time granted by the ultimatum for a reply, and directed 
Sir Maurice de Bunsen to use his best efforts at the Ball 
Platz to obtain it. To this, however, Count Berchtold 
refused positively to agree, an uncompromising attitude 
which the German Ambassador, Baron von Tschirsky, 
did not think it worth while to discourage. Despite the 
unsuccessful issue of his effort, Sir Edward Grey at once 
suggested the idea of a conference. His offer was 
accepted by France, Italy and Russia, but refused by 
Germany and by Austria, upon which Sir Edward — who 
had determined to try every means to avoid the breaking 
out of a war — asked the German Government to propose 
any other step which it might consider effective on the 
part of the four great Powers not interested in the 
Q 241 



Sovereigns and Statesmen of Europe 

question to put an end to the conflict or at least to 
localise it. No reply whatever was given to this sug- 
gestion, which was simply treated with contempt by the 
Wilhelmstrasse as well as at Vienna. Instead, a remark- 
able proposition was made by Germany that Great 
Britain should stand aside and see France denuded of her 
colonies and Belgium devastated. Sir Edward Grey, 
however, did not allow himself to be discouraged, and, 
after very properly refusing such overtures, pressed for 
the acceptance of the desire, expressed by Germany her- 
self, that Austria and Russia ought to be allowed to 
settle between themselves the knotty questions which 
were threatening the peace of the world, the other Powers 
exercising their influence ' ' to allay the mutual suspicions 
of Vienna and Petersburg." 

Any other man would have resented conduct which 
did not- even take notice of the most elementary forms 
of courtesy, but the English Foreign Secretary was 
above such petty susceptibility. He instantly applied 
himself to find something else capable of bringing Austria 
to her senses. And he succeeded, for Austria agreed, 
and Russia was only too willing to talk things over. But 
here Germany plainly showed her hand. There was little 
doubt, after her overt suggestions to England, that she 
meant war, but on the 31st of July she openly proclaimed 
her aggressive disposition by sending the ultimatum to 
Russia. 

A marked difference is observable between the diplo- 
matic courtesies of the two nations. German diplomacy, 

242 



Anxious Days 

instead of answering the British proposal, made dis- 
honouring suggestions. Sir Edward Grey, disdaining to 
notice the double insult of an ignored proposal and of 
the implied willingness on England's part to barter treaty 
obligations for the sake of British immunity, showed his 
intense desire for peace by making alternative suggestions 
for co-operation in maintaining future freedom from war. 
And, when all this had failed, Sir Edward, as a last 
resort, declared himself ready to recommend France, 
as well as Russia, to agree to any reasonable German or 
Austrian offer that would put an end to the conflict. But 
no such offer or suggestion was made, and in the mean- 
time Germany finally decided the question in the way it 
was feared she would. 

Right up to the 1st of August — the day when war 
was declared upon Russia — Sir Edward Grey kept send- 
ing dispatches all over Europe in the endeavour to prevent 
the calamity even at the eleventh hour. The British 
Blue Book contains no fewer than twenty-eight dispatches 
exchanged between London and the principal European 
capitals during the 29th of July and the 1st of August. 

Notwithstanding this determined effort to preserve 
peace, Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg declared in the 
Reichstag that Sir Edward Grey had done all that he 
could to urge France and Russia to go to war. 

How much more clear-sighted was Sir Edward Grey 
and how much better informed were British diplomats 
than the statesmen of even France and Russia, is seen in 
the suggestion made by Russia and France that England 

243 



Sovereigns and Statesmen of Europe 

should declare that she would take up arms on behalf of 
these two countries were Germany to start hostilities. 
Such a course, M. Cambon and M. Sazonov thought, 
would cause Germany to think twice. They were wrong. 
The real situation was better understood in England and 
clearly explained in the views of Sir G. Buchanan, the 
British Ambassador at Petrograd, who reported to Sir 
Edward Grey his conversation with M. Sazonov : " I said 
that his Excellency was mistaken if he believed that the 
cause of peace could be promoted by our telling the 
German Government that they would have to deal with 
us as well as with Russia and France if they supported 
Austria by force of arms. Their attitude would merely 
be stiffened by such a menace, and we could only induce 
her to use her influence at Vienna to avert war by 
approaching her in the capacity of a friend who was 
anxious to preserve peace. ..." 

I make no excuse for having referred at some length 
to matters already well known on the subject of the 
events that preceded the war. I do so out of the desire 
to point out that Sir Edward Grey is the only statesman 
who has shown that he clearly understood the whole 
situation , and for the reason that it is to him that Europe 
must look in the future to settle the terms of peace. He 
is the one man whose coolness of judgment, shrewdness 
of wit, and high moral character will make it possible 
for him to suggest conditions likely to be accepted by 
the interested parties. He preserved the dignity of his 
country under the most trying circumstances a Minister 

244 





X 
h 

5 
o 

< 



Lord Lansdowne 

ever found himself obliged to face. Had Germany not 
invaded Belgium, it is probable that Great Britain would 
to this day have remained neutral. In this attitude on 
this question the British nation was worthy of such a 
great Minister as Sir Edward Grey, and the Minister is 
well worthy of the responsible honour of representing the 
interests of the nation when the time comes. 

Very probably Lord Lansdowne will lend Sir Edward 
the help of his experience, of his great name, and of his 
popularity amongst foreign diplomats ; and it is to be 
hoped that Mr. Asquith will find it possible to join 
them. His trained outlook will be a distinct asset in 
that assembly, to detect the true meaning of whatever 
diplomatic suggestions are made and to probe the real 
import of the pretty phrasings that will certainly be used. 
The dignity and firmness with which the Prime Minister 
dealt with the situation in August, 1914, will long be 
remembered. On the Continent England has had a name 
for dalliance, and probably Germany relied on the reluct- 
ance to decide which is not unknown in the British 
Parliament. They were deceived. In this, the question 
of a nation's pledged word, it is to the eternal honour of 
Mr. Asquith that he hesitated not a single moment, but 
flung out the challenge of right and justice to meet an 
arrogant and cannon-proud aggressor. 

It will be England's duty to take the lead in the 
deliberations of that congress, because England will hold 
the key to the whole of the European situation, and 
the attitude of England that will determine the final 

245 



Sovereigns and Statesmen of Europe 

readjustment after the war, just as much as she will have 
to bear its principal burden. Both France and Russia 
will follow her lead, because they know that England 
has always stood at the head of civilisation, has always 
been the champion as well as the pioneer of progress. 

I imagine that, among others who will be called to 
help Sir Edward Grey in his tremendous task, Sir Maurice 
de Bunsen and Sir Edward Goschen will not be forgotten. 
The former, as his dispatches prove, is an unusually 
perspicacious diplomat, who at once saw through the 
bluff put up by the Ball Platz. He recognised that there 
was another and far more powerful reason behind the 
extraordinary step that Austria had taken of her own 
accord, as it was said, and as no one believed who 
knew anything about the relations existing between 
Vienna and Berlin. Sir Maurice did not fail to warn his 
Government of the intention of Germany to make 
Austria bear the responsibility of an aggression she was 
determined to force upon Europe. In this respect the 
communications exchanged between Sir Maurice de 
Bunsen and the English Foreign Office constitute most 
interesting and instructive reading, and can be advan- 
tageously compared with those that Sir Edward Goschen 
sent to his chiefs at the same time. They throw on the 
whole conduct of the Cabinets of Berlin and of Vienna 
a light which, for the sake of their reputation in history, 
it would have been far better had never shone upon 
them. 

In a congress the experience of these two diplomats 

246 



Sir Edward Goschen 

would be of enormous value and considerably facilitate 
the task of Sir Edward Grey and of Lord Lansdowne. 
It is likely, therefore, that they will be called to attend 
the deliberations which shall precede the conclusion of 
peace. Sir Edward Goschen particularly, having spent 
some time in Russia as Councillor of the British Embassy 
in Petrograd, had the opportunity to come into contact 
with Russian official spheres, and may be a valuable help 
to the plenipotentiaries of the Tsar, who will feel more 
at home with him than with an utter stranger. He is 
a quiet man, with a strong will, who never loses his 
temper, and in presence of the greatest difficulties finds 
generally a way out. 

The task which England has before her is a stupendous 
one. There can be no room for doubting that she will 
pull through, but it is a question whether she will not 
find herself compelled to resort to drastic measures in 
order to do so. The time for illusions is past, and it is 
best to look matters in the face. Practically speaking, 
England is the only nation who can go on fighting 
indefinitely, who has the men and the money to do so. 
England, who, whilst all the other belligerents are 
gradually getting weaker, is, on the contrary, getting 
stronger from the military point of view, more experi- 
enced from the technical one, and more martial than she 
was at the beginning of the struggle, which at first was 
not understood by her in its tragic seriousness, but of 
which the whole English nation at the present day 
appreciates the importance. England can be the saviour 

247 



Sovereigns and Statesmen of Europe 

of the civilisation of the world, and therefore we all look 
toward England and toward her statesmen to guide the 
deliberations to a just and an honourable issue. 

It is not political questions only that will be discussed 
during this congress. Financial and industrial matters 
will also have to be touched upon, especially in view of 
the commercial clauses that Germany will certainly insist 
on being inserted into the peace treaty. Mr. Lloyd 
George will probably have to defend the interests of his 
country as to that point, and it is but to be expected 
that he will give sound, common-sense advice concerning 
this most important question. He will be one of the 
most picturesque figures at the congress, and probably a 
centre of interest for its spectators. His personality has 
always been the object of great curiosity abroad, where 
he is relatively but little known, and his actions will 
therefore be looked upon with considerable attention. 

It is likely that Sir Louis Mallet, and possibly Lord 
Robert Cecil, the distinguished son of a great father, 
will form members of the British mission, the latter in 
his capacity of Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs. 
These names command respect, and not one of the states- 
men who will meet them as representatives of other 
countries will be likely to look upon any of the British 
statesmen and diplomats as men of less calibre than them- 
selves. Their names are above reproach, their achieve- 
ments have sustained the most severe tests, and they will 
stand before the congress as fit men to represent the 
greatness and nobility of the British Empire. 

248 



X 
GOOD-BYE 

AS the time approaches to say " Good-bye " to my 
It. readers I have some misgiving at the thought 
that, all the time, I have been talking of a congress 
and of the people who may be expected to take part 
in it. Yet I find comfort in the realisation that the 
topic is not unimportant. It also may possess some 
element of interest at the present time, when the doings 
and sayings of the sovereigns and statesmen I have 
described are fresh in the mind ; while yet again, in those 
days when the actual congress is being formed, the words 
I have here written may usefully recur to the memory. 

The debates of such an assembly will bring out the 
real qualities of the men engaged, will test character, 
intellect, judgment, diplomacy, as seldom men have been 
tested before. Towering above the personalities will 
appear the sovereigns whose countries have had to bear 
the brunt of the cruelly bitter and desolating war. Those 
sovereigns I have tried to describe as I have known them, 
and as I believe them to be according to their conduct 
in the moments of supreme crisis they have had to face. 
About one, the German Emperor, I have said nothing 
for many reasons. I have known him in his youth; I 
Q* 249 



Sovereigns and Statesmen of Europe 

have watched him in his manhood ; and have come to the 
conclusion that dead illusions are like dead little children 
— they should be left undisturbed in their graves. His 
name will remain engraved in the annals of the world, 
but how it is as well not to try to think. Nearly all of 
us weep over the loss of a dear one who, but for him, 
would not have perished. I have, therefore, abstained 
from expressing any judgment concerning his person, 
though I have said freely what I thought about his 
Ministers and his advisers. 

The great obstacle to a prompt ending of the work 
that will devolve upon the congress will consist in the 
necessity for peace not being quite what each party 
expects it should be. Concessions will have to be made 
on each side. Neither will Germany obtain the advan- 
tages for which she went to war, nor will the Allies crush 
Germany so entirely as they desire. A modus vivendi 
must be found that will put an end to the spirit of 
militarism to which Europe owes her present misfor- 
tunes ; at the same time Prussia must be left some of 
the privileges that were formerly hers. 

In saying this I am looking with impartiality and 
common sense at the situation such as it presents itself 
to my eyes. Both sides engaged in the struggle have had 
successes, and each of them will have to admit that such 
has been the case. It is the work of England to minimise 
these advantages on the part of her enemy, and to enlarge 
upon them on her own and on that of her friends. In 
Germany exactly the same thing is going on in an 

250 




Albert I. 

King of the Belgians 




Responsibility of the Allies 

inverted order. Both sides will have to make even more 
colossal sacrifices than hitherto. In the interest of 
humanity neither England nor France must fall short of 
supreme effort. Russia, for the moment, is gathering 
her strength anew. 

Germany, true to the convictions fostered of old by 
her diplomats at Petrograd, is reckoning upon a new 
and formidable revolution breaking out, the consequences 
of which might prove disastrous for the throne of the 
Romanoffs. This was the reason of her hurried march 
into the interior of Russia and is the secret source of the 
energy with which she pursues the armies of the Tsar. 
She is satisfied that every new defeat will hasten the 
general revolt of the nation against Russian bureaucracy. 
It must not be forgotten that for a whole year the country 
had been told that she was victorious, and that her troops 
would soon enter Berlin. Suddenly she had to learn that 
Galicia was wrested from her, that Poland had fallen into 
the hands of the enemy, that Lithuania and Courland 
were invaded. Germany counted upon the rebound of 
the sentiments of a people losing thus all the illusions 
which they had cherished for such a long time. There 
is one thing which Germany has forgotten, which the 
world must remember : Russia has an invincible strength 
of resistance ; she has an army which for personal courage 
cannot be equalled. The people, too, are full of patriot- 
ism, of faith, of determination to go on until the end. 

It is the responsibility of England to help her pass 
safely through the peril of the present hour ; and 

251 



Sovereigns and Statesmen of Europe 

England, I know, is doing so. The enemy who believes 
he can conquer her makes a mistake. Yet we must 
recognise that the longer our victory is deferred the 
worse becomes the situation. The strength of Russia is 
unimpaired ; her armies retreated in good order, and the 
moment they are able to renew the struggle with even 
chances they can begin again. 

And, now that the Tsar is in personal command, an 
enormous moral force will be added to Russian arms. 
The " Little Father " is leading them, and to the Russian 
he represents Church and State and home and everything. 

There is no denying, as the Morning Post so justly 
remarked a month or two ago, that the German organisa- 
tion is something quite wonderful ; but that does not 
prove that the German nation is worthy to stand at the 
head of the civilisation of the world. Nor will the 
congress prove that the troubles of Europe are over. I 
venture to express my conviction that Richelieu was 
right when he said that "It is not difficult to make a 
war, or to win it. Complications only come when the 
time for making peace arrives." These complications 
have been before me the whole time that I have been 
writing this book, which may, perhaps, prepare the 
public for them by making it acquainted with the 
character of the men who, in all human probability, will 
have to decide how they can heal the wounds of Europe. 

The task will not be an easy one. It will require 

unusual intelligence, knowledge of mankind, of history, 

and of the resources of all the nations at present engaged 

252 



"Something more Glorious " 

in the struggle to bring a happy peace accepted by all. 
It will also require a thorough appreciation of the mean- 
ing of patriotism, in the sense that it does not infer a 
yielding to the passions of the crowd, but setting the 
higher interests of one's native land before even mone- 
tary triumphs that would appeal to the vanity of the 
masses, and make them see laurels where only green 
leaves exist. 

It will require courage, too, that civil courage which 
is superior even to the courage displayed on the battle- 
field, where the example of others and the excitement of 
the fray stirs men to action, for the decisions, whatever 
they may be, are sure to excite discontent in some 
direction. 

Such disturbing elements, we sincerely pray, will be 
overcome, so that a peace may be arrived at which, if 
not permanent, will at least last through several genera- 
tions. Only then will it become possible for the world 
to develop itself quietly and without fear of unexpected 
surprises coming to disturb and to destroy the work and 
the labour of years. Only then will it become easy for 
humanity again to breathe freely. In that happy day 
mankind will at last come to the conclusion that, though 
it may be a great thing to be a conqueror, there 
is something better than this vain satisfaction of the 
moment, something much more glorious and far more 
beautiful. 



INDEX 



Abdul Hamid, Sultan, 195, 207 

Albanian problem, the, 199 

Albert, King of the Belgians, acces- 
sion of, 149 ; his noble example, 
151 

Alexander I., Tsar of Russia, 208 

Alexander III., Tsar, 1 ; accession of, 
13 ; and M. Goremykin, 31 ; death 
of, 3 ; Stambouloff s overtures to, 
138 

Alexander of Battenberg, Prince, 130 ; 
and M. Stambouloff, 135 

Alexander, King of Servia, and Draga 
Maschin, 115 ; assassination of, 
115, 123 

Alexander of Servia, Crown Prince, 
125 ; a telegram to the Tsar, 127 ; 
as Regent, 127 ; at Petrograd, 127; 
his personality, 126 

Alsace - Lorraine, Bethmann - Hollweg 
advised to grant autonomy to, 70 

Angelo, Duke Michael, 191 

Asquith, Mr., 245 ; on the neutrality of 
Belgium, 225 

Augustus, Prince, 133 

Austria, a request from Russia, 101 ; 
accession of the Emperor Francis 
Joseph, 72 ; her army under Ger- 
man command, 108, 109 ; her atti- 
tude during the Balkan War, 72 ; 
her ultimatum to Servia, 55, 57, 
61, 97, 99, 100, 127, 164, 227 ; Italy 
declares war on, 186 ; the Revolu- 
tion of 1848, 73 



Balkan wars, the, 22, 72, 90, 122, 126, 
158, 194, 197 

Balkans, the, 111 

Bark, M., and war finance, 29 

Barrere, M., French Ambassador in 
Rome, 60, 167-8 

Beaumarchais, M., 65 

Belgium, 144 ; a contemplated aggres- 
sion of, in 1870, 147 ; her neu- 
trality : Bethmann-Hollweg on, 
215, Bismarck and, 225, England's 



attitude regarding, 225, violation 
of, 149 ; Leopold I. of, 144 ; 
Socialism in, 151 

Belgrade, 111 ; the Austrian Minister 
asks for his passports, 102 

Beliaev, General, 37 

Benckendorff, Count, 39 

Berchtold, Count, 91, 219, 241 ; and 
Francis Ferdinand, 94 ; and Fran- 
cis Joseph, 92 ; and William II., 
95 ; his dilemma, 103 ; his sym- 
pathy for Russia, 91 ; resignation 
of, 107 

Berlin, the Congress of, 87, 130, 197 ; 
the French Ambassador in, 53 ; the 
military party in, 59 ; the Treaty 
of, 136 

Bethmann-Hollweg, Dr. von, 59, 61, 
70, 108, 214 ; a diplomatic blunder 
by, 215 ; and Sir Edward Grey, 
240, 243 ; his interview with Baron 
Burian, 107 ; reproaches France, 69 

Bismarck, Prince, 42, 56, 94, 146, 147, 
160, 164, 225 ; and Baron Noth- 
omb, 145 ; discovery of, 209 ; his 
attitude towards England, 212 ; 
his fear of a Franco-Russian alli- 
ance, 211 ; his jealousy of rivals, 
210 ; William II. and, 212 

Black Sea, the, 201 

Bollati, Signor, 186 

Bompard, M., 226 

Boris, Prince, re-baptism of, 122, 139 

Bosnia, the annexation of, 89, 97 

Briand, M., 66-7 

Buchanan, Sir G., his conversation with 
M. Sazonov, 244 

Bucharest, the Treaty of, 121, 142, 159 

Bulgaria, 130 ; and Servia, 111 ; the 
mannerisms of, 137 

Bulow, Prince von, 60, 171, 229 ; a dip- 
lomatic triumph, 187 ; and Baron 
Sonnino, 186, 187 ; and Italy, 231 ; 
appointed Ambassador Extra- 
ordinary at the Italian Court, 179 ; 
his changed attitude towards Italy, 
165 ; his secret mission, 177 ; mis- 

55 



Index 



takes of, 180 ; recalled by Ger- 
many, 186, 188, 231 ; received by 
Victor Emmanuel, 184 

Bunsen, Sir Maurice de, 218, 240, 241, 
246 

Bureaucracy in Russia, 4, 9, 251 ; the 
Emperor and, 18 

Burian, Baron, 107 

Byron, Lord, 144 

Byzantium. (See Constantinople) 



Cadorna, the Count, 190 

Cambon, M. Jules, 53 ; a favourite 
with William II., 54 ; as diplomat, 
53, 61 ; his peace efforts, 55, 58, 
217, 244 

Cambon, M. Paul, 60 

Canaris, M., 144 

Capuchin Church, the, Habsburg inter- 
ments in, 96 

Carol, King of Roumania, 122 

Castlereagh, Lord, 208 

Catherine of Russia, Empress, 225 

Cavour, Count, 185 

Cecil, Lord Robert, 248 

Charles of Hohenzollern, Prince, 137 

Chotek, Countess Sophy, 77, 88 

Clarence, the Duke of, his death, 236 

Clemenceau, M., 64 

Clementine of Bourbon-Orleans, Prin- 
cess, 132 ; and the Bulgarian clergy, 
137 

Colonna, Prince Prospero, 192 

Commune, the, collapse of, 167 

Compulsory military service in France, 
46 

Constantine, King of Greece, 153 ; and 
M. Venizelos, 161 ; and the Balkan 
wars, 158 ; ascends the throne, 159 ; 
dangerous illness of, 162 ; his child- 
hood, 154 ; his exile, 157 ; his Ger- 
man proclivities, 154, 155 ; mar- 
riage of, 155 

Constantine, the Grand Duke, 118 

Constantinople, 117, 194 ; the Mosque 
of St. Sophia, 195 ; the neutrality 
of, 194 ; the throne of, 78 



Dachkoff, Count Woronzoff, 3 
D'Aehrenthal, Count, 82 ; and the 
Archduke Francis Ferdinand, 84, 
88 ; and the Emperor Francis 
Joseph, 86, 88 ; as diplomat, 83 ; 
Frau Schratt and, 84, 85 ; his ad- 
miration for the fair sex, 82, 86 ; 
his death, 90 ; his successor, 91 
D'Annunzio, Signor Gabriele, 170, 180, 
181, 185 



Dante, 191 

De Benavente, Prince, 208 
De Caillavet, Madame, 51 
De Keczko, Natalie, 112 
De Wiart, M. Carton, 153 
Delcasse, M., 44, 47, 222; his naval 
programme, 49 ; personality of, 48 
Draga, Queen, assassination of, 115, 123 
Duma, the Russian, 10, 14, 15, 



Edward VII., King, 236 ; accession of, 
212 ; and the Triple Entente, 44, 71 

Eleonore of Reuss, Princess, 141 

Elisabeth, Empress of Austria, 73 

Elisabeth, Queen of the Belgians, 149, 
151 

England, her unselfishness in the Great 
War, 233, 240 

Enver Pasha, 196, 200, 226 

European sovereigns and statesmen : 
Austria, 72 ; Belgium, 144 ; Bul- 
garia, 130 ; England, 233 ; France, 
42 ; Germany, 208 ; Greece, 153 ; 
Italy, 164 ; Russia, 1 ; Servia, 
111 ; Turkey, 194 



Faillieres, M., 62 

Faure, M., 55 

Ferdinand, Emperor of Austria, 72 

Ferdinand, Tsar of Bulgaria, 78, 90, 
98 ; and the Roumelian revolt, 
141 ; at Moscow, 139 ; becomes 
king, 141 ; his ambitions, 122 ; his 
marriage, 139 ; his mother, 132, 
136 ; his reception in Bulgaria, 
135 ; his second visit to Russia, 
140 ; re-baptism of his heir, 122, 
139 

Ferdinand of Coburg, Prince, 116, 130. 
(See also Ferdinand, Tsar of Bul- 
garia) 

Flanders, the Count of, 149 

Flanders, the Countess of, 150 ; death 
of, 151 

Flotow, Frau von, 174 

Flotow, Herr von, 173 ; his request to 
the German Government, 168, 175 ; 
leaves Rome, 179 

France, 42 ; compulsory military ser- 
vice in, 46 ; her ambassadors, 60 ; 
her dignified attitude preceding the 
war, 56 ; her statesmen, 47 ; King 
George of Greece and, 156 ; re- 
organises her army, 45 ; the Ger- 
man Ambassador in, 45 ; the in- 
tense patriotism of her people, 71 ; 
the Republic of, 45 ; the Russian 
Ambassador in, 39 



256 



Index 



Francis Ferdinand, Archduke, 76; 
and Count Berchtold, 94 ; and the 
Count d'Aehrenthal, 84 ; and the 
Emperor Francis Joseph, 79, 88, 
89 ; and William II., 88 ; funeral 
of, 96 ; morganatic marriage of, 
76 ; murder of, 78, 81, 95 ; popu- 
larity of, 79 ; resemblance to 
Emperor Francis Joseph, 78 

Francis Joseph, Emperor, 72 ; and 
Archduke Maximilian, 81 ; and 
Baron von Tschirsky, 99 ; and 
Count Berchtold, 92 ; and Count 
d'Aehrenthal, 86, 88 ; and his 
nephew, Francis Ferdinand, 76, 79, 
88, 89 ; and Servia, 100 ; and the 
Crown Princess of Saxony, 74 ; 
assassination of his wife, 81 ; death 
of his only son, 74, 75, 81 ; his re- 
lations with Frau Schratt, 75, 84 ; 
murder of his nephew, 78, 81, 95, 
96 

Franco-German war of 1870, the, 43, 
56, 57 

Franco-Russian alliance, the, 43, 54 

Frederick, Emperor, 147, 165 

Frederick, Empress, 212 

Frederick William III., King, 208 

French statesmen, German diplomats 
and, 24 

Frontier limitations, the question of, 32 



Galicia, 109 

Gambetta, M., 167 

Garibaldi, 185 

George V., King, 19, 20, 235 ; his 
efforts for peace, 239 ; his tact, 
238 ; home life of, 238 ; popularity 
of, 237 ; proclaimed Emperor of 
India, 237 ; the value of his father's 
experience, 236 

George, King of Greece, 155 ; assas- 
sination of, 158 ; his visits to 
France, 156 

George, Mr. Lloyd, 248 

George of Montenegro, Prince, 124 

German diplomacy, mistakes of, 213 

German diplomats, a strange delusion 
of, 42 

Germany, 208 ; an alliance with Tur- 
key, 196 ; an ultimatum to Russia, 
242 ; and Italy, 165 ; attempted 
intrigues with France, 61 ; her dis- 
pleasure at the Triple Entente, 44 ; 
her aim in the present war, 251 ; 
her delusions regarding France, 
42 ; her wonderful organisation, 
252 ; the spy system of, 42 

Giesl, Baron, 120, 227 



Gladstone, Mr., 225 

Goremykin, M., 31 

Goschen, Sir Edward, 55, 217, 224, 240, 
246, 247 

Gounaris, M., 161-2 

Granville, Lord, 225 

Great War, the, 17 ; Italy and, 164 ; 
Prince Alexander of Servia and, 
126 ; probable representatives at 
the Peace Conference, 19, 24, 25, 
28, 29, 31, 33, 36, 37, 39, 50, 53, 60, 
66, 189, 190, 191, 192, 199, 202, 
222, 232, 244, 245, 246, 248 ; the 
pusillanimity of the Austrian 
troops, 108 ; the Peace Conference 
and its responsibilities, 19, 41, 
249 ; the question of ammunition, 
35 

Greece, 144 ; assassination of the King, 
94 ; Byron and, 144 ; the neu- 
trality of, 162 

Grey, Sir Edward, 24, 39, 234, 240, 
241, 244 ; Bethmann-Hollweg and, 
240, 243 ; his offer of a conference, 
59, 217, 241 

Griesinger, Baron von, 227 

Guentchitch, M., 113 



Hairi Bey, 205 

Hakki Bey, 202 

Hartwig, M., 117 ; and King Peter, 
117 ; death of, 119, 227 ; his Rus- 
sian propaganda, 119 

Helene of Servia, Princess, marriage of, 
117 

Henry of Reuss, Prince, 210 

Herzegovina, the annexation of, 89, 97 

Hohenberg, the Duchess of, 77, 78 ; 
assassination of, 95 ; her funeral, 
96. (See also Chotek, Countess 
Sophy) 

Holstein, Herr von, 210 

Hospitals, Russian, Nicholas II. and, 
17, 18 

Hungarian mutiny, the, 73, 81, 87 

Hungary and Austria, 104 ; dispatch 
of Russian troops to, 73 



Ignatieff, Count Nicholas, 20, 117 

Ignatieff, Count Paul, 20, 38 

Irredentist party in Italy, the, 164, 170, 
180 

Italy, 164 ei seq. ; and the Triple Alli- 
ance, 164, 168 ; and the Triple 
Entente, 60, 167, 229 ; and Trieste 
and the Trentino, 164, 170, 175, 
180, 182 ; declares war on Austria, 
186 ; demonstrations against Aus- 



257 



Index 



tria in, 180, 181 ; Germany and, 
165 ; her curious position in the 
Great War, 188, 231 ; her protest 
to Austria, 165 ; renounces the 
Triple Alliance, 186 ; the Queen of, 
167, 168 ; the question of her neu- 
trality, 182 ; visited by the Presi- 
dent of the French Republic, 166 
Izvolsky, M., 39, 40, 93 



Jagow, Herr von, 54, 55, 58, 59, 61, 
214, 215, 216, el seq. 

Japanese, Russo-, War, the, 10, 11 

Jaures, M., 63 

Jesuits, the, 132 

Jews, the, 26 

Joflre, General, 67 

John Constantinovitch, Prince, mar- 
riage of, 118 

Justinian, the Mosque of. (See St. 
Sophia) 



Kavala, the harbour of, 159 
Keller, Count, 174 
Kluck, General von, 68 
Kokovtsov, M., 25 ; created a count, 

27 ; his ability for finance, 26 
Konopischt, William II. at, 95 
Krivocheine, M., 29 ; personality of, 30 



Lansdowne, Lord, 24, 31, 245 

Lemberg and its conqueror, 36 ; re- 
taken by the enemy, 109 

Leo XIII., Pope, 122 

Leopold I., King, 144 

Leopold II., King, 148 ; and the 
Countess of Flanders, 150 

Liao-yang, the battle of, 174 

Lichnowsky, Prince, 218, 223 

Livadia, 8 

London, the French Ambassador in, 
60 ; the Russian Ambassador in, 39 

Loubet, M., 62 

Louis XV., his intercommunications 
with subordinate agents, 178 

Louis Philippe, his daughter, 132 

Louise of Parma, Princess, death of, 
141 ; marriage of, 139 

Luzzatti, Signor, 190 



Macchio, Baron de, 101 
Mackensen, General von, 108 
Maeterlinck, 153 
Mallet, Sir Louis, 226, 240, 248 
Manchurian war, the, 174 
Manteuilel, Baron von, 208 



Marcora, Signor, 182 

Marie, Queen of the Medici, 200 

Marie TMrese, 87 

Marne, the, battle of, 68 

Mary, Queen, 237, 238 

Maschin, Madame Draga, 115, 123 

Maximilian, Archduke, 81 

Mehmed Rechad, Sultan, 195 

Metternich, Prince, 72, 73, 214 

Milan, Austria's desire for, 184 

Milan, King, 111 ; abdication of, 115 ; 

his marriage, 112 ; separation from 

Queen Natalie, 113 
Montaigne cited, 28 



Natalie, Queen, 112 ; her unhappy 
married life, 113, 114 

Nicholas I., Tsar, and the Hungarian 
mutiny, 73-4, 81, 87 

Nicholas II., Tsar, 1 ; a telegram from 
Prince Alexander, 127 ; an ardent 
patriot, 12, 13 ; and Count Witte, 
12 ; death of his father, 3 ; gene- 
rosity of, 4 ; his affection for King 
George V., 19 ; his Manifesto, 16 ; 
his Ministers, 19 ; his timidity and 
reserve, 3, 7 ; home life of, 7 ; takes 
command in the Great War, 17, 18 ; 
the coronation of, 139 ; visits 
England, 14 

Nicholas of Montenegro, Prince, 124 

Nicholas, the Grand Duke, 19, 33 ; and 
the Great War, 34 ; his military 
career, 33 ; his transference to the 
Caucasus, 35 

Nothomb, Baron, 145 ; his views on 
Germany, 146 



Olga, Queen of Greece, 156 
Olga, the Grand Duchess, 128 
OlmUtz Conference, the, 208 
Orban, M. Frere, his prophecy of Ger- 
man aggression on Belgium, 147 
Orleans family, the, 132 



Paris and the declaration of war, 56 ; 

collapse of the Commune, 167 ; 

visited by the King and Queen of 

Italy, 167 
Paris, the Comte de, 132 
Parma, the Duke of, 139 
Pashitch, M., 115, 116, 118, 120, 121, 

127, 241 ; his advice to King Peter, 

123 ; his attitude regarding Russia, 

123 
Pedro, Dom, 133 
Peter, King of Servia, 115 ; accession 



2 5 8 



Index 



of, 11G ; and his father-in-law, 124 ; 
and M. Hartwig, 117 ; visits the 
Tsar, 125 

Peter the Great, 4 

Petrograd, M. Delcasse in, 48, 49 ; M. 
Viviani's visit to, 52 ; the Austrian 
Ambassador in, 91 

Philip, Prince, 133 

Poincare, M., 61-2 ; a visit to Petro- 
grad, 52, 54, 55, 62 

Portsmouth, the Treaty of, 11, 12, 20 

Pourtalds, Count von, 22, 214, 220, 222 

Przemysl, the fortress of, 109 



Queretaro, the tragedy of, 81 



Radolin, Prince, 45 ; his mother, 220 
Richelieu cited, 252 
Rome, ambassadorial amenities in, 
179 ; the French Ambassador in, 
60 ; the Syndic of, 192 
Roumelia revolts against Turkey, 141 
Rudolf, Crown Prince, 74, 75, 81 
Russia, a false idea of its salvation, 11 ; 
a probable forthcoming revolution 
in, 18, 20, 21 ; bureaucracy in, 4, 9, 
18, 251 ; espionage in, 201 ; ber 
alliance with France, 43, 54 ; her 
request to Austria, 101 ; minis- 
terial changes in, 20 ; responsi- 
bility of the Allies towards, 251 ; 
the Duma, 10, 14, 15 ; the Empress 
of, 6, 7, 18 ; the German ultimatum 
to, 69, 242 ; troops dispatched to 
Hungary, 73 ; tyranny in, 11 
Russo-Japanese War, the, 10, 11 
Russo-Turkish war, the, 13, 196 
Ruszky, General, 36 



St. Sophia, the mosque of, 195 

Salandra, Sign or, 180, 183, 189 ; 
resignation of, 181 

Salisbury, Lord, his attitude of isola- 
tion, 224 

Sarajevo, the tragedy of, 81-2, 95 

Saxony, the Crown Princess of, 74-5 

Sazonov, M., 21, 197, 219 ; his efforts 
in the cause of peace, 22, 219, 244 ; 
personality of, 23 

Schoen, Baron von, 56, 214, 220 

Schratt, Frau, 74, 84-6 

Schwarzenberg, Prince, 208 

Sermoneta, the Duke of, 191 

Servia, 111 ; an anti-Russian regime 
in, 115 ; and politics, 130 ; Aus- 
trian influence in, 111 ; Austrian 
intrigues in, 119, 120 ; revival of 



Russian influence in, 116 ; the self- 
sacrifice of, 129 ; ultimatum from 
Austria, 55, 57, 61, 97, 99, 100, 127, 
164, 227 

Sheikh-ul- Islam, the, 205 

Socialism in Belgium, 151-3 

Sofia becomes the capital of Bulgaria, 
131 

Sonnino, Baron, 180, 183, 184, 189 ; 
and von Bulow, 186, 187, 229, 231 ; 
denounces the Triple Alliance, 181 

Sophie, Princess, 154 ; abjures Pro- 
testantism, 155 ; marriage of, 155 

Sophy, Archduchess, 72 

Sparta, the Duke of. (See Constan- 
tine, King) 

Stambouloff, M., 135 ; assassination 
of, 138 ; Prince Ferdinand and, 136 

Stcherbatoff, Prince Nicholas, 20, 30, 
37 

Stolberg-Wernigerode, Prince von, 211 

Szapary, Count, 219 



Talleyrand, 208, 214 
Tarnow-Tarnovski, Count de, 90 
Tatiana, the Grand Duchess, 128 
Thiers, M., 167 ; death of, 42 
Tisza, Count, 103 ; and Count Berch- 

told, 106 ; and Hungary, 104 
Trade disputes, King George V. and, 

237 
Trentino, the, Italy and, 170, 175 
Trieste, Italy and, 164, 170, 175, 180, 

182 
Triple Alliance, the, 44, 93, 164, 166, 

181, 188 
Triple Entente, the, 44, 63, 92, 93, 161, 
237 ; Italy and, 60, 167, 229 ; Tur- 
key and, 226 
Tschirsky, Baron von, 92, 98, 102, 218, 
241 ; and the ultimatum to Servia, 
99, 219 ; received by Emperor 
Francis Joseph, 99 
Turkey, 194 et seq. ; an alliance with 
Germany, 196 ; and the Triple 
Entente, 226 ; Roumelia and, 141 ; 
Russia at war with, 13 ; the 
finances of, 203, 226 ; the military 
resources of, 199 
Turkhan Pasha, 197 
Turks, the, as diplomats, 196 
Tver, the Zemstvo of, and the Emperor 
Nicholas, 4 



Valerie, Archduchess, 85 
Vandervelde, M. Emile, 151 ; visits 

Russia, 152 
Venice, Austrian desire for, 184 



259 



Index 



Venizelos, M., 159 ; and King Con- 
stantine, 161 ; resignation of, 161 

Verhaeren, Emile, 153 

Victor Emmanuel, King, and the nego- 
tiations with Austria, 170 ; and 
William II., 166, 171, 184 ; honesty 
and sincerity of, 169 ; receives von 
Biilow, 184 

Victoria, Crown Princess. (See Fred- 
erick, Empress) 

Victoria, Queen, 144, 147, 212 

Vienna, the Congress of, 208 

Viviani, M., 50, 52 



Wangenheim, Baron von, 223, 226, 

227, 228 
Wied, the Prince of, 199 
William I., Emperor, accession of, 



209 ; and the Countess of Flanders, 
150 

William II., Emperor, 165 ; a telegram 
to Victor Emmanuel, 184 ; and 
Bismarck, 212 ; and M. Jules 
Cambon, 54 ; and his sister, 155 ; 
at Konopischt, 95 ; entrusts von 
B31ow with a secret mission, 177 ; 
his displeasure at the Triple En- 
tente, 44 ; his mistaken estimate of 
the King of Italy, 171 ; interviews 
King Victor Emmanuel, 166 ; the 
author's intimate knowledge of, 249 

Witte, Count, 9, 11, 12 ; death of, 28 ; 
signs the Treaty of Portsmouth, 11, 
20 



Zichy, Count Eugene, 114 



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